Threat by association:how distant events can affect local intergroup relations by Bouman, Thijs
  
 University of Groningen
Threat by association
Bouman, Thijs
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2016
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Bouman, T. (2016). Threat by association: How distant events can affect local intergroup relations.
[Groningen]: University of Groningen.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the




Threat by association: 




















The research presented in this dissertation was funded by a PhD grant from the 
Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen. 
 
Cover design: Marlies Bouman – www.LotlDesign.nl 
Printed by: Koninklijke Wöhrmann CPI 
 
ISBN (printed version): 978-90-367-8473-3 
ISBN (electronic version): 978-90-367-8472-6 
 
© 2015 Thijs Bouman. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be 
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior 






Threat by association 
 





ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 
op gezag van de 
rector magnificus prof. dr. E. Sterken 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op  
 





Thijs Bouman  












Prof. dr. E.H. Gordijn 
Prof. dr. K.I. Van Oudenhoven-Van Der Zee 





Chapter 1 General introduction 7 
   
Chapter 2 Threat by association:  
Do distant intergroup threats carry over into local 
intolerance? 
27 
   
Chapter 3 When foreign threats turn domestic:  
Two ways for distant realistic intergroup threats to 
carry over into local intolerance 
55 
   
Chapter 4 From global threats to local intolerance:  
The role of superordinate outgroups 
83 
   
Chapter 5 Bad news spreads quickly, good news stays remote?  
The carry-over potential of positive and negative 
news about distant situations 
111 
   
Chapter 6 General discussion 139 
   
   
   
References 165 
  
Nederlandstalige samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 187 
  
Dankwoord (acknowledgements) 205 
  
Curriculum Vitae 213 
  


















In today’s globalized world, local societies host an increasing amount of 
cultural groups. Although this diversification clearly has its merits (e.g., diversity may 
contribute to creativity and innovation; Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007), cultural 
minorities also frequently face prejudice and resistance by host-society members 
(Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, & Verkuyten, 2008; McLaren, 2003; Ward & 
Masgoret, 2006). One prominent explanation for this negativity is that many host-
society majority members perceive cultural minorities as local outgroups that threaten 
their ingroup1 (e.g., Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, 
& Martin, 2005; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). For instance, local outgroups are 
frequently seen as competing over jobs with the ingroup, profiting from social security 
benefits (e.g., Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001), and to threaten the 
ingroup’s cultural identity (e.g., González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). 
However, recent observations (e.g., Allen & Nielsen, 2002) suggest that international 
events in which observers perceive threats from a distant outgroup (e.g., Al Qaeda 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks) might also affect prejudice toward local cultural 
minorities (e.g., Turkish-Dutch citizens). This dissertation will systematically focus on 
these ‘carry-over effects’ by examining whether and how threats from distant outgroups 
facilitate prejudice toward local outgroups.  
The possible influence of international events on local intergroup relations is 
particularly relevant in the current ‘global village’ (McLuhan, 1964), in which the 
media frequently confront individuals with international events that could induce 
feelings of intergroup threat. For instance, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the European debt 
crisis and the Arab uprisings dominated the international media, could be followed 
almost everywhere through (live) media coverage, and often evoked feelings of threat 
among observers worldwide (e.g., Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Antoniades, 2012; De Beer, 
                                                     
1 Within this dissertation we focus on host-society majority members’ (e.g., native Dutch 
citizens’) perceptions of cultural minorities within this society (e.g., Turkish-Dutch citizens). 
Therefore, we refer to the majority group as the ingroup and to the cultural minority groups as 






2011; Tzogopoulos, 2013). As such, one could say that individuals have transformed 
from ‘local observers’ that are mainly aware of threatening events within their 
immediate surroundings into ‘global observers’ that are aware of threatening events 
worldwide, which stresses the importance of studying the psychological consequences 
of these more distant intergroup threats.  
Although these developments have increased observers’ awareness of 
international events, most of the outgroups involved in international events remain 
remote (i.e., observers are unlikely to have direct contact with the far away outgroup). 
Most frequently, international events concern perceived conflicts between the ingroup 
(e.g., native Dutch citizens) and a distant outgroup (e.g., Greeks), or between two 
distant outgroups (e.g., the Egyptian rebels and the Mubarak government)2, which 
makes direct contact with the involved outgroups unlikely. For this reason, global 
observers mainly rely on secondary sources — such as the media — to form 
impressions of the involved distant outgroups. This lack of direct contact makes it 
unlikely that prejudice results in prejudiced actions (such as aggression) targeting or 
influencing the distant outgroup (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). Local cultural minorities, on 
the other hand, are more likely encountered and are more probable targets of 
prejudiced actions. This line of reasoning accentuates the specific relevance of 
studying carry-over effects from distant intergroup threats because their influence on 
local outgroups can be psychologically consequential close to home.  
In sum, threats from distant outgroups might carry over into prejudice toward 
local outgroups. Studying carry-over effects is particularly relevant because the current 
media frequently inform individuals about threatening international events and thus 
affects individuals’ reactions toward local cultural minorities. Nonetheless, surprisingly 
little is known about carry-over effects of distant intergroup threat. Therefore, this 
dissertation will focus on these carry-over effects and, more specifically, investigate 
                                                     
2 Within this dissertation an international event is defined as an event that receives 
international media attention. Accordingly, events that originate within a nation (e.g., Egypt) 







when carry-over effects occur, which different types of intergroup threats can carry over (i.e., 
symbolic and realistic intergroup threats; Stephan et al., 2009), and which associative 
processes underlie these carry-over effects of different distant intergroup threats (i.e., 




Carry-over effects are particularly important to consider in the context of a 
globalized world. Globalization refers to a process that connects and integrates 
national and cultural groups around the world (Giddens, 1990; Rantanen, 2005; 
Thompson, 1995; Waters, 2001). Global integration can occur through growing 
mobility and immigration, which increases direct contact between cultures (e.g., 
between native host-society members and immigrants; CBS, 2015); as well as through 
developments within media and communication, which enable mediated exposure to 
groups far away (e.g., news reports on international events; Rantanen, 2005). 
Moreover, through these processes, globalization has brought distant situations nearby 
in such a way that they can shape local happenings (Giddens, 1990). This dissertation 
brings these underpinnings of globalization together as it focuses on how intercultural 
relations at the local level are influenced by information about distant events.  
Although globalization has brought distant and international events nearby, 
not all events are equally likely to receive global attention. Because global observers 
are generally only weakly involved in such events and do not have contact with the 
outgroups involved, they often rely on what secondary sources, such as the media, 
present to them. Accordingly, the perceived ‘newsworthiness’ of an international 
event is an important indicator of the events’ visibility (Robinson & Sparkes, 1976; 
Segev, 2014). Research has indicated that negative and threatening conflicts are 
considered particularly newsworthy, are centrally discussed within the media (Galtung 
& Ruge, 1965; Greenwood & Jenkins, 2015; S. T. Lee & Maslog, 2005; Segev, 2014), 






2001; Trussler & Soroka, 2014). Hence, global observers are likely to be confronted 
with negative international events that evoke feelings of distant intergroup threat.  
In the remainder of this introduction we3 will outline how these feelings of 
distant intergroup threat could carry over into prejudice toward local outgroups. 
Because not much is known about such threats’ influence on other outgroups than the 
one perceived as threatening, and thus about carry-over effects, we will start by 
defining threat and discuss its influence on the outgroup perceived as threatening. 
From this, we will move to the central theme of this dissertation: carry-over effects of 
intergroup threats. More specifically, we will discuss how previous research on 
intergroup threats might relate to when and how threats from distant outgroups carry 
over into prejudice toward local outgroups. Thereafter, we close by providing a brief 
overview of the chapters of this dissertation. 
 
Theories of threat 
 
Threats, defined as a feeling that individuals experience when their well-being 
or goals are challenged by others’ actions, beliefs, or characteristics (Riek et al., 2006), 
often occur within an intergroup context in which an outgroup is perceived to 
threaten the ingroup (Semyonov, Raijman, Tov, & Schmidt, 2004; Stephan et al., 
2009). For instance, native Dutch citizens might perceive Polish labor immigrants (i.e., 
outgroup) to threaten their ingroup’s job-perspectives. Moreover, even when the 
threat is too general to be caused by a specific outgroup (e.g., global economic 
downturn), individuals tend to attribute this threat to an outgroup (e.g., immigrants; 
Becker, Wagner, & Christ, 2011; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011). Accordingly, when 
individuals experience threat, they often attribute those threats to an outgroup. 
                                                     
3 Throughout this dissertation “we” is used instead of “I” to reflect that the research described 








Various theories have been proposed that consider such intergroup threats as an 
explanation for prejudice toward the outgroup perceived as threatening (for overviews 
see Riek et al., 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000); for instance, whether prejudice by 
native-Dutch citizens toward Polish labor immigrants could be explained by native-
Dutch perceiving threats from Polish labor immigrants. We will discuss three classic 
theories that consider feelings of threat as an explanation of prejudice: realistic group 
conflict theory, group position model, and symbolic racism theory. Thereafter, we will 
continue by discussing the intergroup threat theory (Stephan et al., 2009), which 
integrates these classic approaches and could be considered the main theory 
underlying our predictions. 
Realistic group conflict theory. One of the most prominent theories that 
considers intergroup threats is realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1958; LeVine & 
Campbell, 1972; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sherif, 1966), which 
focuses on how competition between groups can result in prejudice toward the 
competitor (e.g., Bobo, 1988; Sherif et al., 1961). More specifically, within a realistic 
group conflict, an outgroup is perceived to pose a realistic threat to the success of the 
ingroup by competing over tangible, limited resources or power (Bobo, 1988; Sherif et 
al., 1961; Sherif, 1966). Realistic threats could be illustrated by current debates on 
immigration, in which host-society members perceive immigrants to compete over 
jobs with host-society members, using governmental money, and to pose threats to 
the economic well-being of the host-society members’ ingroup (Esses et al., 2001; 
Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; McLaren, 2003; Pichler, 2010; Zárate, Garcia, 
Garza, & Hitlan, 2004). The conflict between Greece and Western-European 
countries regarding the Greek debts, reforms and repayments could be seen as an 
example of an international realistic conflict (Antoniades, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013) 
posing a distant realistic threat. Although observers from the involved countries (e.g., 
Dutch citizens) might perceive and experience threats, they generally do not have 






Group position model. Somewhat related to the realistic group conflict 
theory is Blumer’s (1958) group position model, which focuses on the broader sociological 
position of the ingroup. According to the group position model, dominant groups 
often exhibit a proprietary claim over rights, statuses and resources, and might 
perceive subordinate groups to threaten these entitlements (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 
1999; Minescu & Poppe, 2011). Hence, group members might perceive outgroups to 
threaten certain prerogatives of the ingroup and therefore become prejudiced toward 
these outgroups. Similar to realistic group conflict theory, these prerogatives might 
concern relatively tangible resources such as property, jobs, or political decision 
making. Additionally, these prerogatives might also concern more intangible 
constructs such as prestige, intimacy, or privacy (e.g., Bobo, 1999). In addition, 
Blumer (1958) emphasizes that most threats are induced by the remote public arena 
and not by first-hand information, supporting the earlier notion that mediated 
information about international events might prompt feelings of threat.  
Symbolic racism theory. Lastly, the symbolic racism theory (Kinder & Sears, 
1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988) proposes that individuals become 
prejudiced because they experience threats from conflicting values, norms and beliefs 
rather than competition or conflicting goals. Differences in values, beliefs and norms 
might threaten the identity of the ingroup (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005; 
Harinck & Ellemers, 2014) and the group’s valued way of living (Stephan et al., 2005, 
2009) For instance, immigrants could be perceived as threatening because they might 
have other cultural values and religious beliefs than citizens of the host-society (e.g., 
Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; González et al., 2008; McLaren, 2003). Moreover, 
individuals might experience threats when they perceive another group to violate 
important ingroup values (Biernat et al., 1996). For example, observers from Western 
countries might perceive threats from the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in the 
Egyptian uprisings as it might conflict with their democratic (e.g., separation of church 







In sum, the realistic group conflict theory, group position model and 
symbolic racism theory describe different types of threat which could be experienced 
at both the personal and group level (Stephan et al., 2009): Individuals could 
experience threats to their possessions (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972), group 
position (e.g., Blumer, 1958), or group values (e.g., Sears, 1988). Although these 
theories seem to complement each other (e.g., Riek et al., 2006), they were originally 
seen as conflicting in their claim to predict prejudice and were therefore often studied 
separately (Bobo, 1983; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). More 
recently however, Stephan and colleagues (2002; 2000; 2009) provided an integrative 
framework in which these threats could be studied together: the intergroup threat theory. 
 
Intergroup threat theory 
 
Based on the realistic group conflict theory and symbolic racism theory, 
intergroup threat theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan 
et al., 2009) differentiates between two basic types of threat: realistic and symbolic 
threats. According to intergroup threat theory, both types of threat can occur next to 
each other, and each uniquely predicts prejudice (for a meta-analysis see Riek et al., 
2006). Because the conceptualization of the threats slightly differs from the original 
theories, and because the specific characteristics of each type of threat are associated 
with specific reactions and consequences, we will discuss both threats in more detail 
below. 
Realistic threats. Similar to realistic group conflict theory, intergroup threat 
theory defines realistic threats as threats concerning tangible resources of the ingroup, 
such as its resources, possessions, and power. Additionally, realistic threats include 
threats to the ingroup’s existence, health, and physical well-being. Therefore, 
intergroup threat theory’s definition of realistic threats is slightly broader than the 
definition of realistic group conflict theory, and focuses on the general welfare of the 






relatively concrete as they generally concern observable and measurable things which 
could be directly targeted by outgroup actions (e.g., Esses et al., 2001, 1998; McLaren, 
2003; Pichler, 2010; Zárate et al., 2004).   
These characteristics of realistic threats have important consequences for 
individuals’ reactions to such threats. Because of realistic threats’ concreteness, they 
are typically associated with pragmatic responses aimed at coping with the threat and 
the outgroup perceived as threatening (Esses et al., 1998; Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & 
Polifroni, 2008; Stephan et al., 2009). For instance, when host-society members 
perceive realistic threats from labor immigrants, they might vote for policies that 
might disadvantage labor immigrants (e.g., high taxes for labor immigrants). 
Moreover, reactions to realistic threats often involve feelings of fear and anger 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), and concern behaviors such as negotiation (De Dreu, 
Harinck, & Van Vianen, 1999; De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005; Harinck, De 
Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000; Harinck & Ellemers, 2014) or aggression (Stephan et al., 
2009). 
Symbolic threats. Symbolic threats are perceived threats to the ingroup’s 
religion, values, belief system or ideology (Stephan et al., 2009). These threats rely on 
individuals’ perception that an outgroup has different values from the ingroup, 
violates values of the ingroup, or does not support the ingroup’s values (Biernat et al., 
1996; Stephan et al., 1999). In contrast to realistic threats, symbolic threats are abstract 
and intangible; they concern valued ideas and ideals instead of possessions. Moreover, 
they are often considered central and important to the individuals’ and ingroup’s 
identity (De Dreu, Vries, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1999; Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). 
Because symbolic values are central to the individual´s and ingroup´s identity, 
individuals are unlikely to negotiate or compromise on them (Stephan et al., 2009). 
For that reason, individuals typically respond to symbolic threats by conforming to the 
ingroup’s norms and values (Cameron, Duck, Terry, & Lalonde, 2005; Jetten, 
Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, 2012; Vaes 







Neuberg, 2005), lowered sympathy (Kouzakova et al., 2012), dehumanization, and 
moral exclusion (e.g., Stephan et al., 2009). Moreover, symbolic threats are more likely 
to result in escalating conflicts (Kouzakova et al., 2012; Kouzakova, Harinck, 
Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2014) and may sometimes even lead to vicious behavioral 
responses, such as torture and mutilation (Stephan et al., 2009). 
In sum, both realistic and symbolic threats predict prejudice toward the 
outgroup held responsible for the threat (Riek et al., 2006) and characteristics of each 
threat are related to specific prejudiced reactions (Stephan et al., 2009). Realistic 
threats are relatively concrete, which enables reactions directed at removing the threat; 
symbolic threats are more abstract, which make individuals prone to react by 
defending the ingroup’s worldview and downplaying the outgroup’s worldview (e.g., 
Stephan et al., 2009).  
Typically, however, the study of different intergroup threats occurs in a 
‘local’, not distant, setting. Indeed, although individuals can perceive threats from both 
local (e.g., local immigrant groups) and distant outgroups (e.g., citizens of a distant 
nation), most studies on intergroup threats have focused on local outgroups and 
individuals’ reactions toward these local outgroups that are perceived as threatening 
(for a meta-analysis see Riek et al., 2006). Accordingly, it is yet unclear whether 
intergroup threats from distant outgroups carry over and influence local intergroup 
relations as well. 
 
Carry-Over Effects of Distant Intergroup Threats 
 
Little research has been done so far on carry-over effects of distant 
intergroup threats. Nonetheless, observations during and after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks might be illustrative for a situation in which an international event influenced 
more local intergroup attitudes. After that horrible event, individuals worldwide 
seemed to not only react toward the group behind the attacks (i.e., Al Qaeda) but 






groups (e.g., within the Netherlands, Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens; within 
the United States, Arab Americans) actively condemned these attacks, many became 
targets of prejudice and acts of retaliation (e.g., Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Hitlan, Carrillo, 
Zárate, & Aikman, 2007; Panagopoulos, 2006; Sheridan, 2006).  
Some authors suggested that the violent extremity of the terrorist attacks 
might have psychologically legitimized (already existing) xenophobic attitudes (e.g., 
Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Das, Bushman, Bezemer, 
Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Sheridan, 2006). Moreover, the observation that 
reactions were mainly directed at Muslims could suggest that observers attributed the 
threat to the larger group of Muslims rather than to the specific group Al Qaeda (e.g., 
Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Sheridan, 2006). These suggestions offer important preliminary 
insights in when and how carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats might occur.  
Considering the when question, these observations suggest that carry-over 
effects occur when individuals perceive an outgroup (e.g., Al Qaeda) as being part of a 
broader category (e.g., Muslims). Indeed, research on generalizations of attitudes has 
revealed that individuals often generalize their attitudes toward a larger collection of 
associated objects rather than only one object (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 
2009; Shook, Fazio, & Richard Eiser, 2007; Tausch et al., 2010; Walther, 2002). For 
instance, Shook and colleagues (2007) found that objects that were perceived as 
extreme and negative also affected attitudes toward other objects that looked alike. 
These findings might apply to intergroup threats as well and could imply that, as a 
function of a distant intergroup threat, negative attitudes are generalized toward 
outgroups that are associated with the outgroup perceived as threatening (e.g., in 
appearance or ideology; Allen & Nielsen, 2002). 
Considering the how question, an association between the distant and local 
outgroups might represent the psychological creation of a more inclusive category 
consisting of several outgroups — a category to which we refer as a ‘superordinate 
outgroup’ (e.g., for Dutch observers of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Muslims in general). 







ingroups (or common ingroups; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007, 2009; Gaertner, 
Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). Whereas the creation of a superordinate 
ingroup might improve intergroup relations (Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009), superordinate 
outgroups could enable overgeneralizations of negative attitudes and intensify feelings 
of threat. Indeed, Allport (1954) already indicated that categories are often large 
clusters of objects in which as much as possible is assimilated. Similarly, Blumer 
(1958) argued that the creation of large and abstract entities of others is particularly 
likely to induce prejudice. Accordingly, distant threats might activate a superordinate 
outgroup in which reactions toward these threats are generalized among all included 
outgroups, which might explain how distant intergroup threats carry over. 
In sum, despite their importance and potential implications, little is known 
about carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats. Nevertheless, recent 
observations — such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks — suggest that carry-over effects 
might specifically occur when observers associate the distant and local outgroups with 
each other (e.g., because they share the same world religion), which might represent a 
perceived connection through a shared superordinate outgroup (e.g., Muslims in 
general). Thus, carry-over effects might be particularly likely to occur when global 
observers perceive local outgroups to share a superordinate outgroup membership 
with the distant outgroup seen as causing the threat.  
 
Dissertation Overview 
   
In this dissertation we focus on the local psychological implications of threats 
from distant outgroups by investigating when and how such distant intergroup threats 
can carry over into local prejudice. More specifically, we look at whether and when 
carry-over effects occur for distant symbolic (Chapter 2 and 3) and realistic intergroup 
threats (Chapter 3), which processes underlie carry-over effects (Chapter 3 and 4), and 
close by exploring whether more positive news about distant outgroups could carry 






last chapter (Chapter 6), we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the 
studies in the different chapters, as well as limitations and directions for future 
research. In most of our chapters, we use ongoing international events to test our 
predictions (e.g., threats from the Egyptian uprisings, the global economic downturn, 
or terrorist attacks), which we will discuss in more detail in the respective chapter. 
Below, an overview is given of the empirical chapters4 (Chapter 2 to 5), in which our 
research questions are addressed. 
 
Chapter 2. Threat by association: Do distant intergroup threats carry over into 
local intolerance? 
 
The main goal of Chapter 2 is to experimentally test whether carry-over 
effects of intergroup threat occur. As was already discussed above, not much is known 
about carry-over effects, and what is known is generally based on observations rather 
than controlled empirical studies. Therefore, we empirically test whether media-based 
information about distant events can induce feelings of intergroup threat, and 
investigate whether these feelings of threat relate to intolerance toward local 
outgroups. Based on earlier observations and literature (e.g., Allen & Nielsen, 2002; 
Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 2009; Shook et al., 2007; Tausch et al., 2010; 
Walther, 2002), we hypothesize that carry-over effects are particularly likely to occur 
toward local outgroups that are psychologically associated with the distant outgroup 
rather than toward outgroups in general.  
In addition, based on the characteristic of symbolic and realistic threat, we 
argue and expect that perceived symbolic threats of distant outgroups easily activate 
such an association that connects the distant with local outgroups. Symbolic threats 
concern threats to the ingroup’s values (Stephan et al., 2009), which make these 
                                                     
4 Note that the empirical chapters were written such that they could be read independently as 
individual research papers. For that reason, the chapters necessarily overlap to a certain extent 







threats broad, abstract, and difficult to ascribe to one specific outgroup. Symbolic 
threats could therefore easily transcend the specific intergroup context and be applied 
to other, associated, outgroups as well. Moreover, as symbolic threats are central to 
group-identities (De Dreu & Van Knippenberg, 2005; De Dreu, Vries, et al., 1999; 
Harinck & Ellemers, 2014), they might be specifically likely to activate an association 
that resembles a superordinate outgroup through which carry-over effects could 
occur. Realistic threats, on the other hand, are more concrete and should therefore be 
more easily attributed to a specific outgroup, which could hinder the psychological 
activation of associations, and thereby lower realistic threats’ carry-over potential. 
We test these predictions in three studies. In correlational Study 2.1 we 
inspect whether perceived threats from the Arab uprisings relate to intolerance toward 
local Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens. In Study 2.2 and 2.3 we experimentally 
test whether reports on the potential accession of Turkey to the European Union 
(EU) induce feelings of intergroup threat and affect intolerance toward local Turkish-, 
Moroccan-, and Polish-Dutch citizens. For this purpose, we manipulate whether the 
reports contain information that could be considered potentially symbolically (e.g., 
other culture than most EU member states) or realistically (e.g., high costs of 
accession) threatening. The results of all three studies are in line with the idea that 
particularly distant symbolic threats are predictive of intolerance toward associated 
local outgroups. 
 
Chapter 3. When foreign threats turn domestic: Two ways for distant realistic 
intergroup threats to carry over into local intolerance 
 
Although we suggested in Chapter 2 that symbolic threats are more likely 
associated with local outgroups and therefore have more carry-over potential than 
realistic threats, we do believe that realistic threats can carry over too. Therefore, the 
main aim of Chapter 3 is to identify what types of association could enable carry-over 






symbolic threats (Stephan et al., 2009) and, accordingly, more easily attributed to a 
specific outgroup (Esses et al., 1998; Maddux et al., 2008), the outgroup and/or the 
threat caused by this outgroup could still be associated with other outgroups and thus 
carry over. In Chapter 3 we identify two types of associations that could induce 
indirect carry-over effects.  
Firstly, distant and local outgroups could be connected to each other through 
a group-based association in which both outgroups are perceived to have similar 
worldviews, cultural identities, or values. This group-based association enables 
reactions toward the distant outgroup to carry over toward local outgroups (even 
though these local outgroups might not be seen as threatening). For instance, Dutch 
citizens who perceive realistic threats from Greece’s involvement in the global debt 
crisis might become prejudiced toward Greeks. This prejudice toward Greeks could 
then be generalized to local outgroups that are culturally associated with Greece (e.g., 
groups with a “Mediterranean” culture such as Turkish-Dutch citizens). Secondly, the 
distant and local outgroups could also be connected to each other through a threat-
based association, in which both outgroups are perceived to pose a similar type of threat. 
For instance, when Dutch citizens are confronted with realistic threats from Greece’s 
involvement in the global debt crisis, they might be alerted to potential economic 
threats from Polish labor immigrants and become (more) prejudiced toward those 
local immigrant outgroups. 
We test these pathways in two studies. In Study 3.1, we use the context of the 
potential accession of Turkey to the EU. We argue that a group-based association 
could explain carry-over effects toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens 
because these groups are typically seen as culturally related to Turkey but not very 
economically threatening (e.g., González et al., 2008). A threat-based association, on 
the other hand, could explain carry-over effects toward Polish-Dutch citizens as this 
outgroup is generally seen as economically threatening but unrelated to the Turkish 
culture (Dagevos, 2011; De Boom, Weltevrede, Rezai, & Engbersen, 2008; Van 







context of the global debt crisis and investigate whether Dutch’ perceptions of threats 
from Greece affect local intolerance. The results are in line with the relevance of both 
associations and their relation with local intolerance, and thus to carry-over effects of 
distant realistic threats. 
 
Chapter 4. From global threats to local intolerance: The role of superordinate 
outgroups. 
 
Where Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the whether and when questions concerning 
the occurrence of carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats, Chapter 4 focuses 
specifically on the how. In Chapter 4 we explore in two studies the idea of superordinate 
outgroups and test (a) whether individuals can psychologically construe superordinate 
outgroups and (b) whether these superordinate outgroups can explain the occurrence 
of carry-over effects. More specifically, and in line with our findings from Chapter 2 
and 3, we predict that a superordinate outgroup can be based on a perceived common 
identity (e.g., culture or religion) or common fate (e.g., similar levels of wealth).  
  In Study 4.1 we instruct participants to construe superordinate outgroups 
based on the aforementioned commonalities from a list of nationalities (e.g., Turks, 
Germans, Brazilians). In Study 4.2, we experimentally test whether a fictitious threat 
from Tajikistan could carry over into intolerance toward local Turkish-, Moroccan-, 
and Indonesian-Dutch citizens, depending on the superordinate outgroup that was 
experimentally activated (Middle-Eastern versus Asian). In line with our reasoning, 
these studies indicate that individuals are able to construe both types of superordinate 
outgroups and that carry-over effects only occur when the distant and local outgroup 








Chapter 5: Bad news spreads quickly, good news stays remote? The carry-over 
potential of positive and negative news about distant situations. 
 
In the final empirical chapter of this dissertation we test whether more 
positive news about distant events (e.g., the Arab Spring) could result in similar, yet 
positive, carry-over effects as distant bad news covering intergroup threats. That is, 
may distant positive events enhance local tolerance, just as distant negative events may 
enhance local intolerance? We argue that although similar processes might apply to 
distant good news (for positive generalizations see Lolliot et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 2009; 
Tausch et al., 2010), good news might have less carry-over potential than bad news. 
Specifically, research on a positive-negative asymmetry in information processing 
suggests that negative information is particularly prone to get generalized among 
outgroups (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) and thus to carry over. 
 We compare the effects of distant good and bad news in two experimental 
studies in which we manipulate the valence of the news report (i.e., either a positive or 
a threatening framing) on the Syrian civil war (Study 5.1) and the Egyptian uprisings 
(Study 5.2). As predicted, distant bad news has a larger (and negative) impact on local 
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This chapter is based on Bouman, T., Van Zomeren, M., & Otten, S. (2014). Threat 
by association: Do distant intergroup threats carry-over into local intolerance? The 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 53, 405–421. doi:10.1111/bjso.12046
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In 2011, millions of people in the Arab World protested powerfully against 
the reigning regimes in their nations. Worldwide, many people watched these protests 
unfold through media coverage, most of them likely living far away from the actual 
protests. Although the protests received worldwide (political) support, many felt 
threatened by this situation and its potential outcomes as well (e.g., the Netherlands; 
De Beer, 2011; e.g., the U.S.; Pew Research Center, 2012; Telhamy & Kull, 2011)1. 
For instance, some felt threatened by the protesters' religious convictions, or by the 
protests’ presumed influence on the world economy (De Beer, 2011). Previous work 
suggests that in such situations, people become more intolerant of the specific group 
they perceive as threatening (Riek et al., 2006). However, little is known about 
whether reactions to distant intergroup threats also have the power to transcend this 
distant situation and influence intergroup relations within observers’ local environment 
(e.g., for native Dutch citizens, relations with Arabs in their community such as 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens). This is an important question because the modern media 
enables the exposure to distant intergroup threats and because local outgroups are 
more likely to be encountered than the distant outgroup causing the threat. In this 
article we propose a carry-over hypothesis stating that distant intergroup threats — and 
particularly distant symbolic intergroup threats (e.g., to the ingroup’s worldview) — 
influence outside observers' intolerance of local outgroups. We tested this hypothesis 
in one correlational and two experimental studies. 
 
Do different intergroup threats increase intolerance? 
 
Carry-over effects of distant group threats represent special cases of 
intergroup threats more generally. Intergroup threat is the perception of one group 
                                                     
1 It is also important to keep in mind that many people in the Arab world felt threatened by the 
possible military involvement of Western countries (Pew Research Center, 2011). However, 
because the studies presented in this paper were conducted in the Netherlands, we use threats 







being threatened by another group (Semyonov et al., 2004; Stephan et al., 2009). 
According to Blumer’s (1958) group position model, threats are one of the basic 
feelings underlying racial prejudice. Often, these threats concern the feeling that an 
outgroup threatens the dominant position of the ingroup on a certain dimension (e.g., 
culture, Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999). Threats are particularly likely to cause prejudice 
when there is a clear and specific outgroup which is defined as a large and abstract 
entity (e.g., race or religion). In addition, those threats are induced by the remote 
public arena (e.g., the media) and not by first-hand information (Blumer, 1958). 
Therefore, threats can be induced by groups in people’s immediate environment, but 
also by groups further away. 
The original version of the intergroup threat theory distinguished between 
four types of threats: symbolic and realistic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative 
stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 1999). However, later research 
narrowed these four types of threat down to symbolic and realistic threats (Stephan & 
Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2009).  
Symbolic group threats concern threats to the ingroup’s worldview, characterized 
by intergroup differences in for instance religion, values, or ideologies (Stephan & 
Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 1999, 2009). In the case of the Arab protests, for 
example, observers from the Western world might fear protesters' anti-Western values 
and their imposition on the region, and, by extension, the world (De Beer, 2011). Such 
worldview threats can have important psychological consequences. For instance, 
modern racism theory (McConahay & Hough, 1976) and symbolic racism theory 
(Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988) propose that violations of cherished ingroup 
values predict racism. Similarly, intergroup value violations and differences relate to 
prejudice (Biernat et al., 1996; Haidt, Rosenberg, & Holly, 2003; Minescu & Poppe, 
2011; Wellman & Tokuno, 2004; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Symbolic 
threats thus focus on differences in abstract group values and are likely to cause 
intolerance toward the threatening group.  
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By comparison, realistic group threats concern the loss of concrete ingroup 
resources, power, or physical well-being (Esses et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 1999, 2009). 
For instance, the Arab protests can be considered a realistic threat to Western 
observers because of their potential economic consequences (e.g., through the 
possession of and control over oil supplies) or their risks for world safety and risks of 
warfare. Realistic threats can have important psychological consequences too. 
Approaches like realistic conflict theory suggest that when groups compete over 
resources or have competing goals, intergroup conflict is likely (LeVine & Campbell, 
1972; Sherif, 1966). Indeed, various studies show that perceived intergroup 
competition (e.g., concerning jobs, income, status, power, or resources) increases 
intolerance toward the competing (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Esses et al., 
2001; King, Knight, & Hebl, 2010; Minescu & Poppe, 2011). 
However, most studies on intergroup threats focus on threats from outgroups 
that are likely to be encountered (e.g., immigrants). By contrast, we focus on threats 
from groups which are physically distant. In those situations in which the threatening 
group is far away, a relevant question is whether such distant threats also affect 
intolerance toward local outgroups that are more likely to be encountered. Put 
differently, our focus is on whether distant intergroup threats can carry over into local intolerance. 
 
Do different distant intergroup threats increase local intolerance? 
 
Surprisingly little is known about the causal effects of distant intergroup 
threats on local intolerance. However, there is correlational data supporting the idea 
that distant threats might carry over. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for instance, 
prejudice toward local Muslim groups seemed to increase rapidly and worldwide 
(Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Hitlan et al., 2007; Panagopoulos, 2006; Sheridan, 2006). 
Despite the situation’s extremity and uniqueness, these studies offer some insight in 
when carry-over effects occur. The finding that people reacted toward Muslims in 







superordinate group (i.e., Muslims) instead of only the particular group responsible for 
the attacks (see also Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Sheridan, 2006). Similarly, other 
researchers indicated that intergroup differences are often over-attributed to broader 
and abstract encompassing ideologies (e.g., Islam, see: Van Oudenhoven, De Raad, 
Carmona, Helbig, & Van Der Linden, 2012). Thus, threats might not only be 
attributed to the group causing the threat but also to groups which are associated on a 
superordinate level with this group.   
Because symbolic threats are by definition abstract and concern ideologies 
which often transcend the margins of a specific outgroup (Kinder & Sears, 1981; 
Stephan et al., 1999, 2009), the symbolic threat itself might activate a superordinate 
category to which the threat is projected (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2012). For example, 
people could attribute the media portrayal of the Egyptian protesters as extremist, 
fundamentalist, and supporting violence (e.g., Groen, 2011; Hider, 2011; Van Den 
Dool, 2011) to Muslims in general and thereby change their attitudes toward local 
Muslim groups as well (e.g., Turkish-Dutch citizens). Therefore, we believe that 
symbolic threats are relatively likely to carry over, and accordingly — as the aim of 
this paper is to identify carry-over effects of threats — we specifically focus on 
symbolic threats.  
In contrast to symbolic threats, realistic threats are relatively concrete 
(Stephan et al., 1999, 2009). This makes it easier to define the specific group 
responsible for the threat and differentiate this group from other outgroups. In line 
with this argument, research indicated that responses to realistic threats are mainly 
directed at the competitor itself (Esses et al., 1998; Maddux et al., 2008). As a 
consequence, it is doubtful whether realistic threats have a similar carry-over potential 
as symbolic threats. This is not to say that we believe that realistic threats do not carry 
over. In fact, research focusing on threats unrelated to a specific group showed that 
activating a competitive mindset carries over into prejudice toward outgroups 
unrelated to the threat (Sassenberg, Moskowitz, Jacoby, & Hansen, 2007). Moreover, 
other research indicated that broad economic threats unrelated to a particular 
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outgroup (i.e., the global economic downturn) increase prejudice and anxiety toward 
local outgroups which are typically seen as competitors (Becker et al., 2011; Butz & 
Yogeeswaran, 2011). We therefore explore the carry-over potential of realistic threats 
as well. 
In summary, we hypothesize that distant symbolic (and possibly realistic) 
intergroup threats carry over into local intolerance. Note that we use intolerance as an 
umbrella term for attitudes (Study 2.1), feelings (Study 2.2 & 2.3), and acculturation 
attitudes (Study 2.2 and 2.3), which, according to previous research, are all related to 
both symbolic and realistic threats (e.g., Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Riek et al., 2006; 
Sassenberg et al., 2007). We tested our carry-over hypothesis in three studies that 
employed correlational (Study 2.1) and experimental designs (Study 2.2 and 2.3) 





At the time of Study 2.1 (March, 2011), the Arab — and particularly the 
Egyptian — revolts were covered extensively in the Dutch media. According to a 
study by the Dutch research organization TNS NIPO, 75% of Dutch participants 
worried about potential consequences for the Dutch economy (e.g., increasing oil 
prices); 68% worried about radicalization and threat of terrorism; and 35% worried 
about trade and business relationships (De Beer, 2011). This is in line with media 
reports such as, for instance, “Live: fear of Islamist plan to take over Egypt” (Hider, 
2011) and later “Muslim fundamentalist Egypt receive 70 percent of the votes” (Van 
Den Dool, 2011). This suggested to us that the turmoil in the Middle-East could be 
associated, at least among Dutch citizens, with both symbolic and realistic intergroup 
threats. Moreover, the Dutch society includes a large minority of Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens that are geographically and culturally connected to the larger Arab region 







over hypothesis. Specifically, would distant symbolic threats from the Arab world 




Participants. Seventy-four native Dutch undergraduate university students 
(59% female; Mage = 21 years) participated in an online study entitled “Turmoil in the 
Middle-East” for partial fulfillment of course requirements. In the questionnaire2 
participants first received basic information on the ongoing protests. Thereafter, they 
were asked to give their opinion on the protests by filling out the questionnaire 
comprising of a measure of the two intergroup threats which could be posed by the Arab 
world (the two predictors), and two measures of different facets of local intolerance 
toward Moroccan-Dutch citizens (the outcome variables). All measures consisted of 
statements on which participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree and 
7 = totally agree). 
Measures. Our measure of intergroup threats consisted of six items about 
threats from the Arab world at the time of the protests (adapted from: González et al., 
2008). These items were displayed on a single page in a random order. Three items 
measured symbolic threats (i.e., “Religious values …”, “Norms and values …”, and 
“Moral convictions in the Arab world threaten Western societies”; α = .95, M = 3.96, 
SD = 1.50) and three measured realistic threats (“The Arab world is a threat to the 
Western economy”, “… competes with the Western world”, “Developments in the 
Arab world might also cause war in the Western world”; α = .69, M = 3.38, SD = 
                                                     
2 This experiment originally included a manipulation of the type of group creating the distant 
threat, which was described as Islamist vs. democratic, plus a third control condition with no 
information. Other than intended, this manipulation did not significantly influence perceived 
symbolic threats (means were respectively: 4.04, 3.79, 4.08; F(2, 71) = .28, p = .75). Moreover, 
an additional multivariate analysis of variance on the measures of distant symbolic threat, 
distant realistic threat, local attitudes, and local differences did not reveal a significant effect of 
the manipulation (F(8, 138) = 0.87, p = .54). Accordingly, we conducted the correlational 
analyses as presented in the paper. 
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1.17). Principal axis factoring with Oblimin rotation (allowing factors to be correlated) 
showed two factors (symbolic and realistic threats), explaining 77.45% of the variance, 
with items loading most strongly on their respective factor (factor loadings > .60). 
These results support the construct validity of our measures of symbolic and realistic 
threat. 
Attitudes toward the local outgroup Moroccan-Dutch citizens3 was the first outcome 
variable measuring a facet of local intolerance. The scale (adapted from González et 
al., 2008; Zárate et al., 2004) consisted of four positive items (e.g., “In general, I 
believe Moroccan-Dutch citizens are friendly”, “honest”, “warm”, “genuine”) and two 
negative items (e.g., “untrustworthy”, “unpleasant”). Negative items were recoded; 
thus, higher scores on the scale represented more favorable attitudes, α = .89, M = 
4.09, SD = 1.08. Second, perceived differences between the participants’ ingroup (i.e., 
native Dutch citizens) and Moroccan-Dutch citizens were measured on a three-item 
scale (e.g., “Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch citizens have very different values”). Higher 
scores indicated more perceived differences, α = .82, M = 5.06, SD = 0.97.  
 
Results & Discussion 
  
Unsurprisingly, realistic and symbolic threats correlated strongly with each 
other, r = .53, p < .001. To test our carry-over hypothesis, we computed a multiple 
regression model, in which both threats were included simultaneously (see Table 2.1). 
As predicted, distant symbolic threat was uniquely and significantly associated with 
both indicators of local intolerance (i.e., stronger perceived differences, pr2 = .15 and 
more negative attitudes, pr2 = .11). Distant realistic threats, conversely, did not 
                                                     
3 For explorative reasons, we included more items in the questionnaires than mentioned in 
text. For instance, we included additional items on overlap between outgroups (all studies), 
general attitudes (all studies), perceived competence, and political preference (Study 2.2). When 
scales strongly correlated with each other (e.g., the feeling thermometers and attitudes toward 
Turkish-Dutch citizens) we choose the most straightforward/concise scale to include in the 







uniquely contribute to the prediction of local intolerance (all pr2s < .01). This provides 
first evidence for our idea that distant symbolic threats have strong carry-over 
potential and, consequently, evoke local intolerance. However, due to the correlational 
nature of this study, it is important to replicate these findings experimentally to enable 
inferences about the generalizability and causality of the predicted relationships. Study 




Regression coefficients of symbolic and realistic threats on dependent measures (Study 2.1) 
 
Dependent Measure Threat Beta Partial r T 
Positive attitudes Symbolic -.39 -.33 -2.96** 
 Realistic .07 .07 0.56 
Perceived differences Symbolic .46 .39 3.61*** 
 Realistic -.04 -.04 0.29 
Note. df = 73 





The main goals of Study 2.2 were to gather experimental support for our 
predictions and to measure intolerance toward different local groups. To meet the first 
aim, we designed a study containing three experimental conditions: a symbolic threat, 
realistic threat, and control condition. To meet the second aim, we chose a different 
context than Study 2.1: the Dutch debate about Turkey’s admittance to the EU. We 
chose this context because, first, Turkey’s admittance can be seen as both realistically 
and symbolically threatening (e.g., Raufaste, Pompanon, & Vautier, 2009). Second, the 
group perceived as posing the threat (Turkey) is relatively distant and most native 
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Dutch citizens do not have contact with people living in Turkey. Finally, three large 
local cultural minorities in the Netherlands (CBS, 2014) are possible targets of carry-
over effects by association. The first group is Turkish-Dutch citizens, this group is 
most closely associated with the distant outgroup Turkey. Because this group has 
settled in the Netherlands for at least two generations and most of its members were 
born and raised in the Netherlands, this group is also clearly different from Turks in 
Turkey. The second group — Moroccan-Dutch citizens — is generally perceived as 
sharing similar cultural and religious values with Turkey and therefore relate to the 
symbolic threats from Turkey (e.g., Van Osch & Breugelmans, 2012). The third group 
— Polish-Dutch citizens — is often portrayed as competing on the Dutch labor 
market, increasing crime rates, and using governmental money, and can thus be 
expected to relate to realistic threats (e.g., Alonso, 2011; Van Haastrecht, 2007). 
Measuring Dutch citizens’ feelings toward each of these three groups thus enabled 




Participants. One-hundred-and-five native Dutch undergraduate university 
students (71% female; Mage = 20 years) took part in a study introduced as “Should 
Turkey join the European Union?”. Students were compensated for their participation 
with partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the three conditions: Realistic threat (n = 35) vs. Symbolic threat (n = 35) vs. 
Control (n = 35)4. 
Manipulation of distant threats. In all conditions, participants read a bogus 
newspaper article about the admittance of Turkey to the EU. The first paragraph 
                                                     
4 We also manipulated the perceived likelihood that Turkey would join the EU, which was 
implemented in the first paragraph of the bogus newspaper article. Because this manipulation 
did not affect participants’ perceptions of the likelihood that Turkey would join the EU (100-
point scale: Admittance likely, M = 47.00, SD = 23.25; Admittance unlikely, M = 48.23, SD = 







introduced the ongoing debate and the second paragraph the threat manipulation. In 
the symbolic threat condition, the second paragraph stated that a recent poll indicated 
that many Europeans fear the differences in norms and values between Turkey and 
the EU, and that many believe that Turkey’s admittance would result in the 
“Islamization” of Europe and changes in Europe’s image. The realistic threat condition 
consisted of a similar story; however, the symbolic threats were changed in threats 
regarding economy, competition (e.g., costs of Turkey’s admittance, taking Dutch 
citizens’ jobs) and power (Turkey’s relatively large influence in the EU when they will 
be admitted). For both symbolic and realistic threats, it was clear that Turkey induced 
the threat. At the same time, however, both threats could be associated with similar 
debates about minority groups in the Netherlands (i.e., competition on the labor 
market and cultural differences). In the control condition, only the introduction of the 
article, without a particular threat, was presented. 
Manipulation checks and measures of local intolerance. After 
participants finished reading the newspaper article, they received the questionnaire. 
Participants responded to different scales measuring different facets of local 
intolerance toward different minority groups in the Netherlands. Unless otherwise 
specified, measures consisted of statements on which participants responded on a 7-
point scale (1 = totally disagree and 7 = totally agree). 
Manipulation checks. We checked the effectiveness of the manipulation in 
two ways. First, we checked whether participants had read and understood the 
newspaper article. This check followed immediately after participants read the 
manipulation and consisted of an open-ended question asking what participants 
thought was the most important message of the newspaper article. One respondent 
from the symbolic and one from realistic condition were removed from analyses 
because the given answer did not correspond to the manipulation.  
Next, six items similar to those used in Study 2.1 measured perceived threats. 
This enabled us to see whether participants not only read and understood the 
information regarding threats, but whether they actually experienced them. Three 
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items measured perceived symbolic threats (e.g., “If Turkey joined the EU, this would 
threaten the current norms and values in the EU”, α = .80, M = 3.76, SD = 1.24) and 
another three items measured perceived realistic threats (e.g., “If Turkey joined the 
EU, this would threaten the EU economy”, α = .59, M = 4.73, SD = .88). To prevent 
that these items would interfere with our manipulation, we included them at the end 
of the questionnaire. As a consequence, this measure can be considered conservative 
as it checks whether the manipulation still has an effect after all other items were 
measured. 
Local intolerance. We operationalized local intolerance in a number of ways 
to assess the generality of the carry-over effects threats (scales are discussed in 
chronological order). First, as our main dependent variable we used feeling 
thermometers (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Van Der Noll, Poppe, & 
Verkuyten, 2010) to measure feelings toward three minority groups in the Netherlands: 
Turkish-Dutch citizens (associated with both threats), Moroccan-Dutch citizens 
(mainly associated with symbolic threats), and Polish-Dutch citizens (mainly 
associated with realistic threats). For each subgroup, feelings were measured with two 
thermometers ranging from 1 (negative or cold) to 100 (positive or warm). For all three 
subgroups, the scores on these two thermometers correlated strongly (rs > .80), and 
were therefore combined to a composite scale per group. Because the items for 
Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens were strongly interrelated (α = .94) and factor 
analysis differentiated between one factor consisting of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens and another including Polish-Dutch citizens (explained amount of variance = 
88.41%, factor loadings > .85), we chose to combine the items of Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens in one scale for multivariate testing (high interrelatedness 
between dependent variables invalidate multivariate tests; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
To restrict participants’ work load, we decided to limit the length of the questionnaire 
by presenting the other three indicators (see below) of intolerance only fully for the 







Second, perceived fundamental differences between the participants’ ingroup (i.e., 
native Dutch citizens) and Turkish-Dutch citizens were measured on a four-item scale 
(e.g., “Native Dutch and Turkish-Dutch citizens fundamentally differ from each 
other”; α = .75, M = 4.44, SD = 1.04). This measure concerned the perception of 
fundamental differences (i.e., insurmountable, indispensable differences), and differs 
from the measure used in Study 2.1 as we believe fundamental differences represent a 
more extreme form of intolerance. 
Third, native Dutch’ citizens dissatisfaction with Turkish-Dutch’ citizens acculturation 
was measured with ten statements, five concerning Turkish-Dutch citizens’ adaptation 
to the host culture (e.g., “Turkish-Dutch citizens adapt to the Dutch way of living”) 
and five concerning Turkish-Dutch citizens’ maintenance of the Turkish culture in the 
Netherlands (e.g., “Turkish-Dutch citizens keep the Turkish way of living”). On each 
statement, native Dutch participants were asked to indicate how well the statement 
corresponded to how they perceived and preferred Turkish-Dutch citizens to behave in 
the Netherlands (adapted from Zagefka & Brown, 2002). After the scores for cultural 
maintenance were reversed, dissatisfaction scores were calculated by subtracting the 
perceived (M = 4.42, SD = 0.77) from the corresponding preferred score (M = 3.38, 
SD = 0.62). Overall dissatisfaction was calculated by computing the mean of all these 
dissatisfaction scores (α = .91, M = 1.05, SD = 1.22; higher scores indicated more 
dissatisfaction). 
Lastly, perceived contact was measured by two subscales (adapted from Zagefka 
& Brown, 2002). Three items measured participants’ perception of Turkish-Dutch 
citizens’ openness to contact with Dutch citizens (e.g., “In general, I believe Turkish-
Dutch citizens welcome social activities with native Dutch citizens”; α = .90, M = 
4.59, SD = 1.12), and two items measured the degree to which Dutch citizens 
perceived Turkish-Dutch citizens to have contact with other Turkish-Dutch citizens (e.g., 
“In general, I believe Turkish-Dutch citizens primarily keep contact with other 
Turkish-Dutch citizens”; r = .73, M = 5.00, SD = .99).  
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Results and discussion 
 
Manipulation checks. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, participants perceived 
stronger symbolic threats in the symbolic threat condition than in the other two 
conditions, F(1, 100) = 7.45, p = .007, ηp2 = .07, 95% CI [0.19; 1.19]. For realistic 
threats (Figure 2.1), however, participants in the realistic threat condition did not 
significantly differ from the other two conditions, F(1, 100) = 1.35, p = .25, ηp2 = .01, 
95% CI [-0.15; 0.58]. This did not mean that realistic threat was absent — in fact, 
participants generally experienced stronger realistic than symbolic threats, Mdifference = 
0.96, SD = 1.26, t(102) = 7.75, p < .001, 95%CI [0.72, 1.21]. Thus, the manipulation 
was successful in increasing perceived symbolic, but seemingly unsuccessful in 
increasing perceived realistic, threats.  
Testing the carry-over hypothesis. To test whether symbolic threats carry 
over, we computed a contrast in which the symbolic threat condition was compared 
to the other two conditions (i.e., realistic and control condition; the level of perceived 
threats was similar in these two conditions, see Figure 2.1). Results showed that on all 
measures of local intolerance participants in the symbolic threat condition reported 
higher scores than in the other two conditions (see Table 2.2). Multivariate test results 
confirmed the significance of this pattern, F(6, 95) = 2.54, p = .025, ηp2 = .14.   
 First, feelings toward local outgroups associated with symbolic threats (i.e., 
Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens) were significantly more negative in the symbolic 
threat condition than in the other two conditions (ηp2 = .05; when groups were treated 
separately, respectively ηp2 = .05 and .04). Importantly, however, this was not the case 
for the local outgroup mainly related to realistic threats (i.e., Polish-Dutch citizens). 
This indicated that carry-over effects are limited to local outgroups with a connection 
to the distant outgroup’s symbolic threat. Second, when symbolically threatened, 
participants perceived significantly stronger fundamental differences between 
themselves and Turkish-Dutch citizens (ηp2 = .07). Third, although in all conditions 







acculturation (i.e., the discrepancy between observed and preferred was significant in 
all conditions, all Fs(1, 100) > 16, all ps < .001), dissatisfaction with Turkish-Dutch 
citizens’ acculturation was significantly larger in the symbolic threat condition (ηp2 = 
.04). Finally, compared to the other conditions, native Dutch participants in the 
symbolic threat condition perceived Turkish-Dutch citizens to have more contact with 
other Turkish-Dutch citizens (ηp2 = .08) and less, although insignificant, contact with 
native Dutch citizens (ηp2 = .02). Thus, in line with our carry-over hypothesis, our 
manipulation of distant symbolic threat indeed increased local dissatisfaction with and 
intolerance toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens. Study 2.2, thereby, 
experimentally replicated the findings of Study 2.1 regarding the effects of distant 
symbolic threat on various indicators of local intolerance and provided support for the 
predicted causal relationship. 
Participants in the realistic threat condition were not more intolerant than 
participants in the symbolic and control conditions together and the control condition 
alone (see Table 2.2; Multivariate Fs < 1.59, ps > .15). Because (a) previous studies 
have shown the effectiveness of the kind of manipulation we used (e.g., Esses et al., 
1998; Jackson & Esses, 2000; Maddux et al., 2008), (b) all but one participant correctly 
responded to the open-ended realistic threat manipulation check, and (c) perceived 
realistic threat was high across conditions, we believe that our manipulation only 
confirmed the threat that participants already perceived. Therefore, Study 2.2 did not 
enable a strong conclusion about the carry-over potential of realistic threats. 
In sum, Study 2.2 found that distant symbolic threats lead to local intolerance 
across different groups; thereby, it experimentally replicates the results from Study 2.1. 
Specifically, carry-over effects only occurred for those local outgroups which were 
associated with the distant outgroup and its symbolic threat (i.e., Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens). Although we found clear support for carry-over effects of 
symbolic threats, our results for distant realistic threats were inconclusive due to an 
ineffective manipulation; we will address this issue in Study 2.3. 
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(a) Perceived symbolic threat (b) Perceived realistic threat 
  
Figure 2.1. Bar graphs displaying the mean and standard error on the manipulation check 
for (a) symbolic and (b) realistic threat for the three experimental conditions of Study 2.2 




Study 2.3 was designed to replicate our findings from Study 2.1 and 2.2, and 
address the shortcomings of the previous studies. To test the carry-over effect of 
distant symbolic threats we again included the symbolic threat and control condition 
(similar to Study 2.2). In addition, we included two conditions in which information 
about both symbolic and realistic threats were given. In one condition, it was stated 
that distant symbolic and realistic threats were high (i.e., symbolic plus realistic high 
condition), whereas in the other it was stated that distant symbolic threats were high 
but realistic threats were low (i.e., symbolic high, realistic low condition). We included 
these two conditions to test whether carry-over effects occur for realistic threats when 
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 Moreover, these conditions afforded the exploration of the effects of 
combined and mixed threat messages. Previous research indicated that the unique 
effects of both threats add up and result in even more negative images of the group 
inflicting the threat (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2005). However, results from the 
literature (Esses et al., 1998; Maddux et al., 2008), together with our results of Study 
2.1 and 2.2, indicate that the carry-over potential differs for both threats. This makes it 
unlikely that such an additive effect occurs for carry-over effects. Contrarily, our 
argument that carry-over effects of (abstract) symbolic threats are caused by the 
activation of a superordinate category suggests that the addition of more concrete 
realistic threats would inhibit carry-over effects. That is, providing information more 
specific to the distant outgroup likely hinders the creation of a superordinate category 
and thereby suppresses carry-over effects (e.g., Becker et al., 2011).    
Thus, Study 2.3 aimed to (a) replicate the results of Study 2.1 and 2.2 
concerning the carry-over hypothesis and (b) provide insight in the potential for carry-




Participants and design. Ninety Dutch undergraduate university students 
(64% female; Mage = 20.41 years) participated for partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental 
conditions. Seven participants were removed from the data because they indicated 
they did not fill out the questionnaire seriously. Accordingly, the data of 83 
participants was analyzed (pure symbolic: n = 20; symbolic plus realistic high: n = 20; 
symbolic high, realistic low: n = 22; control: n = 21).  
Manipulation of distant intergroup threats. Similar to Study 2.2, threat 
was manipulated with a bogus newspaper article about the possible admittance of 
Turkey to the EU. Compared to the threats presented in Study 2.2 (e.g., by 







even more distant and focused on threats specific to Turkey (e.g., Turkey’s weak 
economy and Turkey’s different values). As such, this manipulation arguably 
represents a cleaner manipulation of the two types of threat. In the pure symbolic threat 
condition, a paragraph was presented solely containing statements about EU citizens 
perceiving the possible admittance of Turkey as threatening because of Turkey’s 
diverging religion, norms, and values. The symbolic plus realistic high and symbolic high, 
realistic low condition contained this same paragraph about symbolic threats. 
Additionally, in these two conditions a paragraph about realistic threats was added 
which stated that authorities and experts believe that Turkey’s weak and instable [versus 
healthy and steadily growing] economy and market threaten [versus do not threaten] the EU 
economy. The fourth condition, which was the control condition, did not contain a 
newspaper article.  
Manipulation checks and measures of local intolerance. For the 
manipulation checks we used comparable items as in Study 2.2: (a) open-ended 
questions, and (b) two scales at the end of the questionnaire to measure perceived 
distant realistic (3 items, α = .80, M = 4.14, SD = 1.33; we changed Study 2.2’s item 
“the admittance of Turkey will cost the EU a lot of money” into “the admittance of 
Turkey will negatively influence the EU economy”) and symbolic threats (3 items, α = 
.88, M = 4.52, SD = 1.46). As in the previous studies, the dependent variables 
concerned overlap and local intolerance, including measures of feelings, perceived 
differences, and acculturation attitudes. The following measures from Study 2.2 were 
used without making any changes: Perceived fundamental differences (α = .74, M = 
4.74, SD = 0.96), dissatisfaction with Turkish-Dutch citizens’ acculturation (perceived: 
M = 4.50, SD = 0.84; preferred: M = 3.30, SD = 0.73; dissatisfaction: α = .92, M = 
1.20, SD = 1.30), the subscales for perceived contact (with Dutch citizens: α = .93, M 
= 4.54, SD = 1.33; with Turkish-Dutch citizens: r = .67, M = 5.08, SD = 1.02). The 
two feeling-thermometers for feelings toward Turkish-Dutch citizens were included in 
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Study 2.3 with minor changes to the scale5 (both standardized and centralized around 
the neutral midpoint of scale, r = .86, M = -.11, SD = 0.96).  
 
Results and discussion 
 
Manipulation checks and threat perception. All participants answered the 
open-ended questions correctly. Moreover, perceived symbolic threats were higher in 
the pure symbolic threat condition when compared to the control condition alone, F(1, 
79) = 8.56, p = .004, ηp2 = .10, 95% CI [0.41; 2.16]; and all other conditions 
combined, F(1, 79) = 8.76, p = .004, ηp2 = .10, 95% CI [0.35; 1.78] (see Figure 2.2a). 
The three other conditions did not significantly differ from each other (ps > .44). 
Perceived realistic threats (see Figure 2.2b) were highest in the condition, in which 
realistic threats were presented as high (i.e., symbolic plus realistic high vs. all other 
conditions), F(1, 79) = 9.02, p = .004, ηp2 = .10, 95% CI [0.31; 1.52]; as intended, this 
was mainly driven by the condition in which realistic threats were said to be absent, 
F(1, 79) = 21.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, 95% CI [0.95; 2.41]. 
Carry-over effects for distant symbolic threats. In line with our prediction, 
the overall multivariate pattern showed that participants in the pure symbolic condition 
were more intolerant than participants in the control condition, F(5, 75) = 4.50, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .23. Again as predicted — and in line with participants’ level of perceived 
symbolic threats — participants in the symbolic high, realistic low and symbolic plus realistic 
high condition were not more intolerant than in the control condition. Surprisingly and 
unexpectedly, participants in the symbolic high, realistic low (F(5, 75) = 4.54, p = .001, ηp2 
= .23) and the symbolic plus realistic high conditions (F(5, 75) = 5.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .27) 
                                                     
5 During the study, we had to change the survey software package to keep it compatible with 
multiple web browsers; however, the new software package did not allow a 100-point scale. 
Therefore, we changed the thermometers in 20-point scales. The distribution of the 20- (n = 
50, M = 10.10, SD = 3.69) and 100-point scales (n = 33, M = 47.94, SD = 19.00) was 
comparable. Accordingly, we standardized them separately, combined them, and centralized 







were generally more tolerant than in the control condition. As these multivariate 
outcomes support our prediction that only in the pure symbolic condition threats carry 
over to local intolerance, we contrasted the pure symbolic condition with the other three 
conditions (multivariate F(5, 75) = 2.81, p = .022, ηp2 = .16, see Table 2.3 for 
univariate comparisons). Compared to the other three conditions, participants in the 
pure symbolic condition perceived Turkish-Dutch citizens to differ more fundamentally 
from Dutch citizens (ηp2 = .07), had more negative feelings toward Turkish-Dutch 
citizens (ηp2 = .09), were more dissatisfied with Turkish-Dutch citizens’ acculturation 
(ηp2 = .15), and perceived Turkish-Dutch citizens to keep more contact with other 
Turkish-Dutch citizens (ηp2 = .07) and to have less contact with native Dutch citizens 
(ηp2 = .08). 
Carry-over effects for realistic threats? The most straightforward way to 
test whether realistic threats also cause carry-over effects, is to contrast the condition 
in which realistic threats were said to be high (i.e., symbolic plus realistic high condition, 
the condition in which realistic threats were highest) with the condition in which 
realistic threats were explicitly said to be absent (i.e., symbolic high, realistic low condition, 
the condition in which the realistic threats were lowest). As in Study 2.2, results 
showed no significant carry-over effects for distant realistic threats (multivariate 
comparison: F(5, 75) = 1.40, p = .15; see also Table 2.3). 
Thus, Study 2.3 corroborated the idea that distant symbolic threats cause local 
intolerance. For distant realistic threats, we again did not find evidence of carry-over 
effects, despite a cleaner and this time successful manipulation. Moving beyond 
previous studies, Study 2.3 showed that the addition of information about distant 
realistic threats to symbolic threats decreased (rather than increased) perceived 
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eans and standard deviations for the experimental groups of Study 2.3 on various indicators of local intolerance toward Turkish-D
utch citizens, 































































































































a df contrast =
 79, df error =
 1. 
† p <
 .10. * p <










(a) Perceived symbolic threat (b) Perceived realistic threat 
  
Figure 2.2. Bar graphs displaying the mean and standard error on the manipulation check 
for (a) symbolic and (b) realistic threat for the four experimental conditions of Study 2.3: 
Pure Symbolic (P Symb), Symbolic high and Realistic high (Symb H, Real H), Symbolic high 




Three studies documented clear evidence for the hypothesis that distant 
symbolic threats increase intolerance toward local outgroups that are associated with 
the threatening distant outgroup. We did not find such convincing support for carry-
over effects of distant realistic threats. Moreover, results from Study 2.3 indicated that 
adding realistic threats to a symbolic threat message even weakened the perception of 
symbolic threats and local intolerance. All these findings point toward the relevance of 
symbolic threats as an important source of carry-over effects. Our findings have a 
number of important implications.  
First, our findings extend and broaden the domain in which the intergroup 
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relationship between the threatened group and the specific group causing the threat 
(e.g., Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 1999, 2009). Our focus on distant and local 
outgroups broadens the scope of the theory. Our findings also support the idea that 
symbolic and realistic threats should indeed be differentiated.  
Second, our findings are consistent with theorizing about the importance of 
cultural worldviews and extends this work by showing its carry-over potential. Indeed, 
the appearance of an outgroup as being different from the ingroup on religion, norms, 
values, culture, and morality (Biernat et al., 1996; Sears, 1988) was related to 
intolerance toward other (local) outgroups associated with these worldviews.  
Third, our findings may appear to point to an absence of carry-over effects of 
distant realistic threats. Although the explanation of null effects should always be 
treated with caution, this absence could be explained by the idea that reactions to 
competition are often initiated to remove the source of competition (Esses et al., 
1998; Maddux et al., 2008); thus, the distant outgroup responsible for the threat 
should be targeted rather than local minorities. Nonetheless, in the current studies 
distant realistic threats were mainly included for explorative reasons and hence future 
research should focus more systematically on their carry-over potential (see Chapter 
3). 
We believe that the different findings for symbolic and realistic threat can be 
explained by symbolic threat’s potential to be attributed to a superordinate group or 
category (e.g., religion, culture). Even though one group causes the threat, this might 
be attributed more generally and influence how a superordinate group is perceived. As 
a result, local outgroups which are associated with the superordinate group become 
targets of intolerance as well. However, because our studies were designed to identify 
carry-over effects and did not focus specifically on the underlying processes, further 
research is needed to test this suggestion (see Chapter 4).  
In addition, more research is needed to explore potential motivational 
underpinnings of carry-over effects and to integrate them with an associative 







reactions to outgroup threat are directed at restoring the ingroup’s perceived 
dominant position (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Minescu & Poppe, 2011). Accordingly, 
when there is fear of outgroup encroachment, people might be motivated to react 
toward outgroups in general to reaffirm their overall position. Such motivational 
explanations specifically make sense when these groups are associated with 
dimensions on which the ingroup’s position is threatened (Becker et al., 2011; Butz & 
Yogeeswaran, 2011; Glick, 2005), yet they are not necessary for carry-over effects to 
occur. Future research should therefore investigate the interesting interplay between 
motivation and association in explaining carry-over effects. 
Furthermore, one can consider which specific characteristics of the distant 
group and threat make carry-over effects stronger or weaker. We believe that the 
abstractness and generality (e.g., Becker et al., 2011) of threats and social categories are 
likely to promote the size of carry-over effects because, in those instances, threats are 
most easily attributed to multiple groups. Indeed, we hypothesized and found a strong 
carry-over potential for symbolic threats which could be considered abstract (Kinder 
& Sears, 1981; Stephan et al., 1999, 2009) and often concern social categories broader 
than the outgroup posing the threat (e.g., ideologies or religion; Sheridan, 2006; Van 
Oudenhoven et al., 2012). However, this does not mean that only symbolic threats can 
carry over into local intolerance — in fact, realistic threats may carry-over when they 
are broader and applicable to multiple groups (e.g., macroeconomic downturn; Becker 
et al., 2011; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011) or when they are more extreme (e.g., direct 
attacks to one’s country). 
Finally, we note that replication is needed with respect to our finding from 
Study 2.3 that adding realistic to symbolic threat information might weaken carry-over 
effects. This finding intriguingly suggests that making threats specific to one group by 
adding group specific information to the message conveying the threat may lower its 
carry-over potential, but more evidence is necessary to evaluate this interpretation. 
Similarly, the current set of studies has general limitations such as that we used real 
present-day events and convenience samples. Although both choices may limit the 
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external validity of our results, they can also be seen as producing conservative tests of 
our hypotheses (e.g., Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Nevertheless, future research 
should use more minimal methods and different samples to replicate our findings.  
In conclusion, three studies consistently identified carry-over effects of 
distant symbolic intergroup threats into local intolerance. Little support was found for 
similar carry-over effects of distant realistic threats. These findings are especially 
important keeping in mind that many intergroup threats emanate from distant groups 
that individuals are unlikely to encounter except through the media. In this sense, even 
when the media report covers a threat from far away, this threat — at least when 
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In times of global economic downturn, realistic intergroup threats (Stephan & 
Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) seem prevalent throughout society and 
dominate political and media discourse. Although such threats may be perceived to 
originate from ‘local’ outgroups (e.g., competition caused by labour immigrants, 
referred to here as local realistic threats), they can also be perceived to emanate from 
more ‘distant’ outgroups (e.g., competition with other nations, referred to here as 
distant realistic threats). Indeed, people typically become more prejudiced toward the 
group that is believed to cause the threat (e.g., Riek et al., 2006). Furthermore, they 
also become more prejudiced toward local outgroups when distant threats carry over 
into local intolerance (Bouman, Van Zomeren, & Otten, 2014). The latter is an 
important insight because it suggests that local intolerance can be due to, so to speak, 
threats foreign and domestic. 
Carry-over effects of distant threats have been found for symbolic threats 
(e.g., Bouman et al., 2014), which concern the perception that ingroup values and 
ideologies are threatened by an outgroup. For instance, Bouman and colleagues (2014, 
Study 2 and 3) found that presenting Dutch students with symbolic threats from 
Turkey’s EU candidacy (e.g., differences in religion and culture) resulted in stronger 
intolerance toward the local Moroccan-Dutch citizens. Most likely, these carry-over 
effects occurred because participants perceived both outgroups as ‘Muslim’ and 
therefore as supporting the same stereotypical values and ideologies. Distant realistic 
threats, however, are about outgroup actions (e.g., competition) and thus cannot 
psychologically link the distant and local outgroups in this direct manner. 
In this chapter we therefore suggest two ways by which distant realistic 
threats may carry over more indirectly into local intolerance. First, the group-based 
association pathway (GAP, Figure 3.1, top) describes how direct reactions to the distant 
outgroup posing the threat (e.g., intolerance toward Turks due to perceived negative 
economic consequences of a Turkish accession to the EU) generalize to local 
outgroups already perceived as similar to the distant outgroup (e.g., Moroccan-Dutch 







distant realistic threats might alert individuals about other realistic threats from local 
outgroups (e.g., threats from labour immigrants) and influence intolerance toward 
these local outgroups. We tested the empirical viability of these pathways in two 
studies that aimed to answer the questions whether and how realistic distant threats carry 




Figure 3.1. Full model of the effect of distant realistic intergroup threat (X) on feelings toward 
local outgroups (Y), with the mediators feelings toward distant outgroup (M1, GAP) and local 
realistic intergroup threat (M2, TAP). Paths b and c (i.e., group-based association) belong to the 
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Carry-over effects of realistic intergroup threats  
 
Realistic intergroup threats concern perceived harm to the ingroup’s 
possessions caused by an outgroup (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2009), 
such as harm to the ingroup’s economic resources or power. Realistic group conflict 
theory (Sherif, 1966) posits that intergroup competition likely results in negative 
attitudes toward the competitor (e.g., Citrin et al., 1997; Esses et al., 2001; King et al., 
2010; Minescu & Poppe, 2011). Similarly, relative deprivation theory (Pettigrew et al., 
2008) and the relative group position model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999) indicate 
realistic threats’ negative influence on individuals’ perceptions of the threatening 
outgroup. In line with these theories, meta-analytic findings suggest that realistic 
intergroup threats predict intolerance of the outgroup (Riek et al., 2006). 
However, this research does not move beyond studying direct reactions 
toward the outgroup perceived as threatening (e.g., immigrants; Stephan et al., 2005). 
Little is known yet about whether and how realistic threats from distant outgroups 
carry over into local intolerance. This is important because (a) distant threats are 
frequently presented in the media, and (b) the existence of carry-over effects would 
indicate the relevance of such distant intergroup situations for local intergroup 
relations (Bouman et al., 2014). Although we believe that both realistic and symbolic 
intergroup threats can carry over, research has focused on symbolic threats (Bouman 
et al., 2014). When people perceive distant symbolic threats, they feel threatened by 
the distant outgroup’s values and ideologies, and the exact same values and ideologies 
could also be perceived as central to local outgroups, making carry-over effects likely. 
This reasoning does not apply to realistic threats. Because responses to 
realistic threats are generally aimed at removing the threat (Esses et al., 1998), 
individuals are likely to respond in a threat-oriented way within this specific intergroup 
context, rather than to other (uninvolved) outgroups. Nonetheless, distant realistic 
threats might carry over indirectly into local intolerance. That is, immediate outcomes 







outgroups. Yet, it remains important that somewhere in this indirect process the 
distant situation becomes psychologically connected to the local outgroups. There are 
at least two aspects of the threatening situation that could foster such a connection: (a) 
The distant outgroup responsible for the threat (which relates to the GAP), and (b) 
the distant threat itself (which relates to the TAP). 
GAP. As portrayed in Figure 3.1 (top), individuals’ perception of a distant 
realistic intergroup threat causes intolerance toward the threatening distant outgroup 
(path b). These feelings of intolerance toward the distant outgroup affect how local 
outgroups are perceived (path c, the group-based association). For instance, Western-
European media have often blamed Greece and its citizens for the ‘Eurozone crisis’ 
(i.e., the debt crisis within the Eurozone; e.g., Antoniades, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013) 
and, accordingly, to pose realistic threats to EU citizens. These perceptions of threat 
might result in negative views toward Greeks, which may influence feelings toward 
Mediterranean immigrants living in Western Europe. 
Many studies support the effects of realistic threats on intolerance toward the 
threatening outgroup (Riek et al., 2006). Furthermore, attitudes toward one object can 
generalize toward other objects (e.g., Walther, 2002), and this process also applies to 
groups (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch et al., 2010). For instance, 
intergroup contact with one outgroup can also affect attitudes toward other 
uninvolved outgroups (i.e., secondary transfer effect; Pettigrew, 2009). One 
explanation for these generalizations is that observers perceive both outgroups as 
similar on for instance culture, stereotype content, or social stigma (Harwood, Paolini, 
Joyce, Rubin, & Arroyo, 2011; Lolliot et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 2009; Van Laar, Levin, 
Sinclair, & Sidanius, 2005)1. Although such generalizations have mainly been studied 
within positive intergroup contact (Tausch et al., 2010), we believe that negative 
                                                     
1 We acknowledge that similarities based on culture/ethnicity could be considered symbolic 
and thus be confused with symbolic threats. However, within the proposed framework 
symbolic characteristics cause the association, whereas realistic threats cause the negative 
feelings that are generalized toward groups. Therefore, symbolic similarities are not necessarily 
threatening or related to the threat. 
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generalizations toward other outgroups also occur. In fact, Shook, Fazio, and Eiser 
(2007) found that negative and extreme attitudes toward objects are generalized most 
strongly. Thus, we predict that one indirect way in which distant realistic threats carry 
over into local intolerance is via evaluative reactions toward the distant outgroup (i.e., 
the GAP-hypothesis). That is, the stronger observers react with intolerance toward the 
distant outgroup as a function of its perceived distant threat, the more intolerant these 
observers will be toward similarly perceived local outgroups.   
TAP. As portrayed in Figure 3.1 (bottom), individuals may perceive local 
realistic threats because the distant threat alerts them to such local threats (path d, the 
threat-based association). For instance, in the context of the role of Greece in the 
Eurozone crisis, Dutch individuals might be alerted about realistic threats from Polish 
labour migrants because this group might be perceived as representing competition on 
the local dimension (Pijpers, 2006). These individuals’ perceptions of local threats may 
result in intolerance toward this local outgroup (path e; e.g., toward Polish labour 
immigrants). However, little is known about the threat-based association itself. One 
way in which such a threat-based association could occur is due to the activation of a 
competition mindset (Sassenberg et al., 2007). Indeed, a competitive situation might 
activate a mindset that makes people prone to react toward potential competitors in 
general. Importantly, whereas Sassenberg and colleagues activated a local threat, we 
focus on distant threats. Thus, the TAP proposes that perceived distant threats alert 
individuals about potential threats from local outgroups, and these local threats cause 
intolerance toward the involved local outgroups, constituting a second indirect way in 
which distant realistic threats may carry over into local intolerance. 
 
Predictions and overview of studies 
 
We analytically distinguished between two psychological pathways. The first 
pathway — the GAP — proposes that distant threats influence attitudes toward the 







outgroups associated with the distant outgroup. In the second pathway — the TAP — 
distant and local threats are positively associated with each other, and these activated 
local realistic threats influence intolerance toward the now threatening local outgroup. 
The main aim of this research was to test whether we could identify those 
assumed pathways in two studies using different contexts. Study 3.1 tested these ideas 
in the context of Turkey’s potential inclusion in the European Union (EU), whereas 
Study 3.2 followed-up on the Study 3.1 findings in the context of perceived economic 
threats from Greece. Both contexts afforded a focus on distant realistic intergroup 
threats, but differed in how the distant outgroup relates to local outgroups in the 
Dutch society. The two largest minority groups in the Netherlands, Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens (CBS, 2014), are clearly culturally related to Turkey. 
Accordingly, the context of Study 3.1 seems well-suited to test the occurrence of 
carry-over effects via the GAP. For the Greek context, such associations are much 







In Study 3.1, we chose Turkey’s potential inclusion in the EU as our research 
context for three main reasons. Firstly, the same context was successfully employed by 
Bouman and colleagues (2014, Study 2 and 3) to manipulate the salience of realistic 
and symbolic threats. Secondly, it is likely that a group-based association exists 
between the distant outgroup held responsible for the threat (i.e., Turks) and the local 
outgroups Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens because many native Dutch citizens 
perceive them as sharing religious views, culture, and way of living (e.g., Van Osch & 
Breugelmans, 2012; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998). Thirdly, a threat-based 
association might also be present for Polish-Dutch citizens. Although Poland became 
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an EU member in 2004, there is still much debate on the influence of Poland and its 
citizens on the EU economy. For instance, Poland has been portrayed as causing 
unfair competition due to cheap labour costs and causing economic mass migration to 
better-off EU members (e.g., Alonso, 2011; Pijpers, 2006; Van Haastrecht, 2007). 
Accordingly, we predicted that realistic threats from the Turkish accession would 
influence intolerance toward Turkish-, Moroccan-, and Polish-Dutch citizens, but for 
different reasons. Whereas intolerance toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens 
may be based on a group-based association (GAP-hypothesis), intolerance toward 
Polish-Dutch citizens may be based in a threat-based association (TAP-hypothesis). 
Participants and design. Ninety-nine native Dutch undergraduate students 
(77% female; Mage = 21 years) participated in the study and were compensated with 
partial fulfilment of a course requirement. We manipulated the salience of distant 
realistic and symbolic threats by presenting these threats in a (fictitious) newspaper 
article, resulting in a 2 realistic threat (salient versus not salient) x 2 symbolic threat 
(salient versus not salient) experimental design. Note that we included the symbolic 
threat salience manipulation to isolate realistic threats from symbolic ones, and to see 
whether we could replicate the earlier findings of Bouman and colleagues (2014) in the 
current context.  
Materials and procedure. The salience of distant realistic and the salience of 
symbolic threats were manipulated in a newspaper article about whether Turkey 
should be granted EU membership. We chose this type of manipulation because 
research indicated its effectiveness in activating the salience of perceived intergroup 
threats (Bouman et al., 2014; Esses et al., 1998; Jackson & Esses, 2000; Maddux et al., 
2008). Participants first read that a majority of the EU citizens is opposed to the 
Turkish accession. Thereafter, a paragraph was shown in which — depending on the 
experimental condition — the threats were presented. When symbolic threats were 
salient, this paragraph stated that many EU citizens are opposed to the Turkish 
accession because they feel threatened by Turkey’s values and ideologies and Turkey’s 







paragraph stated that many EU citizens are opposed to the Turkish accession because 
they feel threatened by Turkey’s (presumed) weak economy, the costs of its accession, 
and the high power Turkey would get within the EU democracy. When both realistic 
and symbolic threats were salient the article first reported on symbolic and thereafter 
on realistic threats. In the control condition, participants started with the questionnaire on 
local attitudes, after which they completed the measures about Turkey’s accession.  
Comprehension check. Immediately after the newspaper article was 
presented, two open-ended questions checked whether participants had accurately 
read the article. The first question asked what the main message of the article was 
about, whereas the second question asked what the participant thought was the most 
important part of the article. All participants’ answers corresponded to the 
manipulated newspaper article. 
Manipulation check. Participants were asked to indicate how strongly (1 
completely disagree and 7 completely agree) they perceived Turkey to be symbolically 
threatening (3 items: Turks have different norms and values than native Dutch 
citizens, Turkish citizens are less attached to the European laws and constitutions, 
Turkey’s accession is at the expense of the EU culture; α = .76, M = 4.46, SD = 1.15) 
and realistically threatening (3 items: Turkey will have too much power in the EU, 
Turkey will be too dominant in EU politics, Too much money will be spent on 
Turkey; α = .69, M = 4.07, SD = 1.02). Note that this manipulation check was a 
conservative one as it was included at the end of the questionnaire to prevent it from 
influencing any effects of our manipulation. 
Feelings toward Turkey and its accession (mediators). Two feeling 
thermometers asked participants about their feelings toward Turkey and its citizens (0 
negative or cold and 100 positive or warm, r = .66, M = 57.90, SD = 16.77). In addition, 
one item measured participants’ feelings toward Turkey’s accession (0 negative and 100 
positive; M = 38.29, SD = 17.74). 
Feelings toward local groups (main outcome variables). Similar feeling 
thermometers were used to measure feelings toward the local outgroups Turkish-
 
When foreign threats turn domestic:  







Dutch citizens, r = .85, M = 53.36, SD = 19.35, Moroccan-Dutch citizens, r = .90, M 
= 43.89, SD = 21.41, Polish-Dutch citizens, r = .78, M = 50.85, SD = 18.09, and the 
ingroup native Dutch citizens2, r = .77, M = 69.43, SD = 12.96. Based on stereotypes 
about each of these local outgroups, we expected distant threats to influence feelings 
toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens via the GAP and feelings toward 
Polish-Dutch citizens via the TAP. 
We further included exploratory measures at the end of the questionnaire on 
the relationship between Turkish-Dutch citizens and native Dutch citizens and asked 
about details of the local outgroups. However, because both threats had already been 
discussed when these items were presented (which invalidates our manipulation at this 




Effectiveness of manipulation. We performed a univariate analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) including the two experimental factors and their interaction effect 
as predictors and either perceived realistic or perceived symbolic threat as dependent 
measure. As expected, participants perceived more realistic threats from Turkey in the 
conditions in which realistic threats were made salient, Mdifference = 0.82, F(1,95) = 18.61, 
p < .001, η2partial = .16; there was neither a significant main nor interaction effect for 
the manipulation of symbolic threat on perceived realistic threats, Fs < 1. Thus, our 
key manipulation was effective. 
For symbolic threats, there was a slight trend that participants perceived 
somewhat more symbolic threats from Turkey in the conditions in which symbolic 
threats were salient, but this difference was not reliable, Mdifference = 0.34, F(1,95) = 2.52, 
p = .116, η2partial = .03, neither was the main effect of realistic threat salience, Mdifference = 
                                                     
2 We included a measure of feelings toward the ingroup because people sometimes respond to 
threats by rating their ingroup more favorably (e.g., Stephan et al., 2009). However, results did 







0.27, F(1,95) = 1.50, p = .224, η2partial = .02, and their interaction, F(1,95) = 3.09, p = 
.082, η2partial = .03. Accordingly, our manipulation of distant symbolic threat salience 
was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, we included the manipulated symbolic threat salience 
and its interaction with realistic threat salience in all following analyses to control for 
any possible influence3.  
Feelings toward Turkey and its accession. A MANOVA on feelings 
toward Turkey and Turkey’s accession indicated a significant multivariate effect of the 
manipulation of realistic threat salience, F(2, 94) = 3.08, p = .050, η2partial = .06. 
Univariate effects showed that participants’ attitudes toward Turkey’s accession 
became more negative, Mdifference = -8.58, F(1,95) = 6.16, p = .015, η2partial = .06, but did 
not reliably affect feelings toward Turkey, Mdifference = -4.69, F(1,95) = 2.09, p = .15, 
η2partial = .02. 
Feelings toward local outgroups. Another MANOVA showed a marginal 
significant effect of realistic threat salience from the distant outgroup Turkey on 
feelings toward the local outgroups, F(3, 93) = 2.434, p = .070, η2partial = .07. 
Univariate effects indicated that the salience of realistic threats from Turkey caused 
more negative feelings toward Turkish-Dutch citizens, Mdifference = -9.15, F(1, 95) = -
5.67, p = .019, η2partial = .06, and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, Mdifference = -10.99, F(1,95) = 
-6.78, p = .011, η2partial = .07; but did not significantly alter feelings toward Polish-
Dutch citizens, Mdifference = 4.03, F(1,95) = 1.21, p = .275, η2partial = .01. Accordingly, 
these effects are in line with the GAP-hypothesis rather than with the TAP-
hypothesis.  
Analyses on the process behind carry-over effects. We also included a 
potential GAP-mediator to inspect the process more thoroughly: feelings toward 
                                                     
3 The symbolic manipulation and the interaction did not affect any of the dependent measures 
(multivariate Fs < 1.00, univariate Fs < 1.30) and are therefore not reported further (results are 
available upon request). Nevertheless, in line with earlier findings (Bouman et al., 2014), the 
measure of perceived symbolic threats correlated significantly with feelings toward Turkish-
Dutch citizens, r = -.55, p < .001, Moroccan-Dutch citizens, r = -.39, p < .001, and Polish-
Dutch citizens, r = -.21, p < .038. 
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Turks in Turkey. However, the effect of our manipulation on this mediator was not 
reliable. Nonetheless, the association between feelings toward Turks in Turkey and 
feelings toward the local outgroups followed the expected pattern. Feelings toward 
Turks was associated most strongly with Turkish-Dutch citizens, r = .61, p < .001, 
followed by Moroccan-Dutch citizens, r = .46, p < .001, and to a lesser extent toward 
Polish-Dutch citizens, r = .32, p = .001. Accordingly, the association between feelings 
toward Turks in Turkey and similarly perceived local outgroups indicated the 
possibility of a group-based association. 
We reasoned that one potential reason for why our realistic threat salience 
manipulation did not alter mean-level feelings toward the distant outgroup itself was 
that participants were far removed from the distant outgroup. This remoteness could 
have resulted in less emotional, more concrete, and threat-oriented reactions; much 
like the effect on feelings toward the Turkish accession. In fact, exploratory 
bootstrapping mediation analyses using the SPSS PROCESS macro with 5000 
bootstrapping samples (Hayes, 2013, model 4) indicated that feelings toward the 
Turkish accession mediated the relationship between our manipulation and feelings 
toward the local outgroups (see Table 3.1). The indirect effect was significant for 
Turkish-Dutch citizens, ρ = -3.79, 95%CI [-7.95, -1.07], Moroccan-Dutch citizens, ρ 





Study 3.1 showed that making realistic threats from a distant outgroup salient 
led participants to perceive more realistic threats from the distant outgroup, become 
more unfavourable toward the distant group, and become more intolerant toward 
local outgroups. Unfortunately, our manipulation of distant symbolic threat salience 
did not alter perceived symbolic threats, which prohibited us to explicitly compare any 







found in our focus on real-life situations and the relatively high level of perceived 
symbolic threats throughout our experimental conditions. As previously suggested by 
Bouman and colleagues (2014), when people already perceive such threats strongly, 
making such threats salient might affirm their perception rather than strengthen it. This 
may explain why the symbolic threat salience manipulation was not successful — it 
was already salient across conditions. 
Our analyses also confirmed that perceived distant realistic threats indirectly 
influenced local intolerance. Although the intended GAP-mediator feelings toward 
Turkey did not reliably mediate the relationship between our manipulation and local 
feelings, individuals’ feelings toward the Turkish accession did. Moreover, based on 
prior knowledge about the distant and local outgroups, our results suggest that 
realistic threats can carry over toward local outgroups associated with the distant 
outgroup itself (i.e., group-based association; Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens) 
or its threat (i.e., threat-based association; Polish-Dutch citizens). Clearly, however, 
more evidence is needed to examine the GAP and TAP. Study 2 was designed to 
further test these processes. 
 
Table 3.1. 
Model coefficients for the indirect influence of distant realistic threat (X) on feelings toward Turkish-Dutch 
citizens, Moroccan-Dutch citizens, and Polish-Dutch citizens via the mediator feelings toward the Turkish 
accession (M1). 
 
 Feelings toward Turkish-Dutch c. 
 Feelings toward 
Moroccan-Dutch c.   
Feelings toward 
Polish-Dutch c. 
 b SE p  b SE p  b SE p 
Distant threat 
(X) -5.40 3.60 .137 
 -8.09 4.14 .053  -1.70 3.63 .640 
Feelings Turkish 
accession (M1) 0.44 0.10 .001 
 0.35 0.12 .003  0.28 0.10 .007 
 R2 = .21,  
F(2, 96) = 12.83,  
p < .001 
 
R2 = .15,  
F(2, 96) = 8.34,  
p < .001 
 
R2 = .09,  
F(2, 96) = 4.44,  
p = .014 
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Study 3.2 used an ongoing discussion within the Netherlands about the 
perceived influence of Greece on the EU economy. The main goal of Study 3.2 was to 
test the GAP and TAP. Accordingly, we included feelings toward Greece (i.e., the 
GAP-mediator) and realistic threats from local outgroups (i.e., the TAP-mediator). In 
addition, because Study 3.1 only indicated weak indirect effects for the TAP, we chose 
to further investigate this pathway. Specifically, we manipulated whether the realistic 
threats were attributed internally to the distant outgroup members, or externally to the 
situation. 
   We predict the presence of a threat-based association when the threat is 
attributed internally to the distant outgroup members because such internal 
characteristics could easily be represented within the nearby society and thus alert 
observers about potential threats from local outgroups. Indeed, observers often blame 
outgroup members for the threatening actions (Bilewicz & Krzeminski, 2010; Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Glick, 2005). In contrast to internally attributed threats, we 
predict that when the threat is attributed to the situation, the threat becomes very 
specific. Thereby, the threat gets isolated from other threats, obstructing a threat-
based association. Accordingly, we predicted a moderating role of threat attribution 
on the association between the distant and local threats. When attributed internally 
(i.e., to the outgroup members), the distant threat is likely associated with local threats; 





Participants and design. Seventy Dutch psychology students participated 
(79% female, Mage = 19 years) in the study entitled “the Netherlands and the 







randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions in which threats from 
Greece were either attributed internally to characteristics of Greeks (n = 38) or 
attributed more externally (n = 32)4.  
Materials and procedure. After agreeing on informed consent, participants 
received (bogus) information on why Greece poses a threat to the European and 
Dutch economy. In addition, depending on the experimental condition, they received 
information on why Greece is specifically responsible for this threat. After reading the 
information, participants filled out a questionnaire on the economic crisis and Greece 
(i.e., the distant measures). Afterwards, they were asked to fill out another — 
ostensibly unrelated — questionnaire on Dutch local outgroups (i.e., the local 
measures). 
Manipulation. We manipulated the attribution of threat in a (bogus) article 
explaining why the Greek situation negatively influences the European economy. In 
the internal attribution condition, the threats were ascribed to presumed stereotypical 
attributes of ‘the Greeks’, such as being lazy, unwilling to change, swindlers, and 
profiteers (Antoniades, 2012; Tzogopoulos, 2013). In this condition, we specifically 
expected carry-over effect via the TAP. In the external attribution condition, we provided 
a system explanation for the threats. Here Greece was accused of poor investments 
and borrowing decisions, having a bad infrastructure, using inefficient production 
processes, and having a large imbalance in their power and money distribution among 
its citizens. We expected carry-over effects via the TAP in the internal attribution 
condition but not in the external attribution condition. 
Measures about Greece and the economic crisis. The main purpose of 
the first questionnaire was to measure perceived threat from Greece (i.e., the 
predictor, Figure 1, X) and attitudes toward Greece (i.e., the mediator according to the 
                                                     
4 Originally, we included a third experimental condition in which we did not specify the threat. 
However, because we could not tell how participants attributed the threat in this condition, we 
decided to drop this condition from the analyses to make the results section more 
comprehensible. 
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GAP, Figure 1, M1). Moreover, additional items were included (a) to strengthen the 
cover story that questionnaire 1 and 2 were separate studies, (b) to strengthen the 
manipulation by repeating the threat, and (c) for exploratory reasons. Those items 
concerned: consequences of the economic threat (measured before manipulation), 
stereotypes toward Greece (stereotype content model; Fiske et al., 2002), and 
responsibility of Greece for the economic crisis; but were excluded from the current 
paper to keep the method and results section comprehensible. 
Comprehension check. To check whether participants had read the presented 
information, an open-ended question was administered after the manipulation. 
Participants were asked to mention what they believed was the most important 
message of the provided information. All answers were in line with the manipulation. 
Feelings toward Greece and its citizens (GAP-mediator). For feelings toward Greece 
and its citizens, two feeling thermometers were included (0 negative or cold and 100 
positive or warm). We differentiated between the nation Greece and its citizens as we 
considered reactions to the nation as more threat oriented. However, all four feeling 
thermometers were highly interrelated; accordingly, we combined the four items in a 
single scale, α = .91, M = 56.06, SD = 16.57. 
Perceived realistic threats from Greece (main predictor variable). Three items measured 
perceived realistic threats from Greece on a 7-point scale (1 not at all and 7 completely). 
That is, Greece has a negative influence on Europe’s economy, Greece poses a threat 
to the European economy, and Greece poses a threat to the EU, α = .74, M = 4.75, 
SD = 1.06. This variable was used as the main predictor in our analyses. 
Intolerance toward local outgroups. The second questionnaire consisted of 
items about the local outgroups Turkish-, Moroccan-, and Polish-Dutch citizens. The 
purpose of this questionnaire was to measure feelings toward these local outgroups 
(i.e., response variable, Figure 3.1, Y), and to measure realistic threats from these local 
outgroups (i.e., the TAP-mediator, Figure 3.1, M2).  
Feelings toward local outgroups (main outcome variables). Two feeling thermometers 







= .90, M = 54.46, SD = 19.60, Moroccan-Dutch citizens, r = .94, M = 47.16, SD = 
19.38, and Polish-Dutch citizens, r = .91, M = 47.81, SD = 20.42.  
Realistic threats from the local outgroups (TAP-mediator). For each local outgroup, 
participants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 not at all and 7 completely) whether [local 
outgroup] had a negative influence on the Dutch economy and whether [local 
outgroup] was a burden to the Dutch economic system; Turkish-Dutch citizens, r = 
.80, M = 3.50, SD = 1.23; Moroccan-Dutch citizens, r = .89, M = 3.91, SD = 1.50; 
Polish-Dutch citizens, r = .84, M = 3.83, SD = 1.37. Originally, we included a third 
item “compared to Dutch citizens, how efficient do [local outgroup] work?” but in 
hindsight we were unsure about the face validity of this item (as it may also tap into 
symbolic threats). Accordingly, we did not use this item in our analyses.  
Symbolic similarities with Greece. For each local outgroup, participants indicated 
on two items whether the group was symbolically similar to Greece. The items were: 
“To what extent is the [local outgroup’s] culture similar to the cultural norms and 
values of Greece?” and “How similar is the [local outgroup’s] way of living (e.g., 
behaviour, mentality, and work ethos) to the way of living in Greece?”; Turkish-Dutch 
citizens, r = .69, M = 4.35, SD = 1.09; Moroccan-Dutch citizens, r = .63, M = 2.86, 
SD = 1.03; Polish-Dutch citizens, r = .76, M = 3.95, SD = 1.03. The purpose of this 
variable was two-fold. Firstly, we included these items to explore whether symbolic 
similarities strengthen the assumed path between feelings toward Greece and feelings 
toward the local outgroups. Secondly, we ran our analyses with this variable as a 
covariate. However, in both cases, the effect of this variable was negligible and we 
therefore decided to not include this variable in our analyses presented below. 
Dimension reduction: Local outgroups. Because our hypotheses did not 
differentiate between the local outgroups, we explored whether factor analysis would 
discriminate between them. A single factor analysis including the local feeling, realistic 
threat, and cultural similarity items identified five factors explaining 82.97% of the 
variance. The first factor consisted of all local feeling items, R2 = .40; factor loadings 
> .80. The second factor consisted of the realistic threat items for Turkish- and 
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Moroccan-Dutch citizens, R2 = .16; factor loadings > .72. The third factor contained 
the cultural similarity items for Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, R2 = .12; 
factor loadings > .65. The fourth factor consisted of the two cultural similarity items 
for Polish-Dutch citizens, R2 = .09; factor loadings > .83. The last factor contained 
the remaining two realistic threat items for Polish-Dutch citizens, R2 = .06; factor 
loadings > .57. As this analysis did not discriminate between Turkish- and Moroccan-
Dutch citizens on the feeling, threat, and similarity items, we decide to combine these 
two groups in the local group Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens: feelings: α = .94, M 
= 51.14, SD = 18.86; realistic threats: α = .93, M = 3.66, SD = 1.23; cultural 




Analysis of means. We checked whether the internal and external attribution 
conditions differed from each other on any of the measures. MANOVA did not 
indicate significant differences, F(6,63) = 0.14, p = .990. This suggests that carry-over 
effects are equally present or absent in both conditions. Note, however, that we did 
not expect differences between means as in both conditions carry-over effects could 
occur. Instead, we expected that within the different experimental conditions different 
processes would underlie these carry-over effects. The remainder of our analyses will 
be on these processes. 
Testing the processes underlying carry-over effects. We proposed two 
indirect pathways which could explain why threats from a distant outgroup carry over 
into local intolerance: the GAP and the TAP. For the GAP (Figure 3.1, top), the 
relationship between distant realistic threats (X) and negative feelings toward local 
outgroups (Y) is mediated by feelings toward the distant outgroup (M1) — for the 
TAP (Figure 3.1, bottom), this relationship is mediated by realistic threats from local 
outgroups (M2). In addition, we predicted attribution of the threat (W1) to moderate 







The relationships between each of the variables can be observed in Table 3.2. Because 
the mediators were correlated in the internal attribution condition (see Table 3.2), we 




Correlation coefficients between our measures in Study 2. The correlations presented above the diagonal are for the 
internal attribution condition, whereas the correlations presented below the diagonal are for the external 
attribution condition.  
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Threat Greece — -.17 .43** .41* -.45** -.27 
2. Feeling Greece -.32⁺ — -.34* -.31⁺ .79*** .70*** 
3. Threat Polish-Dutch 
citizens -.27 .11 — .81*** -.51*** -.54*** 
4. Threat Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens -.12 -.08 .44* — -.35* -.55*** 
5. Feelings Polish-Dutch 
citizens -.03 .48** -.17 -.11 — .82*** 
6. Feelings Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens -.04 .48** -.07 -.42** .67*** — 
Note. ⁺p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Testing the GAP. According to this pathway (Figure 3.1, top), distant 
realistic threats (X) indirectly influence feelings toward local outgroups (Y) via the 
mediator feelings toward Greece (M1). We tested the GAP with bootstrapped 
mediation analyses using the SPSS PROCESS macro with 5000 bootstrapping samples 
(Hayes, 2013, model 4) and controlled for the effect of the TAP-mediator “local 
realistic threats” on feelings toward local outgroups. The results are presented in Table 
3.3 and 3.4 (columns “Feelings toward Greece” and “Feelings toward Turkish- and 
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Moroccan-Dutch citizens/Polish-Dutch citizens”). Similar to Study 1, the relationship 
between feelings toward Greece and the local outgroups was significant, but the 
relationship between distant threat and feelings toward Greece was only marginally 
significant. This resulted in a marginally significant indirect effect for Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens, ρ = -2.05, 95%CI [-4.75, 0.09], and Polish-Dutch citizens, ρ 
= -2.38, 95%CI [-5.71, 0.17], suggesting that distant realistic threats can indeed 
indirectly affect local intolerance via feelings toward the distant outgroup.    
Testing the TAP. According to this pathway (Figure 1, bottom), distant 
realistic threats (X) indirectly influence feelings toward local outgroups (Y) via the 
mediator local realistic threats (M2). Accordingly, we predicted that the distant and 
local outgroups are connected to each other based on a threat-based association (path 
d). Importantly, we hypothesized that this threat-based association would specifically 
occur when the threat was attributed internally to characteristics of the distant 
outgroup’s members (experimentally manipulated moderator W1, dummy-coded: 0 = 
external attribution condition, 1 = internal attribution condition). We tested the TAP 
with the SPSS PROCESS macro with 5000 bootstrapping samples (Hayes, 2013, 
model 7) and controlled for the effect of the GAP-mediator “feelings toward Greece” 
on feelings toward local outgroups. We will describe these analyses step-by-step 
below.  
Our prediction that the effect of distant threats (X) on local threats (M2) 
would be moderated by attribution (W) was supported by the significant interaction 
effect (see Table 3.3 and 3.4, column “Local Threat”). Also in line with our 
predictions, local threats were strongly related to feelings toward the corresponding 
local outgroup (see Table 3.3 and 3.4, column “Feelings toward Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens/Polish-Dutch citizens”). Bootstrapped moderated 
mediation analyses further supported our conditional TAP-hypothesis for Turkish- 
and Moroccan-Dutch citizens and Polish-Dutch citizens. When distant threats were 
attributed to the distant outgroup members, the conditional indirect effect was 







and Polish-Dutch citizens, ρ = -2.02, 95%CI [-5.11, -0.34], indicating that distant 
threats indirectly caused local intolerance. When threats were attributed to the system, 
the indirect effect was positive but unreliable for Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens, ρ = 0.89, 95%CI [-0.89, 3.50], and Polish-Dutch citizens, ρ = 1.32, 95%CI [-
0.02, 3.84].  
 
Table 3.3 
Hierarchical analyses of our model. The first column represents the effects on mediator 1 feelings toward Greece, 
the second column the effects on mediator 2 local threat, and the last column effects on our outcome variable 









 b SE p  b SE p  b SE p 
Distant threat 
(X) -3.32 1.89 .078  -0.15 0.25 .542  0.02 1.56 .990 
Attribution 
(W) — — —  -2.90 1.44 .048  — — — 
Threat * 
Attribution — — —  0.61 0.30 .044  — — — 
Feelings 
Greece (M1) — — —  — — —  0.62 0.10 .001 
Local threat 
(M2) — — —  — — —  -5.87 1.35 .001 
            
 R2 = .04,  
F(3,66) = 3.19,  
p = .078 
 
R2 = .11, 
 F(3,66) = 2.73,  
p = .051 
 
R2 = .53,  
F(3,66) = 25.19,  
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Hierarchical analyses of our model. The first column represents the effects on mediator 1 feelings toward Greece, 
the second column the effects on mediator 2 local threat, and the last column effects on our outcome variable 
feelings toward Polish-Dutch citizens. 
 Feelings toward 
Greece (M1) 
 




 b SE p  b SE p  b SE p 
Distant threat 
(X) -3.32 1.89 .078  -0.40 0.29 .179  -2.50 1.54 .110 
Attribution  
(W) — — —  -4.94 1.71 .005  — — — 
Threat * 
Attribution — — —  1.00 0.35 .006  — — — 
Feelings Greece 
(M1) — — —  — — —  0.72 0.10 .001 
Local threat 
(M2) — — —  — — —  -3.33 1.08 .003 
            
 R2 = .04,  
F(3,66) = 3.19,  
p = .078 
 
R2 = .15, 
 F(3,66) = 4.00,  
p = .011 
 
R2 = .57,  
F(3,66) = 29.23,  





In line with our TAP-hypothesis, Study 3.2 supported a threat-based 
association when the distant threat was internally attributed to the threatening 
outgroup’s members: Stronger perceived distant threat was related to stronger 
perceived local threat, and these local threats were negatively related to feelings toward 
local outgroups. In addition, though weaker, the data from Study 3.2 also supported 
our GAP-hypothesis and earlier findings from Study 3.1. Similar to Study 3.1, the 
relatively weak relationship between the distant threat and feelings toward distant 







outgroup members due to the outgroup’s geographical distance. Conceivably, we 
would have found stronger support for the GAP if we had measured reactions 
directed at removing the threat (e.g., removing Greece from the EU) instead of 




The results of two empirical studies are in line with the idea that perceived 
distant realistic intergroup threats can carry over into local intolerance via two 
different indirect pathways. Thus, when a distant outgroup (e.g., Turkey or Greece) 
poses an economic threat, this intergroup situation may negatively affect distant 
observers’ (e.g., Dutch university students) perception of local outgroups within their 
local environment (e.g., Turkish-Dutch citizens). Furthermore, the results support the 
analytical differentiation of our two hypothesized pathways. Firstly, in accordance 
with our GAP-hypothesis, distant realistic threats can influence local intolerance via a 
group-based association. That is, reactions toward perceived threats from a distant 
outgroup (e.g., Turkey) are generalized toward local outgroups which are associated 
with the distant outgroup (e.g., Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens). Importantly, 
as illustrated in Study 3.1, this group-based association is based on characteristics of 
the distant and local outgroups and does not necessarily include a realistic threat. 
Secondly, distant realistic threats can also carry over via a threat-based association, 
supporting our TAP-hypothesis. When stereotypical characteristics of the distant 
outgroup members are perceived to cause the distant realistic threat (e.g., perceived 
laziness of Greeks), this distant threat alerts observers about realistic intergroup 
threats within observers’ local environment (e.g., competition on the labour market by 
immigrants), and these local threats are associated with intolerance toward involved 
local outgroups.  
These findings are important because they nuance earlier theorizing that 
realistic threats are unlikely to carry over due to being too concrete and situation-
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specific (Bouman et al., 2014). Our findings suggest that these characteristics of 
distant realistic threats make them less likely to directly affect local intolerance; 
however, indirect carry-over effects of distant realistic threats on local intolerance seem 
more likely to occur. Thereby, our findings extend earlier literature on carry-over 
effects that focused on symbolic intergroup threats (Bouman et al., 2014), local realistic 
threats (e.g., Sassenberg et al., 2007), and general threats unspecific to a particular group 
(e.g., global debt crisis; Becker et al., 2011; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011).  
Furthermore, the current findings broaden the scope in which the intergroup 
threat theory can be applied (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2009). Our 
findings suggest that distant threats may elicit intolerance toward local outgroups that 
are uninvolved in the distant threatening situation. In addition, our results also 
provide important information about how observers react toward the outgroup 
perceived as threatening. In line with previous findings (Esses et al., 2001, 1998; Riek 
et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2009), Study 3.2 confirms that realistic threats from a local 
outgroup relate to negative views of this outgroup’s members. However, when a 
distant outgroup is perceived as realistically threatening, observers react by targeting 
the threat (e.g., not allowing Turkey to join the EU) rather than the distant outgroup’s 
members. Possibly, the remoteness of the distant outgroup objectifies the situation 
more, makes observers less involved, and less inclined to react toward outgroup 
members that are unlikely to be encountered. Clearly however, further research is 
needed to test these suggestions. 
Our findings also have potential applied value. Firstly, our results concur with 
the idea that global situations (e.g., a global economic downturn) might affect local 
intergroup relationships (see also Becker et al., 2011; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011). 
Whereas individuals and policymakers often focus on perceived negative actions of 
local outgroups (e.g., Polish-Dutch citizens ‘stealing’ local jobs) in order to explain and 
contest local intolerance, our results indicate that a much broader context should be 
taken into account. Therefore, in order to improve the image of a specific local 







outgroup in for instance the media, but to also look at (seemingly unrelated) global 
situations occurring at the same time (e.g., the perceived role of Greece within the 
Eurozone crisis). Secondly, our results also point to the possibility that a threat-based 
association can be obstructed when the threat is attributed externally (e.g., bad loans). 
Accordingly, governmental reports on foreign issues might take advantage of these 
findings by focusing on external attributes, thereby preventing any reinforcement of 
local intolerance. Moreover, such external attributions might make observers more 
inclined to react to the context, rather than to the distant outgroup, which may also 
inhibit carry-over effects via the GAP (see also Bouman et al., 2014). 
Our set of studies has at least three limitations. Firstly, because our mediators 
were measured rather than manipulated, we have to be cautious about claims of 
causality (i.e., internal validity). While testing causality is certainly a relevant endeavour 
for future research, the aim of the present paper was more modest, namely, to 
analytically and empirically identify two distinct pathways to carry-over effects of 
distant realistic threat. Because we successfully manipulated the salience of realistic 
threat in Study 3.1, we can conclude that perceived distant realistic threats caused local 
intolerance in that study. Nevertheless, there would certainly be added value in 
experimentally manipulating the mediator variables.  
A second limitation is that we focused specifically on economic threats in our 
studies, whereas our findings may also apply to other intergroup threats. Although 
future research is needed to increase the external validity of our findings, we are 
relatively confident that other realistic threats (e.g., to the ingroup’s well-being, power, 
or safety; Stephan et al., 2009) can similarly carry over. As with economic threats, 
these threats could be considered relatively concrete and group specific, making 
indirect carry-over effects most likely. Future research can test such a broader 
operationalization of distant realistic threats. 
Thirdly, because our symbolic threat salience manipulation in Study 3.1 was 
unsuccessful, we were unable to test whether similar GAP and TAP processes 
underlie carry-over effects due to symbolic threat salience. Although characteristics of 
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symbolic threats suggest more direct carry-over effects (Bouman et al., 2014), future 
research is needed to see whether symbolic and realistic threats do indeed carry over 
in different ways. We think that the larger question is how both pathways toward 
carry-over effects relate to each other. For instance, are they separate processes or can 
they also interact? Further research, which is likely to be of an experimental or 





Our findings suggest that there are at least two ways by which perceived 
distant realistic threats can carry over into local intolerance. The GAP relies on a 
group-based association and implies that reactions to distant outgroups are 
generalized to similar local outgroups. The TAP relies on a threat-based association 
and implies that distant threats alert observers about local threats, which can lead to 
intolerance toward local outgroups. In this sense, foreign realistic threats can indeed 
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This chapter is based on Bouman, T., Van Zomeren, M., & Otten, S. (manuscript 
submitted for publication). From global threats to local intolerance: The role of 
superordinate outgroups.  
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Globalization has made global categories that include multiple large 
subgroups increasingly visible. Political structures like the European Union (EU) and 
the Arab league could be considered as examples of these global categories, as well as 
symbolic structures based on for instance religion (e.g., Muslim or Christian) or 
culture (e.g., Asian or Arabic culture). Such global categories can include the ingroup, 
to which we refer as superordinate ingroups (e.g., for Europeans, the EU) — but can also 
only exist of outgroups, to which we refer as superordinate outgroups (e.g., for Europeans, 
the Arab League). Whereas previous research has mainly focused on superordinate 
ingroups (Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009; Gaertner et al., 1993; Wenzel, Mummendey, & 
Waldzus, 2007), we explore whether individuals also form and use superordinate 
outgroups and test whether these superordinate outgroups enable overgeneralizations 
within this superordinate category.  
Thereby, the current paper introduces a novel focus on whether 
superordinate outgroups can psychologically connect different outgroups with each 
other and induce overgeneralizations among them. More specifically, we apply this 
notion to recent research on carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats (Bouman, Van 
Zomeren, & Otten, 2014, 2015a), which suggests that threats from a distant outgroup 
(e.g., for native Dutch citizens, Islamic State) can carry over into intolerance toward 
other local outgroups (e.g., for native Dutch citizens, Moroccan-Dutch citizens). We 
believe that these carry-over effects could be explained by the presence of a 
superordinate outgroup that connects these outgroups with each other and induces 
overgeneralizations amongst them (e.g., for native Dutch citizens, Muslims).  
Accordingly, the current research has two aims. First, we focus on how 
individuals form superordinate outgroups, which is an under-researched topic. Second, 
we connect the construal of a superordinate outgroup with previous work that 
identified the occurrence of carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats into local 
intolerance (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). That is, we test whether carry-over effects 
can be explained by the existence of a superordinate outgroup of global others that 







two studies. Study 4.1 investigates whether individuals can construe different types of 
superordinate outgroups, namely either based on common identity or common fate 
(e.g., Campbell, 1958; Lewin, 1948), and whether these superordinate outgroups 
facilitate overgeneralizations toward included subgroups (e.g., Allport, 1954; Blumer, 
1958). Study 4.2 builds on these findings and tests whether superordinate outgroups 




Globalization has increased the visibility and importance of global structures. 
These global structures include multiple (large) subgroups (e.g., nations, religious 
movements, or ethnic groups) that share at least one central feature; therefore, these 
groups could be considered as superordinate groups (Brewer & Gaertner, 2004; 
Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2005). For instance, the superordinate group ‘Muslims’ encompasses 
multiple religious subgroups (e.g., Suni, Shia, Ahmadiyya), as well as multiple ethnic 
groups, nations, and institutions. Therefore, although all these groups could be 
perceived as members of the same superordinate group, there is still much complexity 
within this larger entity (Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009). 
Superordinate groups can include the ingroup (i.e., common ingroup; 
Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009; Gaertner et al., 1993, 1989), but can also solely exist of 
outgroups, to which we refer as the superordinate outgroup. Research on superordinate 
groups has mainly focused on common ingroups (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009), and 
tested whether these common ingroups can improve intergroup conflicts between 
subgroups within the superordinate category (Brewer & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner et 
al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif, 1966). In contrast to 
this earlier research about common ingroups, we are interested in superordinate 
groups solely existing of outgroups. We believe that these superordinate outgroups 
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facilitate overgeneralizations toward included outgroups (e.g., the perception that 
Muslims are threatening makes Moroccan-Dutch citizens threatening too).  
Indeed, various psychological and sociological models indicated that large and 
abstract categories of others are at the base of overgeneralizations and prejudice (e.g., 
Allport, 1954; Blumer, 1958; Hamilton, Sherman, & Rodgers, 2004). For instance, 
Allport (1954) describes categories as large clusters of objects or groups in which as much 
as possible is assimilated. Moreover, these categories are used to give meaning to new 
objects or groups, and tend to give everything that is included within the category the 
same emotional and ideational value. Likewise, Blumer’s (1958) group position model 
posits that in order for prejudice to occur, the targeted outgroup should be defined as 
an abstract and vast entity. Accordingly, large and abstract categories — such as the 
‘global’ superordinate outgroups we focus on here — can connect various outgroups 
with each other and facilitate the generalization of individuals’ feelings about this 
category to all subgroups included. 
So far, surprisingly little is known about superordinate outgroups and how 
they are construed. Our point of departure was to consider two types of 
commonalities that might connect outgroups with each other: common identity and 
common fate. Common identity1 is the perceived commonality in meaning of the groups, 
for instance in culture and ideologies (e.g., Campbell, 1958). Because superordinate 
outgroups based on common identity have some form of shared inner essence, we 
believe that observers perceive those groups as relatively entitative (e.g., Vincent 
Yzerbyt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001). Examples of this type of superordinate outgroup 
are ‘Muslims’ for ‘Christians’ (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Sheridan, 2006) or ‘Capitalists’ 
for ‘Communists’. Common fate is the perceived similarity in the situation and context 
the outgroups are in, such as shared goals, similar levels of economic wealth, 
resources, health, geographic proximity, or political context (e.g., Campbell, 1958; 
                                                     
1 Although common identity relates to common-identity groups as defined by Prentice, Miller, 
and Lightdale (1994), Prentice and colleagues referred to individuals’ attachment to an 







Lewin, 1948). One example of a superordinate outgroup based on common fate is the 
‘GIIPS’ — a superordinate outgroup consisting of five EU member states (i.e., 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) that were considered to have systemic 
fiscal problems (e.g., Andrikopoulos, Samitas, & Kougepsakis, 2014; Stockhammer & 
Sotiropoulos, 2014). Other examples of superordinate outgroups based on common 
fate could be the ‘Developing countries’, ‘Tropical countries’, and ‘G20’.  
Because superordinate outgroups based on common identity concern intrinsic 
characteristics of the included outgroups, we believe that these groups are typically 
viewed as more entitative than superordinate outgroups based on common fate, which 
mainly share contextual commonalities. Earlier research has indicated that within-
group generalizations are particularly likely to occur when a group is perceived as 
entitative. That is, the more observers perceive an outgroup as a coherent entity, the 
more observers tend to generalize within this category (Campbell, 1958; Denson, 
Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003; 
Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, & Miller, 2008). For this reason, we believe that 
superordinate outgroups based on common identity (rather than common fate) are 
more likely to act like a conduit through which intolerance toward one outgroup 
becomes generalized toward other outgroups within this superordinate category. 
Indeed, such construal of a superordinate outgroup may be exactly how we can 
explain carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats into local intolerance (e.g., 
Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). 
 
Explaining carry-over effects of intergroup threat 
 
People experience intergroup threats when they perceive an outgroup to 
threaten the ingroup (Semyonov et al., 2004; Stephan et al., 2009). According to the 
intergroup threat theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2009), two general 
types of threat can be differentiated: symbolic and realistic threats. Symbolic threats 
occur when an outgroup is perceived to threaten the ingroup’s values, ideologies, or 
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worldview. Realistic threats occur when an outgroup is perceived to threaten the 
ingroup’s resources, welfare, health, or power. Unsurprisingly, both types of 
intergroup threats induce intolerance toward the outgroup held responsible for the 
threat (Riek et al., 2006). More conspicuously, however, recent research also indicated 
that perceived threats from a distant outgroup can carry over into intolerance toward 
associated local outgroups (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). 
For example, Bouman and colleagues (2014, Study 2) found that after being 
presented with potential symbolic threats from the accession of Turkey to the EU 
(i.e., threats to ingroup’s culture, image, values), Dutch participants showed 
intolerance toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, which could be considered 
culturally related to Turkey; but not toward Polish-Dutch citizens, which are generally 
not perceived as culturally related to Turkey. In another line of research, Bouman and 
colleagues (2015a) suggested that distant realistic threats can carry over via two types 
of associations. Firstly, and closely related to the findings for distant symbolic threats, 
carry-over effects can occur via a group-based association in which perceived threats from 
a distant outgroup affect intolerance toward local outgroups that are perceived as 
having similar (cultural) values or ideologies as the distant outgroup. At this point in 
the process, one could expect the construal of a superordinate outgroup based on 
common identity to facilitate overgeneralization. Secondly, carry-over effects can 
occur via a threat-based association, in which perceived realistic threats from the distant 
outgroup activate similar threats within the local society. These local threats, in turn, 
influence intolerance toward the local outgroups that are now perceived as 
threatening. At this point in the process, one could expect the construal of a 




We report two studies that test our line of thought. Study 4.1 investigates 







based on common identity and common fate, Campbell, 1958; Lewin, 1948) and 
examines how entitative these superordinate outgroups are perceived to be. Study 4.2 
tests whether superordinate outgroups can function as a conduit through which carry-
over effects of intergroup threat occur. Together, this set of studies (a) aims to 
highlight the under-researched notion of superordinate outgroups and (b) applies this 
notion to the explanation of how distant intergroup threats carry over into local 
intolerance through overgeneralizations. Thereby, we underline the importance of a 






Study 4.1 was designed to test which type of commonality facilitates the 
construal of an entitative superordinate outgroup. More specifically, we inspected 
whether individuals can construe superordinate outgroups based on common identity and 
common fate. In addition, and in line with previous research suggesting that outgroups 
perceived as entitative are particularly vulnerable to overgeneralizations (e.g., Denson 
et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2003; Stenstrom et al., 2008), we measured these 
superordinate outgroups’ entitativity as an indicator of the superordinate outgroup’s 
potential for overgeneralizations, and thus to be a conduit through which carry-over 
effects of distant intergroup threats occur (the focus of Study 4.2).  
Participants and design. Forty-four Dutch psychology students (77% 
female, Mage = 22 years) volunteered to participate in our study. Our participants were 
shown a list of 15 foreign national groups (i.e., Americans, Brazilians, Chinese, 
Cubans, Egyptians, Germans, Greeks, Indonesians, Iranians, Japanese, Mexicans, 
Moroccans, Poles, Russians, and Turks) and were asked to form three superordinate 
groups each consisting of at least two of the national groups. Within these 
instructions, we included an experimental manipulation to see whether information 
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presenting a common identity and/or fate could be used to form a superordinate 
outgroup. We chose to focus on foreign national groups because (a) these are 
outgroups to our native Dutch participants and (b) global threats are often discussed 
as being caused by national outgroups, thereby connecting Study 4.1 to our intergroup 
threat context. After having categorized various subgroups into a certain 
superordinate category, we asked participants to describe the superordinate group’s 
shared central features and measured its perceived entitativity, valence, and overlap 
with the participants’ own identity.  
For each participant, this complete procedure was repeated three times. Thus, 
participants formed, in total, three superordinate groups based on the same 
instructions (either common identity, common fate, or both). We allowed participants 
to reuse outgroups, and we therefore permitted superordinate outgroups to overlap 
with each other. Accordingly, at the end of the questionnaire participants had created 
and filled-out questions for three superordinate groups. 
Manipulation. The experimental manipulation was included in the 
instruction and informed the participants to construe a superordinate outgroup based 
on (a) common identity (n = 17), (b) common fate (n = 13), or (c) common identity 
and/or fate (n = 14). We included the combined condition to see whether participants 
had a preference for one specific type of commonality. Within the common identity 
condition the instruction read: “Create a group by selecting (at least 2) national groups 
that closely resemble each other in their convictions (e.g., norms and values, culture, or 
religion)”. Within the common fate condition, the last part was replaced by “living 
conditions (e.g., resources, wealth, and power)”. Within the combined condition, participants 
were instructed to create a group based on “convictions (e.g., norms and values, culture, or 
religion) or living conditions (e.g., resources, wealth, and power)” (order was counter-balanced). 
Measures. For each superordinate group, we included thirteen self-report 
questions (for intercorrelations between the measures see Table 4.1). Two open-ended 
questions were asked to inspect the commonalities between the included groups. 







group.” and: “What is the most important shared characteristic within this 
superordinate group?”. Two independent coders coded the provided answers in ten 
more general types of commonalities (see Table 4.2, 79.82% inter-rater agreement, all 
inconsistencies were resolved after discussion), which were thereafter coded as based 
on common identity and/or common fate (see Table 4.2, 93.94% inter-rater 
agreement, all inconsistencies were resolved after discussion). In addition, both coders 
indicated whether the created superordinate outgroup could be, for our native Dutch 
participants, potentially considered an ingroup (n = 20, e.g., EU members, Western 
nations), an outgroup (n = 106, e.g., Asian, Muslim), or ‘unclear’ (n = 6, e.g., ‘history 
makers’, pursuit to economic power; 89.39% inter-rater agreement, all inconsistencies 
resolved after discussion). 
 
Table 4.1  
Intercorrelations between the variables of Study 1. The variables “common identity” and “common fate” 
represent whether the superordinate outgroup created by the participant is based on the respective commonality (0 
no and 1 yes).  
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Common identity -.76** .39** .54** -.11 .09 -.04 .00 
2. Common fate — -.17 -.41** .00 -.04 .04 .06 
3. Entitativity  — .69** .41** .15 -.06 -.05 
4. Perceived common identity   — .34** .15 .00 -.03 
5. Perceived common fate    — -.02 .10 -.25* 
6. Valence     — -.47** .44** 
7. Perceived threats      — -.32* 
8. Perceived similarities       — 
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Classification of the provided answers into common identity and common fate and the underlying commonalities. 
n1 represents the first mentioned commonality and n2 the second mentioned commonality (if any).   
Cluster n1 n2 Examples of provided answers 
Common identity 67 7  
    Culture 42 6 Culture, collectivism/individualism, Western culture 
    Religion 20 1 Religion, Islam, Catholic 
    Political orientation 5 0 Communism, capitalism 
Common fate 62 16  
    Resources 26 4 Economic resources, technology, cultural heritage  
    Geography 12 3 Climate, environment, location, continent   
    Power 9 1 World power, political power, military power 
    Context 8 3 High criminality, in war, refugees, immigrants 
    Political structure 3 1 Dictatorships, political propaganda, EU 
    Language 2 3 Similar language 
    Appearance 2 1 Appearance, looks 
Miscellaneous 2 0 Vodka 
No value 1 109  
 
 
Six items were adapted from an existing scale (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & 
Sacchi, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007) to measure the 
superordinate group’s entitativity on a 7-point scale (1 not at all and 7 completely), α = 
.83, M = 4.07, SD = 1.04. The items were: “To what extent do you consider this 
group to be an entity? How important do you think this group is for its members? Do 
you believe that people within this group feel connected to the group? To what extent 
are people within this group similar to each other? To what extent do you believe 
there is solidarity within this group? To what extent can you judge this group as a 







whether, and to see which of the created superordinate groups were seen as entities 
that would facilitate overgeneralization. 
One item measured perceived common identity (i.e., “Do you believe 
people within this group are similar in their convictions?”), M = 4.60, SD = 1.49, and 
another item perceived common fate (i.e., “How similar are the living conditions of 
the people within this group?”), M = 4.72, SD = 1.39, on the same 7-point scale as 
was used for entitativity. These items were included to see whether participants 
composed groups based on the experimentally manipulated instructions. 
Finally, three items were included for exploratory reasons to measure the 
superordinate group’s valence (1 negative and 7 positive; M = 4.58, SD = 1.20), 
perceived threat (1 not threatening and 7 very threatening; M = 3.06, SD = 1.62), and 
similarities between the superordinate outgroup and the participants themselves (1 no 




Manipulation effects. First, we checked whether participants construed 
superordinate groups based on both common identity and common fate, and whether 
these superordinate groups corresponded with our experimental manipulation. As can 
be observed in Table 4.3, participants generally construed superordinate groups in line 
with the instructions. When participants were instructed to form superordinate groups 
around common identities, most participants construed a superordinate group around 
common identities; when participants were instructed to form superordinate groups 
around common fate, most participants construed a superordinate group around 
common fate. Moreover, in the combined condition participants created both types of 
superordinate outgroups without a clear preference for one type of commonality. 
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Cross-tabs representing the correspondence of the created superordinate outgroups with the experimentally 
manipulated instructions. 
  Experimental Condition 
  Common identity  Common fate  Combined  
  Perceived common fate  
Perceived 
common fate  
Perceived 
common fate 




No 0 11  0 28  31 15 
Yes 37 3  4 7  20 4 
1These 3 cases represent the answers coded as miscellaneous or missing (see Table 1). 
 
Repeated measure ANOVAs to control for our mixed design2 indicated no 
reliable between-subjects effect of our experimental condition on our measures of 
entitativity, F(2, 40) = 0.02, p = .981, perceived common identity, F(2, 40) = 1.75, p = 
.187, perceived common fate, F(2, 40) = 0.09, p = .912, valence, F(2, 40) = 0.21, p = 
.811, threat, F(2, 40) = 071, p =.498, or overlap with self, F(2, 40) = 0.43, p = .652. 
Accordingly, although most participants answered in line with our manipulation, the 
differences between the experimental conditions on our dependent measures were too 
small to be reliable.  
Common identity and common fate superordinate outgroups. We then 
performed additional ANOVAs in which we used our coded type of commonality as 
the independent variable3. Because the current paper focuses on superordinate 
outgroups, and because only a few superordinate ingroups (n = 20) were created, we 
decided to only present the analyses for superordinate outgroups (n = 106). In Table 
4.4, the means for each type of superordinate outgroup are presented and compared 
with each other. The three types of superordinate outgroups did not reliably differ 
                                                     
2 Because our hypothesis did not concern within-subject effects, we choose to control for, but 
not discuss, within-subject effects (also because none of the effects were statistically reliable). 
3 To control for within-subject effects, we ran additional analyses but also included participant 
number as a factor. Because the outcomes of these analyses were similar to the outcomes 







from each other on perceived common fate, F(2, 100) = 2.27, p = .109, valence, F(2, 
100) = 0.48, p = .622, threat, F(2, 100) = 0.12, p = .889, and overlap with the 
participants themselves, F(2, 100) = 0.36, p = .698.  
Importantly however, the types of superordinate outgroups did differ in the 
hypothesized way on perceived entitativity, F(2, 100) = 11.41, p < .001, and common 
identity, F(2, 99) = 20.43, p < .001. Most important for our hypothesis, superordinate 
outgroups based on common identity were perceived as more entitative than 
superordinate outgroups based on common fate, Mdifference = 0.71, SE = 0.21, p = .001, 
95%CI [0.30; 1.12]. Moreover, participants perceived the superordinate outgroup 
based on common identity as having a stronger common identity, Mdifference = 1.70, SE 
= 0.28, p < .001, 95%CI [1.15; 2.25]. Superordinate outgroups construed by 
participants on both common identity and common fate most closely resembled 
superordinate outgroups construed on common identity, and were perceived as more 
entitative than the superordinate outgroups based on only one type of commonality, 
Mdifference = 1.07, SE = 0.31, p < .001, 95%CI [0.46; 1.69].  
 
Table 4.4 
Means on the dependent measures for each type of superordinate outgroup. Different superscripts indicate 
statistically significant differences between the different types of superordinate outgroups. 
 Common identity  (n = 53) 
Common fate 
(n = 39) 
Both types 
(n = 11) 
Dependent 
variable M SD M SD M SD 
Entitativity 4.27b 0.89 3.56a 1.12 4.98c 0.77 
Common 
identity 5.36
b 0.92 3.66a 1.76 5.36b 0.92 
Common fate 4.64 1.35 4.42 1.56 5.45 1.21 
Valence 4.38 1.10 4.21 1.24 4.55 0.93 
Threat 3.13 1.58 3.29 1.80 3.27 1.49 
Self-overlap 2.45 1.32 2.54 1.19 2.82 1.60 
Note. Different superscripts indicate statistical significant between-condition differences. 
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The Study 4.1 findings suggest that both common identity and common fate 
can be used to connect different groups with each other and to categorize these 
groups within a superordinate group. Indeed, many of the construed superordinate 
groups could be considered outgroups to our Dutch participants (e.g., Asians, 
Muslims), demonstrating that participants construed superordinate outgroups. 
Nevertheless, and as expected, superordinate outgroups based on common identity 
were typically perceived as more entitative than superordinate outgroups based on 
common fate. Superordinate outgroups based on both types of commonalities 
together were perceived as most entitative. A straightforward explanation for this 
relatively high level of entitativity for superordinate outgroups based on both types of 
commonalities is that the more characteristics the subgroups have in common, the 
more similar these subgroups are perceived to be; thereby, making these superordinate 
outgroups particularly entitative.  
Building on these findings, we designed Study 4.2 to apply the notion of a 
superordinate outgroup as an explanation of carry-over effects of distant intergroup 
threat (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). Based on the Study 4.1 findings that 
superordinate outgroups can be construed around both common identity and 
common fate, and that superordinate outgroups based on a combination of these 
commonalities are most entitative, we assumed that such broadly defined 
superordinate outgroups have the strongest carry-over potential in a context of distant 
intergroup threat. For that reason, we operationalized this type of superordinate 
outgroup in Study 4.2 to test whether a superordinate outgroup can function as a 
conduit through which distant intergroup threats carry over into local intolerance — a 











The main goal of Study 4.2 was to experimentally test whether 
overgeneralizations of distant intergroup threats can be explained by a superordinate 
outgroup that connects the distant outgroup causing the threat to outgroups within 
perceivers’ local environment. Thereby, Study 4.2 illustrates the impact superordinate 
outgroups might have on intergroup relations in the specific context of carry-over 
effects of distant intergroup threats (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). More specifically, 
we manipulated the salience of different superordinate outgroups (i.e., Asians versus 
Middle-Easterners) to see whether this influenced which local outgroups are targeted 
by carry-over effects.  
To be able to manipulate the salience of a superordinate outgroup, we needed 
a distant outgroup that was relatively unfamiliar to our participants. In this way, we 
could present different superordinate outgroups without interfering with participants’ 
own beliefs. For this reason, we choose the nation of Tajikistan as our distant 
outgroup. The geographic location of the nation made it possible for us to manipulate 
its superordinate outgroup membership as being either part of Asia, or the (Greater) 
Middle-East4. These two superordinate categories could be considered superordinate 
outgroups for native Dutch participants. Moreover, the broadness of these categories 
enabled us to make commonalities based on common identity and fate salient within 
each superordinate category (which was done in the information containing the threat, 
see below).  
Importantly, three large Dutch minority groups could be included in one or 
both of these superordinate groups and are therefore, according to our hypothesis, 
potential targets of carry-over effects. These local minority groups are: Indonesian-
Dutch citizens (considered as Asian in the Netherlands), Moroccan-Dutch citizens 
                                                     
4 This superordinate categorization is—objectively—not completely accurate. However, 
because the participants were unfamiliar with the nation, we were confident that they would 
believe the information we provided to them. 
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(considered as Middle-Eastern in the Netherlands), and Turkish-Dutch citizens 
(generally considered as Middle-Eastern, but also geographically seen as Asian). We 
thus predicted that when Tajikistan was presented as a member of the superordinate 
group ‘Asians’, distant threats from Tajikistan would be associated with negative 
feelings toward Indonesian- and Turkish-Dutch citizens. Conversely, when Tajikistan 
was presented as part of the superordinate outgroup ‘Middle-Easterners’, distant 
threats would be associated with negative feelings toward Moroccan- and Turkish-
Dutch citizens. Note that Indonesian- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens are only included 
in the superordinate outgroup ‘Asians’ or ‘Middle-Easterners’ respectively, whereas 
Turkish-Dutch citizens are expected to be included in both superordinate outgroups. 
Thus, we expected that the ‘Asians’ or ‘Middle-Easterners’ superordinate outgroup 
would guide carry-over effects of intergroup threats from a distant outgroup into 




Participants. Fifty-five native Dutch undergraduate university students (71% 
female; Mage = 19 years) participated in a study entitled “Current affairs” for partial 
fulfilment of course requirements. The questionnaire was presented as consisting of 
two unrelated parts. First, the part about Tajikistan (including the manipulation) and 
second the part about minority groups within the Dutch society (consisting of the 
dependent variables). In order to make the potential link between the questionnaires 
less explicit, we included several filler items in the first part about Tajikistan (questions 
were about their previous knowledge about the nation and their opinion of the nation 
and the situation) and the local Dutch society (e.g., overlap with native Dutch).  
Manipulation. Participants read a bogus newspaper article describing the 
distant nation Tajikistan as threatening. Tajikistan was said to continuously violate 
human rights and to be a breeding ground for anti-Western extremist organizations. 







superordinate outgroup Asians (n = 27) versus Middle-Easterners (n = 28). This was 
done by adding the phrase “the Asian [versus the Middle-Eastern] nation” before 
Tajikistan in the text. Moreover, participants received a map in which the Tajikistan 
was presented as either part of Asia (Tajikistan was presented at the left-hand border 
and Indonesia at the right-hand border of the map) or the Middle-East (Tajikistan was 
presented at the right-hand border and Morocco at the left-hand border of the map).  
Knowledge about Tajikistan. To check whether participants were relatively 
unfamiliar with Tajikistan, we asked participants how much they knew about 
Tajikistan before any other information was presented (1 Nothing at all and 7 A lot). As 
expected, the knowledge level was extremely low, M = 1.31, SD = 0.66. 
Feelings of threat from Tajikistan. After participants read the information 
on Tajikistan, we measured their feelings of threat from Tajikistan with one item “Do 
you feel threatened by the current situation in Tajikistan?”, 1 Not at all and 7 Completely; 
M = 2.73, SD = 1.53. This item was used as the predictor variable in our analyses. 
Feelings of threat from the superordinate outgroup. The item for 
perceived threats from the superordinate outgroup was similar to the item for 
Tajikistan, but now we replaced “Tajikistan” by either “Asians”, N = 27, M = 2.30, 
SD = 1.41, or “Middle-Easterners”, N = 30, M = 3.11, SD = 1.40, depending on the 
experimental condition. This item was included to directly compare the superordinate 
outgroups with each other. 
Perceived threats to the world. For exploratory reasons we also measured 
the extent to which participants perceived Tajikistan as a threat to the ‘world’ (rather 
than the self) with 3 items on the same 7-point scale as was used for feelings of threat. 
The items were: “To what extent do you think the beliefs in Tajikistan pose a threat to 
the world?”, “The current situation in Tajikistan threatens the norms and values in the 
world.”, and “The current situation in Tajikistan threatens global human rights.”, α = 
.81, M = 4.54, SD = 1.33. 
Tajikistan’s typicality for the superordinate outgroup. We included two 
items to measure Tajikistan’s typicality for the superordinate outgroup Asians or 
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Middle-Easterners (depending on the experimental condition). The items were “How 
prototypical is Tajikistan for the [Asian or Middle-Eastern] world” and “To what 
extent is Tajikistan similar to other nations in the [Asian or Middle-Eastern] world” 
(Asians: n = 27, r = .54, p < .001, M = 3.06, SD = 1.12; Middle-Easterners: n = 28, r = 
.63, p < .001, M = 4.20, SD = 1.26). Like our measure of feelings of threat from the 
superordinate outgroup, this measure was included to directly compare the 
superordinate outgroups with each other. 
Feelings toward local minority groups. For each minority group, three 
feeling-thermometers (0 cold, unfriendly, negative and 100 warm, friendly, positive) were 
included and combined to measure participants’ feelings toward these groups; 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens, α = .92, M = 49.17, SD = 20.36, Turkish-Dutch citizens, α 
= .96, M = 52.57, SD = 21.37, and Indonesian-Dutch citizens, α = .92, M = 72.15, SD 
= 15.695. This variable was our dependent measure and was thus considered the 
outcome of carry-over effects. Intercorrelations between our measures are presented 




Mean-level effects of manipulation. Since the same threats were presented 
in both conditions, we did not have specific expectations about, and did not find 
reliable differences between, the two experimental conditions on feelings of threat 
from Tajikistan, t(53) = -0.12, p = .776, and perceived threats to the world from 
Tajikistan, t(53) = -0.02, p = .963. Similarly, the manipulation did not affect feelings 
toward the local outgroups Indonesian-Dutch citizens, t(53) = -1.03, p = .308, and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens t(53) = -1.46, p = .150. Generally, Turkish-Dutch citizens 
                                                     
5 Originally, we also included questions about Chinese- and Surinamese-Dutch citizens. 
However, due to a programming error these questions were not presented to all our 
participants. For the 42 participants who filled-out these questions, we did not find any effects. 







were perceived more negatively in the Asians condition than in the Middle-Easterners 
condition, MDifference = -11.35, t(53), = -2.03, p = .048, 95%CI [-22.59; -0.11]. In 
addition, participants perceived more threats from the superordinate outgroup 
Middle-Easterners than from the superordinate outgroup Asians, MDifference = -0.81, 
t(53), = -2.14, p = .037, 95%CI [-1.57; -0.05], and perceived Tajikistan to be more 
prototypical for the superordinate outgroup Middle-Easterners than for the 
superordinate outgroup Asians, MDifference = -1.14, t(53), = -3.55, p < .001, 95%CI [-
1.79; -0.50].  
 
Table 4.5 
Intercorrelations between the measures of Study 2 separated by condition. Intercorrelations for the Asian 
condition are presented above the diagonal; intercorrelations for the Middle-Eastern condition are presented below 
the diagonal. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Threat from Tajikistan — .28 .46* .11 -.35† -.21 -.48* 
2. Threat to world from 
Tajikistan .32
† — -.17 -.23 -.26 -.27 -.22 
3. Threat from superordinate 
outgroup .75** .53** — .55 -.28 -.21 -.27 
4. Prototypicality .38* -.01 .36† — .07 -.04 -.02 
5. Feelings toward Turkish-
Dutch  citizens -.36
† -.05 -.52** -.29 — .78** .60** 
6. Feelings toward Moroccan-
Dutch citizens -.35
† .00 -.48** -.31 .94** — .54** 
7. Feelings toward Indonesian-
Dutch  citizens -.28 .10 -.29 -.36
† .66** .63** — 
†p < .05, one-tailed. *p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed.  
 
Carry-over effects of distant threats. Although feelings of threats from 
Tajikistan were relatively low, moderated regression analyses using Hayes (2013) 
PROCESS macro for SPSP (model 1) confirmed the predicted pattern of associations 
between threats and feelings toward local minority groups (see Table 4.6). When 
Tajikistan was presented as an Asian nation, perceived threats from Tajikistan were 
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predictive of more negative feelings toward Indonesian- and Turkish-Dutch citizens, 
who can both be categorized as members of the superordinate outgroup ‘Asians’. 
When Tajikistan was presented as a Middle-Eastern nation, perceived threats from 
Tajikistan were predictive of more negative feelings toward Moroccan- and Turkish-
Dutch citizens, who can both be categorized as members of the superordinate 
outgroup ‘Middle-Easterners’. Despite this clear pattern, none of the interaction-
effects between the manipulation and the perceived threat on attitudes toward each of 
the local minorities was significant; Indonesian-Dutch citizens, F(1, 51) = 1.59, p = 
.213, ∆R2 = .03, Moroccan-Dutch citizens, F(1, 51) = 0.12, p = .726, ∆R2 < .01, and 
Turkish-Dutch citizens, F(1, 51) = 0.01, p = .912, ∆R2 < .01. Note that our 
predictions are at the level of the simple or conditioned effects; not at the (omnibus) 
level of the interaction itself, which can be considered overly conservative in the case 
of interaction patterns that predict a significant simple effect at one level of a variable, 
but no effect at the other (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003).  
 
Table 4.6 
Unstandardized regression coefficients of perceived threats of Tajikistan on attitudes toward Turkish-, 
Moroccan- and Indonesian-Dutch citizens, separated for the experimental conditions based on presented 
superordinate outgroup Middle-Eastern (n = 28) and Asian (n = 27). 
Attitudes toward Condition B SE 95% CI 
Indonesian-Dutch 
citizens 
Middle-Eastern -2.38 1.73 [-5.86; 1.10] 
Asian -5.66** 1.95 [-9.57; -1.76] 
Turkish-Dutch 
citizens 
Middle-Eastern -4.93* 2.36 [-9.66; -0.20] 
Asian -4.53† 2.65 [-9.85; 0.78] 
Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens 
Middle-Eastern -4.20† 2.34 [-8.91; 0.50] 
Asian -2.96 2.63 [-8.25; 2.32] 










The results of Study 4.2 suggest that carry-over effects of distant intergroup 
threat into local intolerance can be explained by the construal of a superordinate 
outgroup. Only when there was a psychological association available that individuals 
could put to use, we found the predicted relationships with threat from a distant 
outgroup and intolerance toward local outgroups. Specifically, when Tajikistan was 
presented as Asian, threats from Tajikistan carried over into less tolerant feelings 
toward Indonesian- and Turkish-Dutch citizens (but not toward Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens); when Tajikistan was presented as Middle-Eastern, threats from Tajikistan 
carried over into less tolerant feelings toward Moroccan- and Turkish-Dutch citizens 
(but not toward Indonesian-Dutch citizens).  
However, admittedly, one limitation of Study 4.2 is that the effects on feelings 
toward Turkish-Dutch citizens in the Asian condition, and Moroccan-Dutch citizens 
in the Middle-Eastern condition, were only statistically significant when tested one-
sided. Possibly, because participants were in general more negative toward Turkish- 
and Moroccan-Dutch citizens than toward Indonesian-Dutch citizens, there was less 
room for distant threats to exert influence on participants’ perceptions of these local 
outgroups. Moreover, Turkish-Dutch citizens are generally perceived to have more in 
common with Middle-Easterners than with Asians, which could explain the weaker 
effect in the Asian condition (e.g., Van Osch & Breugelmans, 2012). Alternatively, due 
to recent events within the Middle-East, the presented threats might have activated 
another superordinate outgroup (e.g., Muslim, terrorist) that connects Tajikistan with 
Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, even in the Asian condition. This explanation 
would also suggest a more clear-cut distinction between the conditions on feelings 
toward Indonesian-Dutch citizens because Indonesian-Dutch citizens are not typically 
associated with the presented threats, which is exactly what we found. Therefore, and 
despite the aforementioned limitations, the pattern of findings corresponds with our 
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The results of two empirical studies by and large support the idea that 
individuals can construe superordinate outgroups (Study 4.1), which can serve as a 
conduit through which carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats occur (Study 
4.2). Study 4.1 indicated that individuals are able to categorize multiple outgroups into 
a superordinate outgroup based on common identity (e.g., all Muslims) or common 
fate (e.g., all wealthy countries). Superordinate outgroups based on common identity 
were perceived as slightly more entitative than superordinate outgroups based on 
common fate; moreover, superordinate outgroups based on both types of 
commonalities were perceived as most entitative, which make these superordinate 
outgroups particularly likely to facilitate overgeneralizations and thus carry-over 
effects (e.g., Denson et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2003; Stenstrom et al., 2008). Study 4.2 
specifically looked at these broadly-defined superordinate outgroups and supported 
the idea that such superordinate outgroups can function as a conduit through which 
carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats occur. The findings showed that, 
depending on the presence of a superordinate outgroup (i.e., Asians versus Middle-
Easterners), the distant outgroup (i.e., Tajikistan) was linked to different local 
outgroups (i.e., Indonesian- and Turkish-Dutch citizens versus Moroccan- and 
Turkish-Dutch citizens, respectively) and through this conduit facilitated intolerance 
toward them. 
Our findings have novel theoretical implications and more generally broaden 
the scope in which superordinate groups can be studied. Whereas previous research 
mainly focused on superordinate groups that include the ingroup (e.g., Dovidio et al., 
2007, 2009; Gaertner et al., 1993, 1989; Wenzel et al., 2007), we show that 







well. That is, whereas previous research mainly focused on how superordinate group 
formation can resolve intergroup conflicts, our findings indicated that superordinate 
groups could also be a channel through which overgeneralizations of intolerance 
occur. Thereby, our findings provide a new link between research on superordinate 
groups (e.g., Brewer & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009; Gaertner et al., 
1993, 1989; Wenzel et al., 2007) and classical theories on prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954; 
Blumer, 1958). In addition, our finding that observers’ can construe superordinate 
outgroups based on a perceived common identity (e.g., religion) and/or fate (e.g., 
wealth) offers important insights in how superordinate outgroups are formed, which 
might apply to the formation of superordinate ingroups as well.  
More specifically, our findings shed new light on research on carry-over 
effects of intergroup threats. Study 4.2 indicated that superordinate outgroups could 
provide an explanation for why perceived threats from a distant outgroup induce 
intolerance toward local outgroups (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). In addition, our 
outcomes relate to earlier findings on the processes underlying carry-over effects 
(Bouman et al., 2015a). Bouman and colleagues (2015a) suggested that observers 
generalize their attitudes about the distant outgroup toward local outgroups (i.e., 
group-based association pathway), as well as perceived threats from the distant 
outgroup (i.e., threat-based association pathway). An interesting implication of this 
might be that superordinate outgroups based on common identity and common fate 
might differ in what gets generalized: group attitudes or group threats. Moreover, 
different types of intergroup threats (i.e., symbolic versus realistic) might activate 
different types of superordinate outgroups (i.e., common identity versus fate). For 
instance, observers might be most likely to generalize perceived realistic threats (e.g., 
from Greece to the Dutch economy) to local outgroups (e.g., alert Dutch about 
potential threats from immigrants) by activating a superordinate outgroup based on 
common fate (e.g., ‘economically weak and dependent’). This suggests dependence 
between the type of threat, type of superordinate outgroup, and type of generalization. 
Further research is needed to test these suggestions. 
 
From global threats to local intolerance: 







The present findings are particularly relevant in the light of globalization for 
two main reasons. Firstly, globalization may increase both the objective and 
psychological presence and visibility of global structures such as the superordinate 
outgroups we focus on. Accordingly, globalization enables and encourages 
psychological processes such as carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats. 
Secondly, globalization may broaden the objective and psychological visibility of 
distant and global events (e.g., through media coverage, for a similar argument see 
Bouman et al., 2014); thereby, globalization may increase the scope of events that 
could carry over into local intolerance. For these reasons, globalization appears to be 
an important enabler and amplifier of carry-over effects of distant intergroup threats 
through the construal of superordinate outgroups. 
Our findings also have potential applied value. For instance, our results 
indicate that the occurrence and specific targets of carry-over effects may depend on 
whether (and if so which) superordinate outgroup is construed by individuals. 
Avoiding the explicit use of superordinate outgroups within for instance policy and 
news reports could therefore help to prevent carry-over effects from occurring. Of 
course, even in the absence of information on superordinate outgroups in reports, 
observers might construe superordinate outgroups themselves (although in fact little is 
known about this; admittedly, in Study 4.1, we instructed individuals to construe 
superordinate outgroups). Alternatively, one could try to prevent carry-over effects by 
categorizing the outgroup perceived as threatening in an exclusive and quite select 
superordinate outgroup (see also Bouman et al., 2015a); thereby, limiting the number 
of outgroups to which carry-over effects could occur. 
Our studies also have at least three potential limitations. Firstly, because of 
the under-researched status of superordinate outgroups, we chose to first identify 
what types of superordinate outgroups can be formed (Study 4.1), where after we 
applied these findings to the case of carry-over effects of intergroup threats (Study 
4.2). Whereas this strategy enabled us to answer our main research questions and 







validity of our findings as our studies were not designed to replicate our findings 
across studies and contexts. Accordingly, future research should try to replicate the 
outcomes of our studies and, ideally, combine both research designs within a single 
study. Nevertheless, we do not believe that this limitation is problematic for the 
current paper’s purpose. In our view, our findings show that superordinate outgroups 
are psychologically relevant and, given their under-researched status, deserving of 
further and more systematic study. 
Secondly, it is true that although we differentiated between superordinate 
outgroups based on common identity and common fate, this distinction is sometimes 
difficult to maintain in practice. As the results of Study 4.1 already indicated, 
superordinate outgroups might also have a mixed nature of both common identity and 
common fate. For instance, the superordinate outgroup GIIPS, which was seen as 
having structural fiscal problems (e.g., Andrikopoulos et al., 2014; Stockhammer & 
Sotiropoulos, 2014), is also often portrayed as the PIGGS (e.g., O’Flynn, Monaghan, 
& Power, 2014) — a name with a negative connotation that is linked to stereotypes of 
the included outgroups (e.g., lazy). However, because both types of commonalities 
appeared to be conducive to the construal of superordinate outgroups and thus carry-
over effects, and because each type of commonality might result in different 
generalizations (e.g., generalizations of threats versus feelings), we believe the 
analytical distinction between superordinate outgroups based on common identity and 
common fate remains relevant. 
Finally, our focus in Study 4.2 on the process of carry-over effects of distant 
intergroup threats might give the impression that superordinate outgroups are mainly 
delivery channels of negative intergroup relationships. Possibly, however, 
superordinate outgroups can also serve as channels for positive overgeneralizations. 
For instance, positive experiences with one outgroup may generalize to other 
outgroups when these outgroups share a superordinate outgroup membership. 
Indeed, research on secondary transfer effects of more direct forms of intergroup 
contact  suggests that such positive generalizations might occur (e.g., Brown & 
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Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch et al., 2010). Future research can test 
whether such effects could also be explained by the existence of superordinate 
outgroups; thus, whether superordinate outgroups can also have positive 





Our findings suggest that individuals can construe and put to use 
superordinate outgroups within which attitudes and threats could be assimilated, 
leading to overgeneralizations to outgroups within this larger entity. These 
superordinate outgroups can be based on perceived commonalities between 
outgroups’ identities (e.g., religion) and fate (e.g., wealth). Moreover, superordinate 
outgroups are often global structures that include multiple outgroups at different 
levels of the society (e.g., distant and local outgroups). Thereby, superordinate 
outgroups can psychologically connect different outgroups with each other and 
provide a conduit through which distant situations can impact people’s perception of 
more nearby outgroups. In this way, ‘global’ superordinate outgroups can make 
distant intergroup situations relevant at the ‘local’ level. Indeed, in times of 
globalization, a better understanding of whether and how individuals construe and use 
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From the moment the Tunisian Mohammed Bouaziz set fire to himself in 
December 2010, the Tunisian and Arab uprisings caught fire as well. The flames were 
noted not just in the Arab region (e.g., mass protests and civil wars forcing 
authoritarian regimes to step down; International Crisis Group, 2011a), but also in the 
broader world where the Arab uprisings became an ongoing topic of interest and 
concern. Indeed, global mass media coverage affected how global observers perceived 
the — for them ‘distant’ — Arab region (Cottle, 2011; Ghannam, 2011). Moreover, 
for these global observers, such distant events are not without ‘local’ consequences. 
For instance, Bouman and colleagues (2014, 2015a; 2015b) found that media 
portrayals of distant situations as threatening can carry over into local intolerance, which 
means that global observers’ attitudes toward local outgroups (e.g., attitudes of native 
Dutch toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens) become more negative when 
those outgroups are psychologically associated with the distant outgroup perceived as 
threatening (e.g., Muslim Brotherhood). To put it simply, these earlier findings suggest 
that bad news spreads quickly. 
What is relatively unknown, however, is whether such carry-over effects also 
occur for ‘good news’. That is, can positive information about distant outgroups 
foster tolerance toward associated local groups? Indeed, carry-over effects have been 
mainly studied and identified in situations which are perceived as negative and 
threatening (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Sassenberg et al., 2007). For instance, 
the global media often portrayed the Arab uprisings as violent and a breeding ground 
for radicalization and terrorism (e.g., Hider, 2011; Van Den Dool, 2011); inducing 
negative reactions toward the Arab region (Cottle, 2011; Ghannam, 2011) and — 
through carry-over effects — intolerance toward local minority groups (Bouman et al., 
2014). This leaves us with a rather pessimistic message, suggesting that distant events 
typically negatively affect global and local intergroup relationships. Yet, there are of 
course also positive portrayals of distant situations in the media; for instance, many 
media outlets referred to the Arab uprisings as the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening’ 







connotation to it. However, not much is known about the effect of such positive 
media portrayals. The aim of this paper is therefore to explore and compare the carry-
over potential of both negative and positive media portrayals of distant intergroup 
events. The key research question we ask is whether the carry-over effects identified in 
the literature regarding distant ‘bad news’ (e.g., Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b) will 
also apply to distant ‘good news’. 
More technically, we ask whether positive media portrayals of distant 
situations (e.g., Arab Spring or Arab Awakening) induce positive carry-over effects, and 
directly compare these with negative carry-over effects. We believe that two 
alternative predictions are possible and plausible. Firstly, the same processes as were 
found for negative carry-over effects (e.g., Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b) might 
also apply to positive information, resulting in similar, but positive, carry-over effects. 
Alternatively — and in our view more likely — based on earlier research on a positive-
negative asymmetry in information processing (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), one could predict weaker carry-over 
effects for positive information, which is, amongst others, considered less diagnostic 
than negative information.  
We report two experimental studies testing these predictions: Study 5.1 
employs the, for our participants, distant context of the Syrian civil war, and Study 5.2 
uses the Egyptian uprisings to this end. But before turning to these studies, we first 
discuss the social psychology of carry-over effects of distant threats and then apply 
this theoretical and empirical evidence to distant ‘good news’. 
 
Carry-over effects of distant ‘bad news’ 
 
People experience intergroup threats when they subjectively perceive that an 
outgroup poses a threat to the ingroup (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2004; Stephan et al., 
1999, 2009). These threats can be experienced at the personal and at the group level, 
and can be symbolic or realistic (e.g., Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2009). 
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Symbolic threats concern perceived threats to the ingroup’s worldview, religion, and 
(moral) values. For instance, Islamist ideologies within the Egyptian uprisings could be 
perceived as symbolically threatening by Christian or non-religious people because of 
differences in religious convictions (e.g., Bouman et al., 2014). Realistic threats concern 
perceived threats to the ingroup’s possessions, resources, safety, or power. For 
instance, Western people might fear the Egyptian uprisings because of potential 
economic outcomes (e.g., oil prices), safety issues, or a loss of political power (e.g., 
Bouman et al., 2014).  
Research on intergroup threats originally focused on local threats (e.g., from 
immigrants; Stephan et al., 2005, 1999) and how these threats directly affect 
individuals’ feelings toward the outgroup perceived as threatening (for a meta-analysis 
see Riek et al., 2006). However, other research indicated that these threats can also 
carry over and affect perceptions of other outgroups than the one originally posing the 
threat. For instance, Sassenberg and colleagues (2007) indicated that personal 
experiences of competition with an outgroup member (i.e., realistic threats) can 
activate a ‘competitive mindset’; this mindset makes people prone to react negatively 
toward other potential competitors as well, and thus causes carry-over effects. In 
addition, and specifically relevant to our topic of interest, Bouman and colleagues 
(2014, 2015a) demonstrated that carry-over effects can also occur when people are 
confronted indirectly with threats through media coverage of distant situations (e.g., 
about the Egyptian uprisings).  
These carry-over effects of threats elicited by distant outgroups seem to rely 
on a psychological association between the distant situation and the local outgroups. 
This association can be group-based (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a); that is, carry-over 
effects occur because the distant and local outgroups are perceived as culturally related 
to each other. For instance, perceived symbolic threats from the possible accession of 
Turkey to the EU made Dutch observers more negative toward culturally related local 
outgroups Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, but not toward the unrelated 







over via a threat-based association: The distant threat might alert observers about 
(potential) local threats and thereby result in local intolerance. For instance, perceived 
economic threats from Greece alerted Dutch participants about potential local 
competitors (e.g., Polish-Dutch citizens), resulting in more negative feelings toward 
Polish-Dutch citizens (Bouman et al., 2015a). Other research (Bouman et al., 2015b) 
suggested that these associations are often based on a perceived superordinate outgroup 
(e.g., for Christians, Muslims) in which the distant (e.g., Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood) and local outgroups (e.g., Turkish-Dutch citizens) are both included, 
and that the activation of this superordinate outgroup determines whether carry-over 
effects occur (e.g., perceived threats from the distant Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
to influence prejudice toward local Turkish-Dutch citizens). 
 
Carry-over effects of distant ‘good news’? 
 
In contrast to carry-over effects of intergroup threats, and thus ‘bad news’, 
little is known about whether distant ‘good news’ can induce similar carry-over effects 
and thus make global observers more tolerant toward local outgroups. Importantly 
however, such positive views are also presented within the media (e.g., Cottle, 2011; 
Harlow & Johnson, 2011). For example, many people referred to the Arab uprisings 
as the ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening’, symbolizing a movement toward 
improvements, democracy, and freedom (e.g., Cottle, 2011; De Beer, 2011; Telhamy 
& Kull, 2011). Accordingly, are observers equally likely to generalize distant ‘good 
news’ within a superordinate outgroup as distant ‘bad news’ (Bouman et al., 2014, 
2015a, 2015b), and thereby increase local tolerance? 
This may indeed be the case as some of the previously described processes 
underlying negative carry-over effects might apply to distant ‘good news’ as well. In 
particular, when observers become more positive toward a distant outgroup which is 
positively portrayed in the media, this positivity might also be attributed to similarly 
perceived local outgroups (i.e., a group-based association; Bouman et al., 2015a). 
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Indeed, previous research on secondary transfer effects of intergroup contact suggests 
that positive contact with one outgroup might also improve feelings toward other 
outgroups (Lolliot et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 1998, 2009; Tausch et al., 2010). However, 
these effects may be restricted to situations in which the contact was more direct than 
the media portrayals we focus on (B. A. Lee, Farrell, & Link, 2004). Accordingly, 
although research on intergroup contact suggests that distant ‘good news’ could — 
similar to distant ‘bad news’ — carry over via a group-based association, it also 
suggests that these carry-over effects are less probable within the context we focus on. 
The potential restriction of indirect contact through media coverage may 
specifically apply to ‘good news’ (B. A. Lee et al., 2004) as multiple studies have 
indicated that ‘bad news’ presented in the media does carry over (e.g., Bouman et al., 
2014, 2015a, 2015b). Such difference between effects of positive and negative media 
messages is in line with earlier research on the positive-negative asymmetry in information 
processing (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 
1989), which suggests that negative information is more diagnostic than positive 
information. For this reason, in comparison to positive information, negative 
information seizes more attention (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Trussler & Soroka, 
2014), is more easily recalled (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), increases the 
salience of in- and outgroup group memberships (e.g., Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 
2010), is generalized more strongly (e.g., Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004), and translates 
more quickly into stable stereotypes (e.g., Barlow et al., 2012). This positive-negative 
asymmetry seems quite fundamental and is found within different contexts, varying 
from the influence of online news on political attitudes and voting behavior (Faraon, 
Stenberg, & Kaipainen, 2014) to judgments of objects within computer games (e.g., 
Fazio et al., 2004). Accordingly, in the current paper we test whether there is a similar 
positive-negative asymmetry for carry-over effects of distant ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news; 
that is, whether distant ‘bad news’ makes observers more intolerant than that distant 








Overview of our studies. 
 
We test in two experimental studies, referring to different ongoing conflict 
situations, whether (a) distant ‘good news’ can carry over into local tolerance and (b) 
distant ‘bad news’ has a stronger carry-over potential than distant ‘good news’. In 
Study 5.1, we focus on the Syrian civil war, which was at the time of Study 5.1 
(February and March 2014) for many Dutch citizens a relatively isolated conflict 
between the Syrian government (i.e., Assad) and the Syrian National Coalition (a quite 
diverse coalition of anti-Assad rebel groups). In Study 5.2, we focus on another 
context — the Egyptian uprisings (end of 2012)1 — which was generally perceived to 
have a more global influence on for instance international politics and the worldwide 




Study 5.1 provided a first test of the occurrence of positive and negative 
carry-over effects in the context of the Syrian civil war. At the time of Study 5.1, two 
fighting groups were generally differentiated within the Syrian war: (a) the Assad 
government, which was in power at the start of the civil war, and (b) the Syrian 
National Coalition (or the “rebels”). Although the Syrian National Coalition was 
united around the shared goal to depose Assad, the group itself was quite diverse and 
fought separately for a long time (International Crisis Group, 2011b). Accordingly, 
within the media and general discourse, the impression of the Syrian National 
Coalition and its ideals varied between a (democratic) freedom movement and a 
fundamentalist Islamic movement (NOS, 2011). Within Study 5.1 we used this 
ambiguity by manipulating how the Syrian National Coalition was portrayed (i.e., 
                                                     
1 The numbering of the studies follows the goal to provide a well-accessible structure, rather 
than their chronological sequence. The data of Study 5.2 (end of 2012) was collected before 
the data of Study 5.1 (early 2014).  
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negatively/threatening versus positively; and a mixed control condition), testing whether 
these portrayals affected Dutch observers’ impression of the rebels and, through 
carry-over effects, their impression of local Dutch minority groups (i.e., Turkish-, 




Participants and design. Fifty-seven native Dutch undergraduate university 
students participated in an online study entitled “Civil war in Syria: Who are those 
rebels?” for partial fulfillment of course requirements. Participants were divided over 
three experimental conditions: The negative (i.e., threat; n = 19), the positive (n = 17), 
and the mixed condition which mainly functioned as a control condition (n = 21).  All 
participants first filled-out a questionnaire on the Syrian civil war (including the 
experimental manipulation). Thereafter, they were directed to the second, allegedly 
unrelated, questionnaire about the local Dutch minority groups Turkish-, Moroccan-, 
and Polish-Dutch citizens (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). 
Materials and measures. Below we will first describe the questionnaire on 
the Syrian civil war and the distant situation presented in the news report. Afterwards, 
we will describe the questionnaire about the local minority groups, which included our 
main dependent variables. 
The Syrian civil war. This first questionnaire focused on the Syrian civil war. 
It  contained our experimental manipulation and  measured initial knowledge on Syria 
(measured before the manipulation), feelings toward the Syrian rebels, perceived 
similarities between the rebels and other Arabs, perceived global threats from the 







uprisings2, which are all at the distant level. Unless stated otherwise, the items were 
measured on a 7-point scale (1 completely not and 7 completely). 
Manipulation. The manipulation informed participants about the ongoing 
situation in Syria. In all conditions, the information was presented as daily impressions 
of a news correspondent visiting the Syrian city Deir el-Zour; a city which was 
according to the report just conquered by the rebels. From a Western perspective, the 
report either framed the Syrian situation as negative/threatening (i.e., Syria was 
presented as becoming radicalized by fanatic Muslims), positive (i.e., Syria was 
presented as becoming more Western and democratic), or ‘mixed’ news (i.e., control 
condition, Syria was presented as valuing both Islamic and democratic ideals). 
Specifically, in the negative [mixed, positive] news condition, the correspondent 
presented Deir el-Zour as “a relatively Arabic [Arabic, Western] city where crowds 
gather around the just rebuild Mosques [Mosques, Market place]. Moreover, the people on 
the street wear mainly religious dresses [white dresses, casual clothing]”. In addition, the 
correspondent’s impression of the rebels was presented and stated that “it was 
relatively hard [easy, easy] to get in contact with the rebels who mainly endorse Islamic 
[liberal, Western] ideologies. These ideologies are the main motives behind the uprisings 
against the totalitarian government of Assad. The rebels strive for an Islamic republic of 
Syria in which the Islamic norms and values are the standard [a democracy in which both Islamic and 
liberal norms are important, a democracy with Western norms and values]. According to one of 
the rebels: “The Islam is the basis for Syria and the Sharia is our law, we do not want to be 
bothered by the demons from the West” [“The Islam is important for Syrians, but democracy should 
be the foundation in which men and women should be treated as equals”, “We are inspired by the 
Western society, democracy should be self-evident and men and women should be treated as equals”]. 
                                                     
2 We also included two items measuring perceived outcomes of the uprisings. The first 
measuring the expected duration of the conflict and the second measuring who was expected 
to win the civil war. Because we did not have specific expectations about these measures and 
because the outcomes did not differ between conditions, we choose to exclude these items 
from further analyses. 
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Comprehension check. Directly after the presentation of the newspaper article, 
participants were asked to indicate what they thought was the most important message 
of the newspaper article and were asked to give their opinion on the current situation 
in Syria. We included this measure to check whether participants had accurately read 
the article. Most answers were in line with the manipulation; however, two 
participants in the positive experimental condition stated that this was how the rebels 
like to present themselves in Western media, but that in reality the rebels are much 
more diverse and often fundamentalist. Because these are realistic concerns in the 
current context, we saw no reason to remove these participants from the analyses. 
Initial knowledge about Syria. To control for initial knowledge about the distant 
situation, four items asked how much the participant already knew about the Syrian 
situation (1 nothing and 5 a little and 10 a lot). The four items were “How much do you 
know about Syria?”, “… the civil war/conflicts?”, “… the ruling government 
(Assad)?”, and “… the rebels?”. Because the items were strongly related (α = .91), we 
used the mean of the four items in further analyses (M = 4.31, SD = 1.67). Initial 
knowledge did not affect any of the relationships between the manipulation and the 
outcome variables; therefore, we did not include this measure in the analyses 
presented in the results section. 
Perception of threat from the Syrian civil war. Because our negative news 
manipulation contained potential symbolic threats (e.g., Islamic radicalization) and our 
positive news manipulation potentially removed symbolic threats (i.e.., Syrians and the 
Dutch observers get more like-minded), we measured whether our manipulation 
affected perceived threats at two levels of analysis. Firstly, we measured perceived 
symbolic threats from the rebels with four items: “To what extent are you threatened 
by the rebels’ ideologies?”, “… worldview (e.g., religion and culture)?”, “To what 
extent do you believe the Syrian rebels have the same norms and values as you?” 
[reverse coded], and “… the same moral convictions as you?” [reverse coded], α = .69, 







Global threats from Syrian civil war. Secondly, two items measured the extent to 
which participants perceived the situation in Syria as having a more global influence: 
“To what extent do you perceive the situation in Syria as threatening?” and “To what 
extent do you think world safety is influenced by the civil war in Syria?” (r = .58, M = 
3.94, SD = 1.31). We included these items to see whether participants considered the 
Syrian civil war as a distant and isolated conflict or as a conflict with a more global 
influence as we believe the latter is more likely to induce carry-over effects (Bouman 
et al., 2014, 2015a). 
Feelings toward the rebels. To test whether feelings toward the distant outgroup 
mentioned in the news report were affected by our manipulation (Cottle, 2011; 
Ghannam, 2011), we measured participants’ feelings toward the rebels on a 100-point 
thermometer scale (1 negative or cold and 100 positive or warm). The mean was computed 
and used for further analyses (r = .70, M = 47.21, SD = 21.74). 
Similarities between the rebels and other Arabs. To see whether the scene presented 
in our news report was considered typical for the overall Arab region, three items 
measured how much similarities participants perceived between the Syrian rebels and 
other people living in the Arab world: “The rebels in Syria are prototypical for Arabs”, 
“The ideals of the Syrian rebels are similar to the ideals of other Arabs”, and “The 
convictions of the Syrian rebels are similar to the convictions of other Arabs” (α = 
.78, M = 4.25, SD = 1.04). 
Measures about local groups. The second questionnaire comprised of 
measures of feelings toward local outgroups Turkish-, Moroccan-, and Polish-Dutch 
citizens, which are all potential targets of carry-over effects. In the Netherlands, 
Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens are generally perceived as culturally related to 
the Arab world (e.g., Bouman et al., 2014), whereas Polish-Dutch citizens are typically 
not associated with the Arab world. Accordingly, the inclusion of these local minority 
groups allowed us to test, whether carry-over effects only occur toward local 
outgroups which are (culturally) related to the distant outgroup (i.e., Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens; e.g., Bouman et al., 2014) or toward local outgroups in 
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general (i.e., also toward Polish-Dutch citizens). In addition, this questionnaire 
contained measures of perceived similarities between Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens and the Syrian rebels3. 
Feelings toward local outgroups. We used two feeling thermometers (1 negative or 
cold and 100 positive or warm) to measure feelings toward Turkish-Dutch citizens, r = 
.80, M = 58.04, SD = 20.72; Polish-Dutch citizens, r = .94, M = 49.34, SD = 24.13; 
and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, r = .90, M = 46.45, SD = 25.26. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Firstly, we tested with a MANOVA whether there were mean-level 
differences between the experimental conditions on participants’ perceptions of the 
distant Syrian situation. The multivariate effect was indeed significant, F(8, 104) = 
4.21, p < .001, η2partial = .24. Follow-up ANOVAs indicated significant differences in 
feelings toward the rebels, F(2, 54) = 12.06, p < .001, η2partial = .31, perceived symbolic threats 
from the rebels, F(2, 54) = 12.33, p < .001, η2partial = .31, and similarities between the rebels 
and other Arabs (F(2, 54) = 3.62, p = .034, η2partial = .12. The effects of the manipulation 
on perceived global threat approached, but did not reach conventional levels of 
significance, F(2, 54) = 2.56, p = .086, η2partial = .09. As intended, post-hoc analyses 
(see Table 5.1 superscripts) indicated that participants in the negative condition were most 
negative toward the rebels, and perceived the most symbolic threats from the rebels; 
on those measures, the mixed and positive condition scored similar to each other. 
Moreover, participants in the positive condition perceived the fewest similarities between 
the rebels and other Arabs.  
 
                                                     
3 These items on similarities between distant and local outgroups were included for exploratory 
purposes. However, to keep the current paper concise and focused, we choose to exclude 










Means on the dependent measures for each experimental condition (threat, positive, and mixed). Different 
superscripts indicate statistically significant differences between the different conditions. 
 Threat Positive Mixed 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Distant measures       
  Feelings rebels 30.47a 18.66 58.06b 19.78 53.57b 16.98 
  Symbolic threat rebels 5.18a 0.98 3.93b 0.82 4.12b 0.69 
  Global threat 3.45a 1.36 3.97ab 1.24 4.36b 1.21 
  Similar to other Arabs 4.53a 1.19 3.71b 0.81 4.43a 0.93 
Local Measures       
  Turkish-Dutch 61.26 21.88 52.74 19.24 59.43 20.94 
  Polish-Dutch 47.48 25.41 42.97 22.98 47.48 25.41 
  Moroccan-Dutch 46.29 24.72 42.06 23.78 46.29 24.72 
 
 
Unexpectedly, participants in the negative condition felt the fewest global 
threats (see Table 5.1). Although in this specific condition symbolic threats from the 
rebels were presented and perceived, this specific information was seemingly not seen 
as having an impact on the rest of the world. That is, participants perceived the 
ideologies of the rebels as threatening, but saw the rebels to only influence the Syrian 
situation. This corresponds with the public opinion about the Syrian civil war, in 
which most countries actively distanced themselves from the conflict (Pew Research 
Center, 2013). Importantly, such isolation of the Syrian situation is also likely to 
obstruct the occurrence of carry-over effects (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a), which was 
indeed reflected by the lack of mean-level effects of the manipulation at the local level, 
multivariate F(6, 106) = 0.82, p = .56, η2partial = .04 (see also Table 5.1). Accordingly, at 
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the mean-level4 we did not find support for our carry-over hypotheses as neither 
negative nor positive information about the Syrian civil war influenced Dutch 
observers’ perceptions of local Dutch outgroups. 
In sum, Study 5.1 indicated that our manipulation successfully altered the 
perception of the distant situation. As expected, the presentation of negative 
information about Syrian rebels made observers perceive more symbolic threats from 
the rebels and become more negative toward the rebels. Also as expected, the 
presentation of positive information made observers slightly positive about the rebels 
but also detached the rebels from the Arab region, suggesting a lower carry-over 
potential (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). Despite these promising results at the distant 
level, however, we did not find support for carry-over effects. 
This lack of carry-over effects could possibly be explained by the surprising 
finding that participants in the negative condition perceived the fewest global threats 
from the Syrian situation. Most likely, the specificity of the information in the negative 
condition might have further strengthened the public perception that the Syrian civil 
war is an isolated conflict (Pew Research Center, 2013). Accordingly, although 
participants acknowledged that they perceived the ideologies of the rebels as 
threatening, they were not afraid that these ideologies would have an impact outside 
the Syrian conflict. Previous research has suggested that this more global impact, in 
which the distant situation is also perceived to threaten the ingroup, is necessary to 
cause carry-over effects (e.g., Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). For that reason, the 
situation of Study 5.1 might have limited the news report’s carry-over potential. Study 
5.2 differed in this respect, as it focused on the Egypt uprisings which were generally 
considered to have a (large) global impact on protests in the Arab region, global 
politics, and the worldwide perception of Muslims and Arabs (e.g., De Beer, 2011). 
                                                     
4 Although we did not find mean-level effects, we found that in the threat condition perceived 
global threats were negatively related to feelings toward Moroccan- (r = -.48, p = .035), Polish- 
(r = -.46, p = .046), and to a lesser extent, Turkish-Dutch citizens (r = -.31, p = .204). This 









Study 5.2 focuses on two potential outcomes of the Egyptian uprisings that 
were often presented within Western media outlets: the anti-Western “Islamization” 
view (symbolic threat, negative condition) versus the pro-Western democratic view 
(opportunity, positive condition). We expect both media portrayals to influence Dutch 
observers’ perception of the Egyptian situation (e.g., Cottle, 2011; Ghannam, 2011), 
and negative information to exert a stronger influence on local intergroup 
relationships than positive information. More specifically, we hypothesize that 
learning about negative threats from the Egyptian uprisings makes Dutch observers 
more intolerant toward local minority groups that are associated with the Arab region 
(i.e., Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens; e.g., Bouman et al., 2014), but not toward 
local minority groups unrelated to the Arab region (i.e., Polish-Dutch citizens). When 
the uprisings are portrayed as a positive opportunity, we test two alternative hypotheses 
suggesting either comparable or weaker evidence for positive carry-over effects 




Participants and design. Eighty-nine native Dutch undergraduate university 
students participated in the online study entitled “Egypt after the revolution” for 
partial fulfilment of course requirements. Participants were divided over four groups: 
The negative information (n = 18), the positive information (n = 20), the distant 
measures baseline (n = 29), and the local measures baseline (n = 22) groups. 
Participants in the negative and positive information groups completed two 
subsequent questionnaires, the first was about the Egypt uprisings (containing the 
experimental manipulation) and the second was about local minority groups. To 
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prevent carry-over effects from occurring in our baseline condition5, we choose to use 
two separate baseline groups: one for the distant and one for the local measures. 
Participants in the distant measures baseline group only received the questionnaire 
about the Egypt uprisings without the experimental manipulation; answers within this 
group functioned as the neutral comparison standard for the distant measures. 
Participants in the local measures baseline group received only the questionnaire about 
the local minority groups; answers in this group functioned as the neutral comparison 
standard for the local measures. 
Materials and measures. As stated above, our study comprised of two 
allegedly unrelated questionnaires; the first about the Egypt uprisings, the second 
about the Dutch local minority groups Moroccan-, Turkish-, and Polish-Dutch 
citizens. We will discuss the measures of both questionnaires in further detail below. 
The Egypt uprisings. This questionnaire (included in the two experimental 
conditions and the local attitudes baseline group; n = 67) solely focused on the distant 
situation and comprised of the experimental manipulation and -checks, perceived 
threats from the rebels, and expected outcomes of the uprisings. Moreover, this 
questionnaire contained measures regarding Egypt’s typicality for the Middle-Eastern 
region.  
Manipulation. Participants were informed about the current situation in Egypt 
by a bogus newspaper article which presented either the negative information or the 
positive information condition. In the negative information condition [positive information 
condition], the article stated that — as a result of the uprisings — “the norms and 
values between the Middle-East and the Western world have become increasingly 
different [similar]. For instance, in a recent poll, Egyptians placed strong emphasis [did not 
place any emphasis on] the role of the Sharia and favored anti-Western [pro-Western] norms 
and values. Moreover, there was almost no [much] attention for the equal rights of men 
and women and the basic human rights. In addition, most of the Egyptians indicated 
                                                     
5 We choose to use baselines instead of the “mixed” control condition of Study 5.1 as we 







that they support the conservative, strongly religious, and anti-Western Muslim brotherhood 
[progressive, unreligious, and pro-Western April 6 movement]”. We did not present this 
manipulation (and comprehension checks; see below) in the baseline conditions. 
Comprehension check. Directly after the presentation of the newspaper article, 
participants in the negative and positive conditions (n = 38) were asked to indicate 
what they thought was the most important message of the newspaper article and were 
asked to give their opinion on the current situation in Egypt. In this way, we could 
check whether participants had accurately read the article. All answers were in line 
with the manipulation. 
Distant intergroup threats. To inspect whether our manipulation affected 
perceived threats from the distant situation, both symbolic and realistic threats from 
the Egypt rebellions were measured with three items on a 7-point scale (1 not at all and 
7 completely; Bouman et al., 2014). The symbolic items were: “Egyptian norms and 
values pose a global threat”, “Egyptian beliefs pose a global threat”, and “Due to the 
changes in Egypt, the Islam will spread over the world”; α = .76, M = 3.10, SD = 1.07. 
Realistic items were: “The Egyptian economy poses a global threat”, “Political 
violence in Egypt poses a global threat”, and “The situation in Egypt influences the 
Dutch economy more than desired”; α = .70, M = 3.10, SD = 0.99. 
Outcomes of the rebellions. On a 7-point scale (1 not positive at all and 7 completely 
positive), three items assessed how participants perceived the influence of the rebellion 
on three societal levels: “I expect that the revolution has a positive influence on 
Egypt”, M = 4.61, SD = 1.31; “… the Middle-East”, M = 4.25, SD = 1.28; “… the 
world”, M = 3.96, SD = 1.43. The first item was included to measure whether the 
information successfully altered participants’ perception of the Egyptian situation 
(e.g., Cottle, 2011; Ghannam, 2011), the other two items were included to see whether 
the Egyptian uprisings were perceived as having a more global influence (see also 
Study 5.1).  
Similarity with the Middle-East. Six items were included to measure the extent to 
which participants perceived Egypt as similar to other Middle-Eastern nations on a 7-
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point scale (1 not at all and 7 completely). The items were: “Egypt is very similar to other 
Middle-Eastern nations”, “Egypt is prototypical for the Middle-East”, “Egypt and 
other Middle-Eastern nations have a lot in common”, “When I think of the Middle-
East, I think of Egypt”, “Egypt differs a lot from other Middle-Eastern nations” 
(reverse coded), and “Egypt is a good illustration for current developments within the 
Middle-East”. The mean score was calculated and used in further analyses, α = .84, M 
= 3.90, SD = 0.86. 
Measures about local groups. The second questionnaire (included in the 
two experimental conditions and the local attitudes baseline group; n = 60) comprised 
of measures of feelings toward local outgroups Turkish-, Moroccan-, and Polish-
Dutch citizens. Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens are generally perceived as 
culturally related to Egypt and the Middle-East (Bouman et al., 2014), whereas Polish-
Dutch citizens are typically not associated with people living in Egypt. Accordingly, 
the inclusion of these local minority groups allowed us to explore whether carry-over 
effects only occur toward local outgroups which are (culturally) related to the distant 
outgroup (i.e., Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens) or toward local outgroups in 
general (i.e., also toward Polish-Dutch citizens). In addition, this questionnaire 
contained exploratory measures of similarities between local minority groups, the 
ingroup (native Dutch), the distant Egyptian rebels, and the Middle-East6.  
Feeling thermometers. For each minority group, three different thermometers 
were included in the questionnaire on which participants had to indicate their feelings 
toward each minority group. The thermometer ranged from 0 (not nice at all, very cold, 
and very negative) to 100 (very nice, very warm, and very positive; e.g., Bouman et al., 2014, 
2015a) and the mean score on the three items was computed for Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens, α = .94, M = 55.12, SD = 20.40; Turkish-Dutch citizens, α = .95, M = 59.21, 
SD = 18.96; and Polish-Dutch citizens, α = .95, M = 56.51, SD = 20.05. 
                                                     
6 These measures were exploratory and were only included in the positive and negative 
information conditions (and not the control condition). Therefore, we decided to exclude these 







Results and discussion 
 
Analyses (distant level). We tested with a MANOVA whether the expected 
outcomes of the rebellions for Egypt, the Middle-East, and the world differed 
between conditions7; indeed, the multivariate effect was significant, F(6, 126) = 2.97, p 
= .009, η2partial = .12. Follow-up univariate analyses indicated significant differences 
between the conditions on expected outcomes for Egypt, F(2, 64) = 6.05, p = .004, 
η2partial = .16, and the world, F(2, 64) = 4.57, p = .014, η2partial = .13, but not for the 
Middle-East, F(2, 64) = 1.14, p = .325, η2partial = .03. More specifically, as indicated by 
the superscripts in Table 5.2, participants in the positive information condition were 
significantly more positive about the outcomes of the rebellions for Egypt than 
participants in the other two conditions. Moreover, they also perceived more positive 
outcomes for the world than participants in the threat condition. A similar, yet 
unreliable, trend was visible for outcomes of the rebellions on the Middle-East. 
Notably, the threat and baseline conditions did not significantly differ from each 
other. 
Carry-over effects: Feelings toward local outgroups. As depicted in Table 
5.2, the means for feelings toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens followed 
the pattern we expected. That is, participants in the condition where threats from the 
Egyptian rebellions were presented were more negative about these local outgroups 
than in the conditions where positive or no information (i.e., local baseline) was 
presented. Indeed, a MANOVA in which we contrasted the threat condition to the 
other two conditions confirmed this multivariate pattern for feelings toward Turkish- 
and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, F(2, 56) = 3.27, p = .045, η2partial = .11. 
                                                     
7 In addition to these analyses which were directly related to our hypotheses, we also 
performed exploratory analyses on the remaining measures at the distant level: perceived 
similarities of Egypt with the Middle-East, and perceived symbolic and realistic threat. 
However, on none of these measures the conditions differed reliably from each other, Fs(2, 64) 
< 1.34 (see also Table 5.2). 
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Follow-up univariate analyses indicated the statistical significance of this 
effect for Turkish-Dutch citizens, Mdifference = -12.74, F(1, 57) = 6.15, p = .016, 95%CI [-
23.03, -2.45], η2partial = .10; and indicated a similar, yet unreliable, trend for Moroccan-
Dutch citizens, Mdifference = -8.81, F(1, 57) = 2.36, p = .130, 95%CI [-20.29, -2.67], η2partial 
= .04. Analyses regarding participants’ feelings toward Polish-Dutch citizens indicated 
that the threat condition did barely differ from the other conditions, Mdifference = -4.41, 
F(1, 57) = 0.60, p = .444, 95%CI [-15.85, 7.03], η2partial = .01. Also in line with our 
expectations, no significant differences were observed between the opportunity 
condition and the baseline condition, multivariate F(3, 55) = 0.60. Accordingly, these 
outcomes are in line with our hypothesis that mainly negative (rather than positive) 
information carries over toward local outgroups associated with the distant outgroup 
held responsible for the threat (rather than toward local outgroups in general). 
 
Table 5.2 
Means and standard deviations for the two experimental conditions and the two baseline conditions (i.e., one for 
the distant measures and one for the local measures). 
 Threat Opportunity Distant Baseline 
Local  
Baseline 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Distant measures         
 Similarities M-E 3.85 0.91 3.91 0.65 3.91 0.98 — — 
 Symbolic threat 3.43 0.98 2.87 1.01 3.06 1.15 — — 
 Realistic threat 3.13 0.92 3.30 1.18 2.95 0.88 — — 
 Outcomes Egypt 4.00a 1.28 5.35b 0.75 4.48a 1.43 — — 
 Outcomes M-E 4.00 1.41 4.60 1.05 4.17 1.34 — — 
 Outcomes world 3.33a 1.46 4.65b 1.23 3.86ab 1.38 — — 
Local Feelings         
 Turkish-Dutch c. 50.37a 17.76 65.53b 18.36 — — 60.68b 18.49 
 Moroccan-Dutch c. 48.96 20.30 57.98 19.44 — — 57.56 21.14 
 Polish-Dutch c. 53.46 16.41 58.98 22.07 — — 56.76 21.38 







Discussion. Study 5.2 indicated, in line with Study 5.1, that both negative 
and positive information affect observers’ perceptions of the distant situation itself. 
Importantly, however, Study 5.2 revealed that mainly negative information from the 
distant situation carries over and affects feelings toward culturally associated local 
outgroups (i.e., local intolerance). These findings are in line with our hypothesis that 
distant ‘bad news’ is more likely to carry over into local intolerance than ‘good news’ is 
likely to carry over into local tolerance.  
We note, however, that we did not find effects on the measures of perceived 
threat, which we used to check the effectiveness of the manipulation (see Bouman et 
al., 2014, 2015a). The lack of effects on perceived threat might be due to the different 
focus of our experimental manipulation (which discussed the rebels in the Egypt 
uprisings) and the perceived threat measures (which considered threats from Egypt as 
a whole). Possibly, participants attributed their feelings of threat about the Egyptian 
situation to the rebels in the symbolic threat condition and to the regime in the 
symbolic opportunity condition. Alternatively, the manipulation might have made the 
threat salient but did not alter participants’ perception of the distant situation 




In line with our predictions, the results of our studies indicate a positive-
negative asymmetry for carry-over effects of distant information. More specifically, 
whereas positive and negative news about a distant situation seems to have a similar 
effect on perceptions of the distant situation (Study 5.1 and 5.2; see also Cottle, 2011; 
Ghannam, 2011), negative news carries over more powerfully than positive news and 
thus seems to have a larger impact on local intergroup relationships (Study 5.2). These 
carry-over effects of negative news about a distant outgroup seem to particularly occur 
when the distant situation is perceived as exerting a global influence (e.g., on the Arab 
or whole world, Study 5.2) rather than only influencing the distant region itself (e.g., 
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only on Syria, Study 5.1). Thus, when observers are confronted with negative news 
about a distant situation (e.g., the radicalization of Egypt), and they believe that these 
developments will have a global impact (e.g., on the Arab region or the world), they 
are likely to become more intolerant toward local outgroups (e.g., Moroccan-Dutch 
citizens). 
These findings have novel theoretical implications. Firstly, our results add 
new insights to, and replicate, earlier findings from the literature on carry-over effects 
(Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Sassenberg et al., 2007) by suggesting that carry-
over effects are situation depended. That is, the strength of carry-over effects seems to 
be contingent on the valence and generalizability of the information. The finding that 
negative information about a distant outgroup in a news report carries over and makes 
observers more intolerant toward local outgroups (Study 5.2) is in line with earlier 
findings on carry-over effects of intergroup threats (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b; 
Sassenberg et al., 2007). The observation that positive news about a distant situation 
has only a limited influence on local intergroup relations adds new insights to the 
current literature on carry-over effects. This finding is in line with previous research 
on intergroup contact (Lolliot et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 1998, 2009; Tausch et al., 2010), 
which suggested that more intensive and direct forms of contact (e.g., face-to-face 
contact or direct observations) are needed for positive information to positively 
influence intergroup relations (B. A. Lee et al., 2004). Thereby, our research connects 
literature on carry-over effects of intergroup threat (Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a, 2015b; 
Sassenberg et al., 2007) to literature on secondary transfer effects of intergroup contact 
(Lolliot et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 1998, 2009; Tausch et al., 2010), which might provide 
interesting avenues for future research. 
Secondly, the diverging findings for positive and negative information about a 
distant outgroup provide further support for the commonly found positive-negative 
asymmetries in information processing (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) and indicate its applicability in a new line of 







clearly applies to carry-over effects in our research, no such asymmetry was present 
for reactions toward the distant situation itself. That is, positive and negative 
information about a distant situation seems equally effective in changing observers’ 
perception of this distant situation (see also Cottle, 2011; Ghannam, 2011). We believe 
that this difference could be explained by the remoteness of the target group. Whereas 
the contact literature mainly focused on groups that are likely to be encountered (e.g., 
homeless people; B. A. Lee et al., 2004), we focus on distant outgroups that are 
unlikely to be ever met in person (e.g., Egyptian rebels for Dutch observers). Possibly, 
this distance and unfamiliarity makes it easier for observers to change observers’ 
perception of this outgroup. Clearly however, further research is needed to test this 
suggestion.  
Lastly, our findings might be valuable for media and communication studies 
as they indicate that media portrayals of distant situations are likely to not only 
influence observers’ perception of the discussed situation itself (for similar findings 
see Cottle, 2011; Ghannam, 2011), but also local intergroup relations (see also: 
Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a). Most importantly, we effectively showed that negative 
information about a distant situation that is portrayed as a global issue with a global 
impact is likely to negatively influence how people perceive the world around them 
and to induce intolerance at the local level. This impact of the media on individuals’ 
perceptions stresses the importance of, and might contribute to, the current debate on 
the media’s responsibilities in informing people (Broersma, 2010; Davies, 2008; 
Luyendijk, 2010).  
Applying this to practice, we believe that media outlets should at least be 
aware of their influence on public perception and, in our opinion, try to prevent carry-
over effects from occurring. The findings of Study 5.1 suggest that one way by which 
this could be achieved is by keeping the distant situation remote. That is, instead of 
focusing on the global impact of the situation, media outlets could accentuate the 
remoteness of the situation and discuss its outcomes for the directly involved groups 
(e.g., Syrians). Moreover, providing specific (instead of more general) information 
 
Bad news spreads quickly, good news stays remote? 





about the distant situation might also limit the information’s carry-over potential (see 
also Bouman et al., 2014, 2015a), possibly because this hinders the creation of a 
superordinate outgroup (Bouman et al., 2015b). Of course, in a globalizing world 
these suggestions may not always be realistic or desirable, but at least an awareness 
and deeper understanding of carry-over effects might be valuable to journalists, 
politicians and other public spokespersons.  
Besides the study-specific limitations which were already discussed in the 
corresponding discussion sections, there are at least two more general limitations 
which could be addressed in future research. Firstly, in our studies we looked at local 
outgroups which are generally neutrally or negatively perceived by the native Dutch 
majority (Van Osch & Breugelmans, 2012). It would be interesting to see whether 
positive and negative information about a distant situation carries over similarly to 
more positively perceived local outgroups, such as for example, Indonesian-Dutch 
citizens (Bouman et al., 2015b), or whether perceptions of these positively perceived 
local outgroups are more receptive to positive generalizations. Secondly, in contrast to 
the positive information we presented to our participants, other types of positive 
information might cause more powerful carry-over effects. For instance, positive 
information that confirms a (positive) stereotype about a superordinate outgroup (e.g., 
Arab people being hospitable) might carry over more easily than positive information 
that disconfirms a (negative) stereotype (e.g., Arab people preferring religion and 




In sum, in two experimental studies we showed the potential impact of media 
portrayals of distant situations (e.g., for Dutch citizens, the Egyptian uprisings) on 
public opinion. We found that both positive and negative information influences how 
the portrayed distant outgroup (e.g., Egyptians) is perceived: Positive information 







negative toward the distant outgroup. Importantly however, and central to the current 
paper, we found a positive-negative asymmetry for carry-over effects of distant 
information. That is, negative information about a distant situation has a much 
stronger influence on local intergroup relations (e.g., between native Dutch and 
Turkish-Dutch citizens) than positive information. Hence, whereas ‘bad news’ spreads 












   
   







The main aim of this dissertation was to answer the questions whether, when, 
and how global observers become more prejudiced toward local outgroups when they 
perceive a distant outgroup to pose an intergroup threat (i.e., carry-over effects). This 
question is particularly relevant in the current globalized world in which the media 
frequently confronts global observers with foreign threats (e.g., for Dutch citizens, the 
possible radicalization of the Arab world, or the presumed influence of Greece on the 
global debt crisis). Due to the distance between the global observer (e.g., a native 
Dutch citizen) and the distant outgroup (e.g., Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), global 
observers are generally unable to directly react upon these threats toward the distant 
outgroup. Instead, however, they may react to such threats in their local environment. 
This highlights the relevance of studying whether remote threats might impact local 
intergroup relations. Throughout this dissertation, we indeed found that distant 
intergroup threats can carry over into local intolerance. 
Our findings accentuate the value of studying the influence of foreign threats 
on local intergroup relations (e.g., with Turkish-Dutch citizens). Nonetheless, to date 
most research on intergroup threats has focused on local threats (e.g., immigrants; 
Stephan et al., 2005, 1999; Ward & Masgoret, 2006) and direct reactions toward the 
local outgroup perceived as source of this threat (for a meta-analysis see Riek et al., 
2006). Accordingly, not much is known yet about carry-over effects. Therefore, with 
this dissertation we hope to add new insights in the possible underpinnings of local 
prejudice by focusing on carry-over effects of distant group threats. We thus added 
distant intergroup threats as a new dimension to the analysis of local prejudices, 
suggesting that events far away may affect local intergroup relations. 
However, carry-over effects of distant intergroup threat are certainly not a 
given and little is known about the underlying processes. Within the current 
dissertation we therefore focused on when and how perceived threats from a distant 
outgroup relate to local prejudice. We hypothesized that both symbolic (e.g., threats to 
the ingroup’s worldview) and realistic (e.g., threats to the ingroup’s possessions) 
intergroup threats (Stephan et al., 1999, 2009) might carry over into local prejudice, 
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and that carry-over effects mainly occur when the global observer perceives an 
association between the distant and local outgroup that could resemble a superordinate 
outgroup (e.g., the group of Muslims as bridging distant Egyptians and local Dutch-
Moroccans). Our findings indeed suggest that it is important to differentiate between 
symbolic and realistic threats as both threats seem to carry over differently, although 
both threats can carry over and often co-occur. 
In the current discussion chapter, we reflect on the empirical chapters 
(Chapter 2 – 5) in which these research questions were addressed in various ways and 
across a variety of contexts. For this purpose, we first summarize the main findings of 
each empirical chapter, and then reflect on the theoretical and practical implications of 
our findings, discuss potential limitations, and close by providing directions for future 
research. 
 
Summary of the Main Findings 
 
Because not much is known about carry-over effects of intergroup threats, we 
started by exploring the concept of carry-over effects and testing whether distant 
group threats can indeed carry over. Chapter 2 mainly focused on carry-over effects of 
distant symbolic threats because we regarded these threats to have the strongest carry-
over potential. Chapter 3 specifically investigated whether distant realistic threats carry 
over, and what kind of associations could underlie these carry-over effects. Chapter 4 
built on these findings and connected these associations to the concept of 
superordinate outgroups. Finally, Chapter 5 explored whether carry-over effects may 
also occur for more positive news about distant outgroups. Below, we discuss the 
main findings reported in each chapter in turn. 
Chapter 2. Chapter 2 reports a first empirical test of the hypothesized carry-
over effects of distant group threats; that is, whether perceived threats from a distant 
outgroup can induce intolerance toward associated local outgroups within observers’ 
nearby environment. We hypothesized that carry-over effects mainly occur toward 







local outgroups that are associated with the distant outgroup perceived as threatening 
(e.g., similar cultural background). Moreover, based on the characteristics of symbolic 
and realistic threats, we hypothesized a stronger carry-over potential of distant 
symbolic threats because these threats are relatively abstract (e.g., Stephan et al., 2009), 
easily transcend the specific intergroup context, and might activate an association 
between the distant and local outgroups that could resemble a superordinate outgroup 
based on a shared identity (Hitlan et al., 2007; Kam & Kinder, 2007; Sheridan, 2006; 
Sides & Gross, 2013).  
These hypotheses were supported in the three studies reported in Chapter 2. 
Study 2.1 indicated that the stronger symbolic threats native Dutch observers 
perceived from the Arab uprisings (e.g., from Islamic values; De Beer, 2011), the more 
negative they felt toward local Moroccan-Dutch citizens and the more they 
differentiated this local outgroup from native Dutch citizens. By contrast, no such 
effects were found for perceived realistic threats from the Arab uprisings (e.g., 
consequences for the Dutch economy; De Beer, 2011). Similar findings were found in 
experimental Study 2.2 and 2.3: When native Dutch citizens read about symbolic 
threats from the Turkish accession to the EU, they perceived stronger symbolic 
threats from Turkey, and became more negative toward the local Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens. Interestingly, no such carry-over effects occurred toward 
the local outgroup Polish-Dutch citizens. These findings are in line with our 
prediction that carry-over effects only occur toward local outgroups associated with the 
distant outgroup perceived as threatening. Moreover, we again did not find support 
for carry-over effects of perceived distant realistic threats.  
In sum, based on one correlational and two experimental studies, Chapter 2 
provides first evidence for the occurrence of carry-over effects of perceived distant 
group threats in the different real-life contexts we studied. More specifically, perceived 
symbolic threats from a distant outgroup can result in negative reactions toward local 
outgroups that are associated with the distant outgroup. 
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Chapter 3. Whereas Chapter 2 supported the notion that perceived symbolic 
threats from distant outgroups might carry over toward associated local outgroups, we 
did not find support for carry-over effects of realistic threats. For that reason, Chapter 
3 was designed to test specifically whether and when realistic threats from a distant 
outgroup might also carry over. We tested whether perceived realistic threats from the 
Turkish accession (Study 3.1) and Greece’s presumed influence on the eurocrisis 
(Study 3.2) related to intolerance toward local outgroups via a group-based association 
pathway (GAP; i.e., negative feelings toward the distant outgroup are generalized 
toward culturally associated local outgroups) or a threat-based association pathway (TAP; 
i.e., perceived threats from the distant outgroup alert observers about threats from 
local outgroups, which relates to negative feelings toward these, now threatening, local 
outgroups). 
Study 3.1 indicated that making potential realistic threats from Turkey salient 
caused native Dutch observers to perceive stronger realistic threats from Turkey, 
become more negative toward the possible Turkish accession to the EU, and become 
more negative toward Turkish-, Moroccan-, and Polish-Dutch citizens. We interpreted 
these carry-over effects toward Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens as support for 
the GAP as these local outgroups and the distant outgroup are most likely associated 
with each other based on the Muslim culture (e.g., Van Osch & Breugelmans, 2012). 
Conversely, carry-over effects toward the Polish-Dutch citizens could be interpreted 
as support for the TAP as Polish-Dutch citizens are, like the Turkish citizens within 
the Turkish accession debate, frequently associated with economic threats (e.g., 
Alonso, 2011; Pijpers, 2006; Van Haastrecht, 2007). 
Study 3.2 empirically supported these pathways within the context of 
Greece’s perceived influence on the eurocrisis. Perceived realistic threats from Greece 
were related to negative reactions toward Greece (i.e., the mediator between distant 
threats and local prejudice according to the GAP) and perceived threats from local 
outgroups (i.e., the mediator between distant threats and local prejudice according to 
the TAP), which in turn were associated with stronger negative feelings toward the 







local outgroups Turkish-, Moroccan-, and Polish-Dutch citizens. Importantly and as 
anticipated, perceived distant realistic threats only alerted observers about local 
realistic threats when we experimentally attributed the threat to characteristics of the 
outgroup members (e.g., being lazy) rather than to more situational and macro-level 
characteristics of Greece (e.g., Greece’s demographics). When threats are attributed to 
the distant group members, these threats are likely to be more similar to, and alert 
observers about, threats within the local society. Accordingly, the results from Chapter 
3 supported our predictions by indicating in real-life contexts that perceived realistic 
threats from a distant outgroup can indeed carry over into local intolerance via a 
group-based and a threat-based association. 
Chapter 4. Our findings from Chapter 2 and 3 indicated that perceived 
distant group threats, either symbolic or realistic, can carry over toward local 
outgroups that are associated with the distant outgroup perceived as posing the threat. 
Chapter 4 built on these findings and focused on whether these associations could be 
embedded within a perceived superordinate outgroup membership (i.e., a superordinate 
category in which both distant and local outgroups are included, e.g., Muslims for 
most native Dutch citizens). For this purpose, we first explored in Study 4.1 whether 
participants could form a superordinate outgroup based on a common identity (e.g., 
culture, related to the group-based association) and common fate (e.g., similar levels of 
wealth; a dimension related to, but broader than, the threat-based association) and 
experimentally tested in Study 4.2 whether the presentation of a superordinate 
outgroup could enable carry-over effects. 
Study 4.1 indicated that participants can categorize nationalities (e.g., 
Brazilians, Germans, Moroccans) in superordinate outgroups based on common 
identity, common fate, or both types of commonalities. Moreover, participants rated 
superordinate outgroups based on common identity or the combination of both types 
of commonalities as particularly entitative, which suggests that attitudes are 
particularly likely assimilated within these superordinate outgroups (Blumer, 1958). In 
Study 4.2 we therefore used superordinate outgroups based on common identity and 
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common fate to experimentally test whether carry-over effects depend on the 
perception that the distant and local outgroup share a superordinate outgroup 
membership. For this purpose, we presented fictitious threats from Tajikistan and 
experimentally manipulated Tajikistan as being a member of the superordinate 
category Asia or Middle-East. Results indicated that when Tajikistan was presented as 
Asian, perceived threats from Tajikistan related to negative feelings toward 
Indonesian- and Turkish-Dutch citizens; two groups with Asian origins. When 
Tajikistan was presented as Middle-Eastern, perceived threats from Tajikistan related 
to negative feelings toward Moroccan- and Turkish-Dutch citizens; two groups with 
Middle-Eastern origins. In sum, Chapter 4 findings indicated that observers could 
psychologically form superordinate outgroups (Study 4.1) and that these superordinate 
outgroups can underlie carry-over effects of distant-group threats into local 
intolerance (Study 4.2). 
Chapter 5. Within the previous chapters we repeatedly and consistently 
found support for the hypothesized carry-over effects of distant group threats. Clearly 
however, more positive news about distant outgroups also reaches global observers 
(e.g., the Arab Spring). For that reason, Chapter 5 explored whether these more 
positive messages about distant outgroups can also carry over and, more centrally to 
the current dissertation, we compared these effects with carry-over effects of distant 
threats. Based on earlier research that indicated that negative news receives more 
attention and is more likely to become generalized (Faraon et al., 2014), we 
hypothesized that negative threatening news is more likely to carry over than distant 
positive news. We tested this hypothesis in two experimental studies in which we 
presented, depending on the experimental condition, ‘bad’ or ‘good’ news about the 
Syrian civil war (Study 5.1) or the Egyptian uprisings (Study 5.2) and measured native 
Dutch citizens’ perceptions of the distant outgroup itself and feelings toward 
associated local outgroups (i.e., carry-over effects).  
Both studies indicated that negative and positive news reports influence 
observers’ feelings toward the distant outgroups perceived as threatening in their 







respective ways. Importantly, however, in Study 5.2 we also found the predicted 
positive-negative asymmetry for carry-over effects, such that negative news reports 
about a distant situation had a much stronger influence on local intolerance than 
positive information had on local tolerance. Accordingly, Chapter 5 experimentally 
supported in real-life contexts our idea that whereas ‘bad’ and ‘good’ news about a 
distant outgroup equally affects global observers’ perceptions of this distant outgroup, 
distant ‘bad’ news carries over more strongly than distant ‘good’ news. 
In sum, the four empirical chapters of this dissertation repeatedly and 
consistently indicate that perceived distant group threats can result in local intolerance. 
More specifically, both perceived symbolic (Chapter 2) and realistic threats (Chapter 3) 
from a distant outgroup can evoke negative feelings toward local outgroups that are 
associated with the distant outgroup perceived as posing the threat. These associations 
can be group-based or threat-based (Chapter 3) and are likely embedded within 
observers’ perception that the distant and local outgroups share a superordinate 
outgroup membership based on a common identity and/or a common fate (Chapter 
4). In addition, most of these processes seem better applicable to negative threatening 
news than to more positive news (Chapter 5), which accentuates the particularly 




The findings from our four empirical chapters have important theoretical 
implications. Most importantly, our findings add new insights in, and confirm earlier 
findings from, the existing literature on intergroup threat and prejudice — two related 
research fields that could be considered as the foundations of the notion of carry-over 
effects. Indeed, our research adds a new ‘distant’ dimension to theories of intergroup 
threat. Moreover, there are clear and interesting links and parallels between our 
findings and other fields of research, in particular research on categorization and 
superordinate categories. We will discuss these theoretical implications in detail below. 
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Intergroup threat, prejudice, and carry-over effects 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation is that it indicates that perceived 
distant group threats might also affect prejudice toward other, local outgroups than 
only the distant outgroup that is perceived as causing the threat. More specifically, we 
found that (a) distant outgroups can evoke feelings of intergroup threat, (b) that these 
feelings of distant group threat relate to prejudice, and (c) that these feelings of 
prejudice are not limited to the distant outgroup perceived as causing the threat but 
can be directed at local outgroups as well. Thereby, we extend and move beyond earlier 
literature on intergroup threat and prejudice, which mainly focused on local intergroup 
threats and direct reactions toward the outgroup perceived as causing the threat (e.g., 
Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2005, 2009). Accordingly, our findings indicate the 
relevance of studying intergroup threats in broader, more global, contexts and 
accentuate that prejudice is not necessarily the result of (perceived) actions of the 
targeted outgroup (for a similar argument see Walther, 2002). 
When do distant threats carry over into local prejudice? Throughout our 
empirical chapters we found that stronger perceptions of distant group threats can 
relate to stronger prejudiced feelings toward both the distant outgroup perceived as 
threatening as well as toward local outgroups. These findings are in line with, and 
extend, earlier research that linked intergroup threat to prejudice toward the outgroup 
perceived as threatening (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Campbell, 1958; Kinder & Sears, 
1981; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988; Sherif et 
al., 1961; Sherif, 1966; Stephan et al., 2009). Although it may seem obvious that 
feelings of threat induce reactions toward the perceived instigator of the threat (Riek 
et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2009), it is not so obvious when observers would react 
toward other, local outgroups as well. Accordingly, one of the central themes of this 
dissertation was to identify conditions when perceived distant group threats carry over. 
Although some theories suggest that feelings of threat make observers more 
prejudiced toward others in general (e.g., terror management theory; Das et al., 2009; 







Kam & Kinder, 2007), our results indicate that carry-over effects are more selective. 
That is, throughout our studies, prejudiced reactions as a function of perceived distant 
group threats were mainly directed at local outgroups that were associated with the 
distant outgroup perceived as threatening. For instance, in Study 2.2 we found that 
perceived symbolic threats from Turkey resulted in prejudice toward the culturally 
associated Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch citizens, but not toward Polish-Dutch 
citizens, a group generally not associated with Turkey or its perceived symbolic threat. 
Similarly, findings from Chapter 3 indicated that perceived distant group threats relate 
to local prejudice through two distinct associative pathways: the group- and threat-
based association pathway. In sum, our findings suggest that perceived distant group 
threats carry over when a local outgroup could be associated with the distant outgroup 
perceived as posing the threat. 
Carry-over effects of symbolic and realistic threats. The aforementioned 
types of associations that connect the distant and local outgroups with each other, 
directly relate to characteristics of symbolic and realistic threats and suggest that each 
type of threat carries over differently. Because symbolic threats are threats concerning 
groups’ identities (De Dreu, Vries, et al., 1999; Harinck & Ellemers, 2014), they are by 
definition related to both the threat-based and group-based association pathway. 
Realistic threats, on the other hand, are more concrete and concern groups’ 
possessions instead of their identities (Esses et al., 2001, 1998; Stephan et al., 2009). 
For that reason, realistic threats do not necessarily activate both pathways, which 
might limit their carry-over potential. Hence, whereas symbolic threats relate to both 
associative pathways simultaneously, realistic threats do not necessarily activate both 
pathways at once. 
These findings further support the relevance of the intergroup threat theory’s 
distinction between symbolic and realistic intergroup threats (Stephan et al., 1999, 
2009) and the applicability of classic theories on prejudice in today’s globalized society 
— the realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif et al., 1961; 
Sherif, 1966), group position model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Minescu & Poppe, 
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2011), and symbolic racism theory (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 
1976; Sears, 1988). In sum, global observers can experience feelings of symbolic and 
realistic intergroup threat from remote international events, which each could 
independently and distinctively carry over into intolerance toward local outgroups 
associated with the distant outgroup and/or its threat. 
 
Categorization and the superordinate outgroup 
 
As suggested in Chapter 4, the associations through which carry-over effects 
occur could resemble a psychological categorization of the distant and local outgroups 
in a superordinate outgroup. This superordinate outgroup can be based on global 
observers’ perception that the outgroups have a common identity (e.g., all Muslim) or 
common fate (e.g., all wealthy). The concept of a superordinate outgroup clearly 
speaks to, and adds new insights to, the vast body of literature on categorization into 
superordinate categories. Most importantly, in contrast to previous research that 
mainly focused on outcomes of superordinate ingroups (e.g., common ingroup model; 
Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009; Gaertner et al., 1993; Stone & Crisp, 2007), we approached 
superordinate categorization from another angle by focusing on the outcomes of 
global observers’ categorization of outgroups within a superordinate outgroup. 
Our findings that global observers can psychologically construct 
superordinate outgroups (Study 4.1) and that the presentation of a superordinate 
outgroup that connects the distant with local outgroups can activate carry-over effects 
(Study 4.2) suggest the theoretical and empirical relevance of superordinate outgroups 
in better understanding carry-over effects. That is, global observers’ categorization of 
associated distant and local outgroups within a perceived superordinate outgroup 
category may enable distant group threats to negatively influence local intergroup 
relations. These outcomes further support the classic notion that how individuals 
categorize themselves and others into different in- and outgroups has a profound 







influence on intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, & Flament, 
1971; Tajfel, 1981). 
More specifically, our findings indicate that superordinate outgroups 
consisting of multiple outgroups enable negative generalizations within this 
superordinate category. These findings are in line with previous research indicating 
that individuals assimilate as much as possible within outgroup categories (Allport, 
1954; Blumer, 1958). Moreover, they connect the concept of superordinate 
categorization, which was originally studied as a way to resolve prejudice (Brewer & 
Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio et al., 2009; Gaertner et al., 1993), to the occurrence of 
prejudice. That is, whereas previous research focused on how the perception of a 
superordinate ingroup might result in more harmony between the included groups, we 
focused on how the perception of a superordinate outgroup might result in more 
discord between the (not included) ingroup and included local outgroups. 
In addition, our differentiation between types of commonalities and 
associations, on which superordinate categories could be based, sheds light on the 
content around which (superordinate) outgroups are psychologically constructed. 
Importantly, like symbolic and realistic threats (Stephan et al., 2009), superordinate 
outgroups can be construed around a more abstract common identity (related to a 
group-based association), a more concrete common fate, or both. These findings 
relate to previous research on group formation and entitativity (Campbell, 1958; 
Lewin, 1948; Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994; Vincent Yzerbyt et al., 2001) and 
show that both types of commonalities can also psychologically connect outgroups 
with each other and, thereby, enable the occurrence of carry-over effects. 
In sum, our work highlights the theoretical relevance of looking at distant 
intergroup threats as these threats can affect local prejudice. More specifically, these 
carry-over effects of distant group threats on local prejudice could be explained by an 
association between the distant and local outgroups that resembles a perceived 
superordinate outgroup in which these outgroups are included. The findings in this 
research not only relate to different theories on intergroup threats, prejudice and 
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superordinate categorization, but also connect these theories with each other, and add 
new insights to them by focusing on the concept of carry-over effects of intergroup 





The central theme of this dissertation is largely constructed around the idea 
that perceived foreign threats that are frequently presented in the media have a broad 
and practically relevant impact on local intergroup relations. That is, instead of focusing 
on the impact of perceived distant group threats on prejudice toward the distant 
outgroup itself, we focused on whether these perceived distant group threats also 
negatively impact global observers’ perceptions of local outgroups — outgroups that 
are more likely encountered and influenced by these reactions. Moreover, within our 
studies we often focused on ongoing situations which were heavily discussed within 
the media and politics, which kept our results close to the practice of everyday life. In 
other words, this dissertation was aimed at looking at the more practically relevant 
outcomes of distant group threats presented in the media. 
Indeed, our findings demonstrate that local intergroup relations can be 
affected by perceived distant group threats; thereby, our findings illustrate the 
potential applied value of looking at distant group threats. More specifically, 
throughout our studies we showed that how threatening distant events are framed 
(e.g., as realistically versus symbolically threatening, as concrete versus abstract, with a 
focus on group members versus the nation) can increase or decrease the salience of — 
often already existing — associations between the distant and local outgroups, and by 
this means strengthen or weaken carry-over effects.  
These findings have important practical implications as they demonstrate how 
carry-over effects could be promoted or prevented. Because carry-over effects of 
distant group threats relate to local prejudice, we regard it as having negative 







implications for social harmony. For this reason, we choose to discuss how carry-over 
effects could be prevented rather than promoted. Note that this focus differs to some 
extent from our studies as those were mainly directed at investigating when carry-over 
effects do occur; therefore, some of our suggestions are to some degree speculative. 
Preventing a group-based association. Findings from Chapter 2, 3 and 4 
suggest that one way by which the distant and local outgroups could be associated 
with each other, is through a group-based association that is based on a shared cultural 
identity. Accordingly, preventing that observers perceive the distant and local 
outgroups to share a superordinate identity might inhibit carry-over effects. In 
situations that involve a relatively unknown outgroup (e.g., Tajikistan in Study 4.2), 
this could be comparatively easy to achieve by solely referring to the distant outgroup 
(e.g., Tajikistan) and not mentioning the broader cultural and geographical context 
(e.g., Asians or Middle-Easterners). Accordingly, in those situations, decreasing the 
salience of a potential superordinate outgroup might diminish the likelihood of carry-
over effects.  
However, in cases where global observers already know something about the 
distant outgroup, it might be more difficult or even impossible to prevent the 
activation of superordinate category that links the distant to local outgroups. For 
instance, probably most of the Dutch observers already knew before the Egyptian 
uprisings that the Islam is the main religion in Egypt and that Egypt is part of the 
Middle-East, two superordinate categories that could link Egypt with Turkish- and 
Moroccan-Dutch citizens. In addition, some distant outgroup names already include a 
superordinate outgroup membership themselves (e.g., Islamic State or Muslim 
Brotherhood), which makes it also difficult to prevent a superordinate outgroup from 
being activated. Nonetheless, even in those instances one might lower the 
information’s carry-over potential by not placing emphasis on, or by refraining from 
repeatedly using group names that easily activate, this superordinate outgroup category 
(e.g., using “IS” instead of “Islamic State”). 
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Another way to reduce the likelihood of carry-over effects through a group-
based association is by lowering the distant outgroup’s prototypicality for the 
superordinate outgroup category. One way to do this is by explicating that the values 
and ideologies of a particular outgroup do not resemble the broader superordinate 
community. For instance, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks many political representatives 
explicitly differentiated between the ideals of Al Qaeda and the broader Muslim 
community (see: Allen & Nielsen, 2002). Nonetheless, repetitively discussing both 
groups together might unwantedly induce an implicit psychological association 
between these groups and thereby enable carry-over effects. Therefore, another and 
possibly more promising way to lower the distant outgroup’s prototypicality for the 
superordinate category is by giving more, and more specific, information about the 
distant outgroup (e.g., Study 2.3, the combined threat condition). More specific details 
about the distant outgroup could make this group more unique and less representative 
for the superordinate category, which could disable generalizations, and, thus carry-
over effects from occurring.  
Preventing a threat-based association. Whereas carry-over effects through 
a group-based association rely on the generalization of negative feelings within the 
superordinate outgroup category, carry-over effects via a threat-based association 
mainly occur because local outgroups are perceived to pose threats similar to those 
perceived from the distant outgroup (see also Sassenberg et al., 2007). For instance, in 
Study 3.1 we found that perceived realistic threats from the accession of Turkey carry 
over into prejudice toward Polish-Dutch citizens; that is, two groups that could be 
seen as economically competing with the Dutch observers but are generally not 
perceived as sharing an entitative superordinate group membership. Similarly, 
Sassenberg and colleagues (2007) found that being in competition with one outgroup 
member related to prejudice toward members of unrelated competitive outgroups as 
well. Accordingly, carry-over effects could occur because the perceived distant group 







threat activates a “competitive mindset” (Sassenberg et al., 2007)1 that alerts global 
observers about associated threats within the observers’ local society.  
Our findings from Chapter 3 may indicate a specific way in which a threat-
based association could be prevented. More specifically, in Study 3.2 we found that 
carry-over effects only occurred through a threat-based association when the 
perceived threat was attributed to characteristics of the distant outgroup members 
(e.g., being lazy). This suggests that a competitive mindset is particularly likely 
activated when observers hold the group members personally responsible for the 
threats. Accordingly, one might prevent carry-over effects of perceived distant group 
threats by presenting them as concrete (e.g., failing of big banks) and situational (e.g., 
within the global downturn) instead of personal (e.g., lazy and incautious Greeks), 
thereby disabling a competitive mindset and a threat-based association. 
Keeping the threat remote. In addition to the aforementioned strategies 
that directly focused on the prevention of an association between the distant situation 
and local outgroups, another way to prevent carry-over effects from occurring is by 
keeping the international event remote. Threats are most likely to cause carry-over 
effects when global observers themselves have the feeling that they or their fellow 
ingroup members are impacted (Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2004). That is, 
particularly when a report induces feelings of intergroup threat, observers will become 
more prejudiced (e.g., Study 3.1, Study 5.1). Accordingly, discussing the distant 
situation objectively and concretely, and focusing on the national level (e.g., influence 
on the Netherlands) rather than the individual level (e.g., influence on “typical Joe” or 
“Henk and Ingrid”; Groshek & Engelbert, 2012) might prevent feelings of more 
personal involvement and thus carry-over effects from occurring. 
                                                     
1 Although the term “competitive mindset” (Sassenberg et al., 2007) originally referred to 
economic competition, we believe it might also apply to symbolic intergroup threats 
originating from the perception that values or ideologies of the outgroup compete with those 
of the ingroup. 
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In sum, within the previous sections we highlighted how our findings on 
when and how distant group threats carry over could be used to prevent carry-over 
effects from occurring. Most importantly, in order to prevent distant group threats 
from influencing local intergroup relations, one should be cautious about presenting 
information that could strengthen an association between the distant and local 
outgroups. More specifically, detailed, concrete and group-specific information that 
isolates the distant outgroup and its threat from other contexts, are most likely to keep 




Moving beyond the specific theoretical and practical implications, our 
findings could also be relevant on a broader societal level. In this dissertation we show 
that perceived distant group threats relate to prejudice within observers´ local society. 
Importantly, as suggested above, most distant group threats are communicated 
through media coverage or by political representatives, which highlights the specific 
relevance of our findings for media and politics. In addition, our findings illustrate the 
complex process of globalization in which societies are increasingly aware of, and 
affected by, other societies around the world. We will discuss these broader societal 
implications below. 
Carry-over effects in media and politics. Global observers’ impressions of 
distant situations often rely on what the media and politics present to them, which is 
also why we used (bogus) media and political reports on current issues as our 
experimental manipulations. As such, most of our findings directly illustrate the 
impact such communications might have on local intergroup relations. For instance, 
presenting perceived threats from the accession of Turkey to the EU in a (bogus) 
Dutch news report, strengthened feelings of intergroup threat from Turkey and 
prejudice toward the local Turkish-, Moroccan- (Study 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1) and Polish-
Dutch citizens (Study 3.1). Accordingly, this dissertation indicates the specific power 







of the media and politics in shaping images about distant situations and, thereby, 
influencing local intergroup relations. 
This observation might contribute to the current debate on the 
responsibilities of the media in truthfully informing observers (e.g., Broersma, 2010; 
Davies, 2008; Luyendijk, 2010; Wijnberg, 2013). This debate is centered on the 
critique that the media tends to present a distorted representation of the truth due to 
its current routines and demands (e.g., news should be actual, short, and easy to 
understand; Davies, 2008; Luyendijk 2010; Wijnberg, 2013) and this debate developed 
in a way that discusses the media’s ability and responsibility to accurately reflect on the 
truth (e.g., Broersma, 2010; Wijnberg, 2013). Although we are not in the position to 
judge whether the media accurately represents the truth, our finding that media 
reports on distant situations can (unwantedly) influence observers’ perceptions of 
local outgroups is something journalists should be aware of and, arguably, brings 
certain responsibilities with it. That is, when the goal of the journalist is to inform 
observers about a distant situation without affecting local intergroup relationships, 
reports should be written in a way that prevents unwanted carry-over effects from 
occurring. 
Based on our reasoning when discussing practical implications, there are at 
least two concrete ways to lower the likelihood of carry-over effects. Firstly, because 
carry-over effects often occur through a perceived association between the distant and 
local outgroup, one could be cautious about presenting information (e.g., 
culture/continent; Study 4.2) that links the distant situation (e.g., Tajikistan) with local 
outgroups (e.g., Turkish-Dutch citizens). Secondly, another way to prevent carry-over 
effects is by presenting more specific and detailed information on the distant event 
and the involved distant outgroup. Whereas this was often impossible in the past (e.g., 
due to limited space within newspapers), the current digitalization of the media has 
made this option much more realizable (e.g., due to lower costs and the direct 
accessibility of background information through internet links; Luyendijk, 2010, 
Wijnberg, 2013). In sum, our work demonstrates that media and political reports on 
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distant events might influence local intergroup relations and suggests that unwanted 
carry-over effects could be prevented by providing specific information on the distant 
situation that detaches the distant situation from local outgroups. 
Carry-over effects as an illustration of globalization. The increasing focus 
of the media and politics on international events has often been linked to the process 
of globalization in which groups around the world are increasingly connected with 
each other (Giddens, 1990; Rantanen, 2005; Thompson, 1995; Waters, 2001) and 
international events have become globally visible (Rantanen, 2005) and locally relevant 
(Giddens, 1990). Although this process is complex and impacts societies in many 
ways, our findings could be used to illustrate all of the aforementioned elements of 
globalization. That is, our work illustrates that the presentation of intergroup threats 
from a distant outgroup (i.e., visibility of international events) could connect the 
distant outgroup with local outgroups (i.e., connects groups around the world) and 
negatively influence local intergroup relations (i.e., make international events locally 
relevant). In this way, our work provides a comprehensible illustration of the complex 
process of globalization. 
 
Strengths, limitations and future directions  
 
The main contribution of the current dissertation is that it demonstrates that 
perceived distant group threats can carry over into prejudice toward associated local 
outgroups. Our studies reveal the strength and relevance of this relationship within 
different contexts and for different types of threats. The implemented experimental 
manipulation concerned (fictitious) news reports on various actual and ongoing 
international events that were at the time of our studies discussed within the media 
and politics. Accordingly, our findings could be considered to have high ecological 
(i.e., we used natural and ongoing contexts) and internal validity (i.e., we used 
controlled experimental designs). Hence, based on multiple studies that incorporated 
various research designs and referred to multiple ongoing international events, we can 







conclude that carry-over effects of distant group threats occur. Notwithstanding this 
clear conclusion however, there are still some potential limitations that were not 
addressed within the current dissertation and should be addressed by future research. 
These limitations and future directions will be discussed below. 
Firstly, in our studies we measured prejudice relatively quickly after our 
manipulations to prevent our effects from being confounded by external factors (e.g., 
other news reports). Therefore, our conclusions mainly pertain to immediate reactions 
toward local outgroups instead of longer lasting reactions of prejudice, which might 
have limited the external validity. Not having measured long-term effects does not 
mean, however, that we assume that long-term effects do not occur. In fact, earlier 
observations after acts of terrorism suggest that prejudice toward different yet 
associated outgroups do exist for a longer period of time (e.g., 10 months; Gautier, 
Siegmann, & Van Vuuren, 2009). In addition, when international events reach global 
media, these events are often already perceived as big and impactful (e.g., Wu, 2000). 
Accordingly, the chances are high that global observers are repetitively confronted 
with threatening news messages about this event, which could strengthen an 
association with, and carry-over effects toward, local outgroups. On the other hand, 
however, repetitive exposure might also increase observers’ specific knowledge on the 
distant event and thereby detach it from local outgroups. Accordingly, it would be 
interesting to test (e.g., through long-term media database studies) whether perceived 
distant intergroup threats have long-term carry-over effects, and how these effects 
develop over time. 
Secondly, more research is needed to test and detect the underlying processes 
of carry-over effects and investigate how these processes relate to specific types of 
intergroup threats. More specifically, our investigation of different types of threats was 
relatively fragmented, with Chapter 2 mainly focusing on symbolic threats and 
Chapter 3 mainly focusing on realistic threats. It would therefore be interesting to test 
the occurrence and processes underlying carry-over effects for both types of threats 
within a single study. Moreover, further research is needed to test potential 
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moderators and mediators underlying carry-over effects (e.g., perceived prototypicality 
of distant outgroup for the superordinate outgroup category). Particularly useful in 
this respect would be (a) experimental studies in which moderators and mediators are 
manipulated, (b) field studies that test these processes in actual ongoing situations, and 
(c) studies that rely on larger, more representative samples.  
Thirdly, a particularly interesting avenue for future research would be to 
investigate whether carry-over effects are motivated/deliberate or occur more 
implicitly/reactional. Most closely related to our concept of a superordinate outgroup 
(Chapter 4) and threat-based association (Chapter 3), previous research has indicated 
that when observers perceive an association between groups, they are also likely to 
perceive those groups as similar on the (threatening) topic of interest (Pryor, Reeder, 
& Monroe, 2012; Stenstrom et al., 2008). For instance, when Dutch observers 
associate the Muslim Brotherhood with Turkish-Dutch citizens through the 
superordinate Muslim category, they are also likely to perceive those groups to pose 
similar threats. Accordingly, global observers are motivated to react toward local 
outgroups because they perceive them as threatening, too. These generalizations are 
particularly likely to occur within groups that are perceived as entitative (Pryor et al., 
2012; Stenstrom et al., 2008) and could psychologically justify local prejudice.  
In addition to this more motivated generalization, observers could also 
deliberately use threatening distant events to legitimize their already lingering prejudice 
toward a local outgroup (e.g., Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; 
Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Sheridan, 2006). Furthermore, because 
the distant outgroup is typically out of reach for global observers, global observers 
might be motivated to search for associated local outgroups to attribute the threat on 
and react upon (e.g., Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011; Marcus-Newhall, Pedersen, Carlson, 
& Miller, 2000; Sheridan, 2006).  
Most of the abovementioned motivated processes rely on the assumptions 
that (a) the distant and local outgroups are perceived as similar on the threatening 
dimension, (b) the global observer is already prejudiced to some extent, and/or (c) the 







local outgroup is negatively perceived. However, these assumptions do not always 
match the data and methods of our studies. This might suggest a less motivated 
process based on a mere association between the outgroups (Pryor et al., 2012; 
Stenstrom et al., 2008), which affects observers’ attitudes about outgroups within the 
activated superordinate outgroup category outside their conscious awareness. Clearly, 
further research is needed to investigate when and for whom carry-over effects occur 
through motivated/deliberate or more implicit/reactional processes. 
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the concept of carry-over effects 
in other contexts, with other types of information, and with other samples, and 
thereby further increase the external validity of our findings. Amongst others, 
following up on our Chapter 5, it would be interesting to further test whether and 
which carry-over processes apply to more positive news about distant events. 
Research on secondary transfer effects of positive contact (Lolliot et al., 2012; 
Pettigrew, 1998, 2009; Tausch et al., 2010) already indicated that more direct forms of 
contact might enable positive carry-over effects. It would therefore be interesting to 
test ways in which mediated positive information can induce similar carry-over effects. 
For instance, making observers aware that they might benefit from distant positive 
developments could increase their personal involvement, and might make them more 
likely to generalize positive reactions toward local outgroups. Another interesting 
topic to study is how cultural minorities (e.g., Moroccan-Dutch citizens) react toward 
presented threats from a distant outgroup (e.g., Muslim Brotherhood) with which they 
could be associated. Do those situations influence their perception of the distant 




The focus of this dissertation was on whether, when and how perceived 
threats from distant outgroups influence local intergroup relationships. Within 
multiple studies, which employed various methods and were implemented within 
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different ongoing international contexts, we showed that perceived threats from a 
distant outgroup can indeed enhance prejudice toward local outgroups. More 
specifically, our findings indicate that both symbolic and realistic group threats can carry 
over, that carry-over effects generally occur toward local outgroups that are associated 
with the distant outgroup, and that this association can resemble a superordinate outgroup 
category. By focusing on distant intergroup threats and how they can carry over into 
local intolerance we added a new dimension to the analysis of intergroup threats and 
prejudice. These findings are particularly relevant in the current globalized world in 
which the media increasingly confronts individuals with potential threats from distant 
outgroups. When distant and local outgroups are associated with each other in the 
mind of the global observer, negative distant events can indeed negatively influence 
local intergroup relationships. 
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Door globalisering komen mensen steeds vaker in contact met mensen uit 
andere culturen. Dit contact is soms dichtbij en direct omdat de (culturele) diversiteit 
binnen landen toeneemt (bijv. CBS, 2014). Het contact is echter vaak ook 
afstandelijker en indirect omdat de media en politiek mensen in toenemende mate 
over verre gebeurtenissen en culturen informeert. Ondanks dat diversiteit veel 
voordelen kan hebben (zo kan diversiteit bijdragen aan innovatie en creativiteit; zie 
Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007), kijken veel mensen ook negatief tegen 
diversiteit aan (bijv. McLaren, 2003). Lokale culturele minderheden zouden 
bijvoorbeeld banen kunnen innemen van de autochtone bevolking, de autochtone 
cultuur kunnen bedreigen, of profiteren van sociale systemen en belastinggelden 
(Stephan et al., 2009). Deze subjectieve waarneming1 dat lokale culturele minderheden 
de autochtone meerderheid bedreigen, wordt vaak als verklaring gezien voor 
intolerantie tegenover deze minderheidsgroepen (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 
2009). Echter, in het huidige proefschrift stellen wij dat deze lokale intolerantie soms 
ook verklaard kan worden door berichtgeving over verre gebeurtenissen waarin verre 
groepen betrokken zijn. Binnen dit proces wordt lokale intolerantie dus niet 
veroorzaakt door negatief contact met dichtbije minderheidsgroepen, maar door een 
associatie met waargenomen dreigingen vanuit een verre out-groep2. 
Bovengenoemd effect waarbij waargenomen dreigingen vanuit een verre out-
groep intolerantie veroorzaken tegenover dichtbije out-groepen noemen wij “carry-over 
effecten” van verre dreigingen. Deze carry-over effecten kunnen geïllustreerd worden 
door gedragingen en attitudes in Europa na de 9/11 terroristische aanslagen (Allen & 
Nielsen, 2002). Voor veel Europeanen was zowel de plaats van de aanslagen 
(Amerika) als de groep achter de aanslagen (Al Qaeda) ver weg. Toch werd er na de 
1 We gebruiken bewust het woord “waargenomen” om aan te geven dat het gaat om 
subjectieve indrukken die mensen van een groep hebben, welke niet noodzakelijk 
overeenkomen met de werkelijkheid (zie ook Semyonov et al., 2004). 
2 Binnen deze Nederlandstalige wetenschappelijke samenvatting verwijzen wij naar een groep 
waar iemand zelf deel van uitmaakt als de “in-groep” en naar een groep waar iemand geen deel 
van uitmaakt als de “out-groep”. 
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aanslagen in veel Europese landen meer intolerantie ten opzichte van dichtbije out-
groepen, en vooral Moslims, waargenomen. Dit terwijl het merendeel van deze 
Islamitische groepen zich expliciet distantieerde van de aanslagen en deze 
veroordeelden. Deze observaties lijken erop te wijzen dat verre gebeurtenissen 
inderdaad gerelateerd kunnen zijn aan lokale intolerantie en dat deze carry-over 
effecten voornamelijk voorkomen wanneer de verre out-groep via associatie 
verbonden kan worden aan dichtbije out-groepen (bijvoorbeeld door een gedeelde 
religie, in dit geval de Islam). Echter, empirisch onderzoek dat dit idee ondersteunt is 
nog schaars. Daarom passen wij in het huidige proefschrift systematische en 
experimentele methoden toe om te onderzoeken of, wanneer en hoe berichtgeving over 
actuele verre gebeurtenissen lokale intolerantie kan beïnvloeden via associatie.  
Meer specifiek laten wij in dit proefschrift zien dat verschillende soorten 
waargenomen dreigingen van een verre out-groep intolerantie kunnen veroorzaken ten 
opzichte van dichtbije out-groepen (Hoofdstuk 2 en 3). Daarnaast laten wij zien dat twee 
verschillende soorten associaties tussen verre en dichtbije out-groepen deze carry-over 
effecten kunnen faciliteren (Hoofdstuk 3 en 4). Tot slot laten wij zien dat negatieve 
informatie over verre gebeurtenissen een sterker effect heeft op lokale intolerantie dan 
dat positieve informatie over verre gebeurtenissen effect heeft op lokale tolerantie 
(Hoofdstuk 5). Voordat wij deze bevindingen gedetailleerder zullen beschrijven, zullen 
wij in deze Nederlandstalige wetenschappelijke samenvatting eerst de belangrijkste 
onderwerpen en theorieën toelichten. 
Twee Soorten Groepsdreiging 
Het idee dat leden van een (culturele) meerderheid intoleranter worden ten 
opzichte van een lokale (culturele) minderheid wanneer zij deze dichtbije out-groep als 
bedreigend ervaren, is al veelvuldig onderzocht en ondersteund (Riek et al., 2006). 
Binnen deze onderzoeken wordt vaak een onderscheid gemaakt tussen symbolische en 
realistische groepsdreigingen. Mensen ervaren symbolische groepsdreigingen wanneer zij 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
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zich bedreigd voelen door de overtuigingen, idealen of waarden van een out-groep, 
bijvoorbeeld omdat zij bang zijn dat deze overtuigingen botsen met de eigen 
overtuigingen of dat de eigen overtuigingen plaats moeten maken voor deze 
overtuigingen (bijv. Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988; 
Stephan et al., 2009). Mensen ervaren realistische groepsdreigingen wanneer zij het 
gevoel hebben dat een out-groep bezittingen, middelen of het welzijn van de in-groep 
bedreigt, of wanneer zij competitie ervaren over deze middelen met een out-groep 
(Campbell, 1958; LeVine & Campbell, 1972, Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif, 1966; Stephan 
et al., 2009). Symbolische groepsdreigingen kunnen daarom als relatief abstract en 
immaterieel worden gezien en realistische groepsdreigingen als meer concreet en 
materieel (Stephan et al., 2009).  
Waar in het verleden deze twee dreigingen werden gerepresenteerd door twee 
losse theoretische stromingen die elkaar bekritiseerden — respectievelijk, symbolic 
racism theory, Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988; en realistic 
group conflict theory, Campbell, 1958; LeVine & Campbell, 1972, Sherif et al., 1961; 
Sherif, 1966) — worden beide dreigingen nu vaak als complementair gezien en als deel 
van een bredere theorie (intergroup threat theory; Stephan et al., 2000; 2002; 2009). Zowel 
symbolische als realistische groepsdreigingen voorspellen op hun eigen manier 
intolerantie ten opzichte van de groep die deze dreiging veroorzaakt (bijv. Riek et al., 
2006). 
Carry-Over Effecten van Verre Groepsdreigingen 
Recent onderzoek (bijv. Becker et al., 2011; Butz & Yogeeswaran, 2011) heeft 
aangetoond dat verre out-groepen en globale gebeurtenissen (bijv. mondiale 
economische crisis) ook gevoelens van groepsdreigingen teweeg kunnen brengen en 
dat deze waargenomen verre groepsdreigingen ook intolerantie ten opzichte van de 
verantwoordelijk gehouden verre out-groepen kan veroorzaken. Echter, door de 
fysieke en psychologische afstand tot deze verre out-groepen is het onwaarschijnlijk 
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dat deze reacties (bijv. intolerantie ten opzichte van de verre out-groep) het dagelijkse 
leven van de betrokken in- en out-groepsleden sterk zullen beïnvloeden. Het is 
daarom wellicht relevanter om te onderzoeken of deze waargenomen dreigingen 
vanuit verre out-groepen ook intolerantie ten opzichte van andere, dichterbije, out-
groepen kan veroorzaken. Desondanks is er nog maar weinig onderzoek naar deze 
carry-over effecten gedaan. Aan de hand van dit proefschrift proberen we daarom 
meer inzicht te geven in wanneer en hoe waargenomen verre groepsdreigingen lokale 
intolerantie kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Carry-over effecten door associaties tussen out-groepen 
Ondanks dat eerder onderzoek naar carry-over effecten van verre naar 
dichtbije out-groepen schaars is, bevatten de eerder genoemde observaties (bijv. 9/11; 
Allen & Nielsen, 2002) en gerelateerde onderzoeken (bijv. generalisatie van 
persoonlijke ervaringen met een groep; Sassenberg et al., 2007) wel enige aanwijzingen 
voor wanneer en hoe deze carry-over effecten kunnen voorkomen. Zo lijkt de eerder 
genoemde waarneming dat voornamelijk lokale Moslims het doelwit zijn van 
intolerantie na de 9/11 terroristische aanslagen (Allen & Nielsen, 2002) erop te wijzen 
dat een (psychologische) associatie tussen de verre out-groep en dichtbije out-groepen 
carry-over effecten faciliteert. Deze waarneming komt overeen met onderzoek naar 
generalisaties van attitudes (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 2009, Shook et al., 
2007; Tausch et al., 2010; Walther, 2002). Dit onderzoek laat zien dat wanneer een 
object een attitudeverandering teweeg brengt, individuen hun attitudes ten opzichte 
van een groep van geassocieerde objecten aanpassen in plaats van enkel de attitudes 
ten opzichte van dit object zelf. Dus, kijkend naar de wanneer-vraag, voorspellen wij 
dat carry-over effecten voornamelijk voorkomen wanneer er sprake is van een 
associatie tussen de verre en dichtbije out-groepen (bijv. Moslims). 
Uitgaande van deze rol van associaties binnen carry-over effecten, is het ook 
belangrijk om te weten waar deze associaties op gebaseerd zijn. Aangezien wij kijken 
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naar de effecten van verre groepsdreigingen, zijn er tenminste twee 
aanknopingspunten voor een associatie: de groep (i.e., groepsassociatie) en de dreiging 
(i.e., dreigingsassociatie). Wanneer de verre en de dichtbije out-groepen psychologisch 
met elkaar verbonden zijn door een groepsassociatie, worden deze out-groepen gezien als 
inhoudelijk overeenkomstig in hun cultuur, eigenschappen of ideologieën (bijv. 
wereldbeeld of religie). Intolerantie ten opzichte van een verre out-groep die als 
bedreigend wordt ervaren, generaliseert naar deze groepsgeassocieerde dichtbije out-
groepen (voor een vergelijkbaar argument, maar dan over de generalisatie van 
positieve ervaringen, zie Harwood et al., 2011; Lolliot et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 2009; 
Van Laar et al., 2005). Wanneer de verre en de dichtbije out-groepen psychologisch 
met elkaar verbonden zijn door een dreigingsassociatie, worden beide out-groepen gezien 
als op eenzelfde manier bedreigend. De verre groepsdreiging alarmeert mensen over 
dichtbije dreigingen en deze dichtbije dreigingen veroorzaken weer intolerantie ten 
opzichte van dichtbije out-groepen (voor een vergelijkbaar argument, maar dan op 
basis van persoonlijke ervaringen van competitie, zie Sassenberg et al., 2007).  
Overkoepelende out-groepen 
Verschillende soorten associaties zouden dus aan de basis kunnen liggen van 
carry-over effecten van verre groepsdreigingen. Deze associaties, en in het bijzonder 
groepsassociaties, kunnen een overkoepelende groep representeren. Een overkoepelende 
groep omvat meerdere (sub)groepen die een gedeelde eigenschap of identiteit hebben 
(bijv. Dovidio et al., 2007, 2009; Gaertner et al., 1993, 1989). Bijvoorbeeld, de groepen 
Soennieten en Sjieten zouden beide onder de overkoepelende groep Moslims 
gerekend kunnen worden. Eerder onderzoek naar overkoepelende groepen heeft zich 
voornamelijk gericht op overkoepelende in-groepen — een overkoepelende groep 
waar de eigen groep deel van uitmaakt (Brewer & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner et al., 
1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif, 1966) — en hoe deze 
overkoepelende in-groep positieve intergroepsrelaties kan bevorderen. De voorspelde 
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onderliggende rol van associaties binnen carry-over effecten van verre 
groepsdreigingen doet echter vermoeden dat een overkoepelende out-groep (negatieve) 
overgeneralisaties tussen de geincludeerde out-groepen bevordert. Mensen reageren 
niet enkel meer op de verre bedreigende out-groep, maar op alle groepen die een 
overkoepelend out-groepslidmaatschap delen met deze verre out-groep. 
Samenvattend onderzoeken wij in dit proefschrift of verre groepsdreigingen 
carry-over effecten kunnen veroorzaken en daarmee intolerantie tegenover dichtbije 
out-groepen kunnen veroorzaken en/of versterken. Wij verwachten dat deze carry-
over effecten voornamelijk voorkomen wanneer er een associatie bestaat tussen de 
verre out-groep die verantwoordelijk wordt gehouden voor de dreiging en de dichtbije 
out-groepen. Deze associatie kan een groepsassociatie (i.e., overeenkomstige identiteit, 
cultuur, ideologie) of een dreigingsassociatie zijn (i.e., overeenkomstige dreiging) en 
kan verankerd zijn in een waargenomen overkoepelende out-groep.  
Samenvatting Empirische Hoofdstukken 
In de empirische hoofdstukken (Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5) onderzoeken wij 
deze verwachtingen voor verschillende soorten dreigingen en binnen verschillende 
actuele contexten. Hoofdstuk 2 bevat een eerste empirische test van carry-over 
effecten van waargenomen verre groepsdreigingen vanuit de Egyptische opstanden 
tijdens de zogenaamde ‘Arabische Lente’ (Studie 2.1) en de mogelijke toetreding van 
Turkije tot de EU (Studie 2.2 en 2.3), waarbij wij ons voornamelijk richten op verre 
symbolische groepsdreigingen. Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op carry-over effecten van 
waargenomen verre realistische groepsdreigingen vanuit de mogelijke Turkse 
toetreding tot de EU (Studie 3.1) en de Griekse economische crisis (Studie 3.2), en 
onderzoekt of carry-over effecten via groeps- en/of dreigingsassociaties plaatsvinden. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 verkennen wij het concept van overkoepelende out-groepen en testen 
wij of overkoepelende out-groepen carry-over effecten kunnen verklaren in een 
context waarin een relatief onbekend land, Tajikistan, als bedreigend wordt 
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gepresenteerd (Studie 4.2). In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk, Hoofdstuk 5, 
onderzoeken wij of negatieve en positieve informatie over de opstanden in Syrië 
(Studie 5.1) en Egypte (Studie 5.2) even sterke carry-over effecten teweeg brengen. De 
uitkomsten van deze studies zullen hieronder kort worden toegelicht. 
Hoofdstuk 2. Bedreigd door associatie: Slaan verre groepsdreigingen over in 
lokale intolerantie? 
Hoofdstuk 2 omvat een eerste empirische test van carry-over effecten van 
verre groepsdreigingen. Daarnaast testen we de voorspelling dat waargenomen verre 
groepsdreigingen voornamelijk intolerantie ten opzichte van geassocieerde dichtbije 
groepen beïnvloedt. Omdat er nog weinig bekend is over carry-over effecten van verre 
groepsdreigingen hebben wij deze eerste empirische test toegespitst op symbolische 
dreigingen, waarvan wij verwachtten dat ze een nog sterker carry-over potentieel 
vertonen dan realistische dreigingen. Symbolische dreigingen zijn abstract, complex en 
immaterieel (Stephan et al., 2009), wat het lastig maakt om deze dreigingen toe te 
schrijven aan één specifieke groep. Ook gaan symbolische dreigingen over de identiteit 
van groepen, waardoor deze dreigingen vaak sterke emoties en heftige reacties 
oproepen (Stephan et al., 2009), wij-zij denken bevorderen (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014; 
Stephan et al., 2009), en gelijk-denkende groepen met elkaar verbinden binnen een 
overkoepelende identiteit (bijv. Katholieken en Protestanten binnen de 
overkoepelende identiteit Christenen).  
In drie studies vinden wij bewijs voor onze verwachting dat verre symbolische 
groepsdreigingen gerelateerd zijn aan intolerantie tegenover geassocieerde dichtbije 
out-groepen. Studie 2.1 toont aan dat hoe sterker autochtone Nederlanders 
symbolische dreigingen waarnamen vanuit de verre Egyptische opstanden, hoe 
intoleranter ze waren tegenover Turkse- en Marokkaanse Nederlanders (maar deze 
relatie was er niet voor verre realistische dreigingen). Experimentele Studies 2.2 en 2.3 
toonden aan dat wanneer autochtone Nederlandse studenten geconfronteerd werden 
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met symbolische groepsdreigingen van een Turkse toetreding tot de EU (in 
vergelijking met geen, realistische, of een combinatie van groepsdreigingen), zij 
intoleranter werden tegenover de geassocieerde Turkse- en Marokkaanse 
Nederlanders. Wij vonden echter geen carry-over effecten voor verre realistische 
groepsdreigingen op intolerantie richting dichtbije out-groepen of voor verre 
symbolische dreigingen op intolerantie richting Poolse Nederlanders. Hoofdstuk 2 laat 
daarmee de specifieke kracht van verre symbolische groepsdreigingen zien om 
intolerantie ten opzichte van geassocieerde dichtbije out-groepen te beïnvloeden. 
Hoofdstuk 3. Wanneer buitenlandse dreigingen binnenlandse groepsrelaties 
beïnvloeden: Twee manieren waarop verre realistische groepsdreigingen 
kunnen overslaan in lokale intolerantie 
Omdat Hoofdstuk 2 geen uitsluitsel gaf over of verre realistische 
groepsdreigingen ook de potentie hebben om intolerantie tegenover dichtbije out-
groepen te veroorzaken, bevat Hoofdstuk 3 twee studies die specifiek ingaan op het 
carry-over potentieel van realistische groepsdreigingen. Meer specifiek hebben wij in 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht of een verre realistische groepsdreiging intolerantie ten 
opzichte van dichtbije out-groepen kan veroorzaken via een groeps- en/of 
dreigingsassociatie tussen de verre en dichtbije out-groepen.  
Studie 3.1 maakte gebruik van dezelfde context als Studies 2.2 en 2.3. 
Autochtone Nederlanders werden geconfronteerd met de mogelijke toetreding van 
Turkije tot de EU en gevraagd of zij hier realistische dreigingen vanuit waarnamen. 
Wij verwachten dat een groepsassociatie het verre Turkije kan verbinden met de lokale 
Turkse- en Marokkaanse Nederlanders (bijv. González et al., 2008), terwijl een 
dreigingsassociatie de verre dreiging kan verbinden met waargenomen dreigingen 
vanuit Poolse Nederlanders (bijv. Dagevos, 2011; De Boom et al., 2008; Van Doorn et 
al., 2012). In beide gevallen verwachten we dat daardoor waargenomen realistische 
groepsdreigingen vanuit Turkije intolerantie tegenover deze lokale out-groepen 
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kunnen veroorzaken of versterken. In Studie 3.2  onderzochtten wij de relevantie van 
deze associates in een andere context, namelijk de waargenomen groepsdreigingen 
vanuit de Griekse economische crisis.  
Beide studies ondersteunen de relevantie van de twee soorten associaties en 
laten zien dat verre realistische groepsdreigingen via deze associaties intolerantie ten 
opzichte van dichtbije out-groepen kunnen versterken. Hoewel de relatie tussen 
waargenomen verre groepsdreigingen en intolerantie tegenover de verre out-groep 
relatief zwak was, was verre intolerantie wel duidelijk gerelateerd aan intolerantie 
tegenover dichtbije groepen (i.e., de groepsassociatie). Carry-over effecten via een 
dreigingsassociatie kwamen voornamelijk voor wanneer mensen de verre dreiging 
attribueerden aan waargenomen eigenschappen van de verre out-groepsleden (bijv. lui, 
onwelwillend) in plaats van waargenomen eigenschappen van het land (bijv. slechte 
demografie, klimaat), waarschijnlijk omdat dichtbije out-groepen op eenzelfde manier 
bedreigingen kunnen veroorzaken. Samenvattend laat Hoofdstuk 3 zien dat verre 
realistische dreigingen ook gerelateerd kunnen zijn aan lokale intolerantie en dat deze 
carry-over effecten via een groeps- en dreigingsassociatie kunnen plaatsvinden. 
Hoofdstuk 4. Van verre dreigingen naar lokale intolerantie: De rol van 
overkoepelende out-groepen 
Waar Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gericht waren op de vragen of en wanneer carry-over 
effecten voorkomen, richt Hoofdstuk 4 zich op hoe carry-over effecten voorkomen. In 
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken wij in twee studies of mensen overkoepelende out-groepen 
kunnen vormen (Studie 4.1) en of deze overkoepelende out-groepen carry-over 
effecten kunnen verklaren (Studie 4.2). In Studie 4.1 instrueerden wij 
onderzoeksdeelnemers om nationaliteiten te categoriseren in overkoepelende groepen 
gebaseerd op een gedeelde identiteit (bijv. zelfde cultuur) en/of gedeeld lot (bijv. gelijk 
niveau van welvaart; zie ook Campbell, 1958; Lewin, 1948). De uitkomsten van Studie 
4.1 lieten zien dat onderzoeksdeelnemers overkoepelende groepen kunnen creëren, en 
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dat voornamelijk de gecreëerde overkoepelende groepen met een gedeelde identiteit of 
een gedeelde identiteit én lot als hecht werden gezien. Wij verwachten dat vooral deze 
hechte groepen carry-over effecten faciliteren (voor een vergelijkbaar argument, zie 
Denson et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2003; Stenstrom et al., 2008); vandaar dat wij in 
Studie 4.2 overkoepelende out-groepen gebruiken, gebaseerd op zowel een gedeelde 
identiteit als lot. 
In Studie 4.2 testten wij in een experiment of carry-over effecten van fictieve 
dreigingen vanuit het relatief onbekende land Tajikistan naar intolerantie tegenover 
Turkse-, Marokkaanse- en Indonesische Nederlanders afhangen van de 
(experimentele) activatie van een gedeelde overkoepelende groep. Om dit te 
onderzoeken presenteerden wij het land Tajikistan als Midden-Oosters of Aziatisch, 
twee overkoepelende out-groepen waarin respectievelijk Marokkaanse- en Turkse 
Nederlanders en Indonesische- en Turkse Nederlanders opgenomen zouden kunnen 
zijn. In lijn met onze verwachtingen vonden wij voornamelijk carry-over effecten 
wanneer de gepresenteerde overkoepelende out-groep het verre Tajikistan met de 
dichtbije out-groep verbond. Hoofdstuk 4 toont aan de hand van deze twee studies de 
relevantie van overkoepelende out-groepen aan, en laat zien dat carry-over effecten 
kunnen afhangen van de activatie van een overkoepelende out-groep. 
Hoofdstuk 5: Slecht nieuws verspreidt zich snel, maar goed nieuws blijft ver 
weg? Het carry-over potentieel van positieve en negatieve informatie over verre 
situaties. 
De voorgaande hoofdstukken hebben zich toegespitst op hoe verre 
gebeurtenissen die als bedreigend worden ervaren, kunnen resulteren in lokale 
intolerantie. In dit laatste empirische hoofdstuk onderzoeken wij of positiever nieuws 
over verre gebeurtenissen (bijv. de Arabische Lente) vergelijkbare, maar positieve, 
carry-over effecten kan veroorzaken. Op basis van onderzoek naar een positief-
negatief asymmetrie in informatieverwerking (bijv. Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & 
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Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) beargumenteren wij echter dat 
positieve informatie een lager carry-over potentieel heeft dan negatieve informatie. We 
toetsen deze verwachting in twee experimentele studies. In deze studies presenteerden 
wij een (fictief) nieuwsbericht aan onze Nederlandse onderzoeksdeelnemers waarin, 
afhankelijk van de experimentele conditie, ontwikkelingen in Syrië (Studie 5.1) en 
Egypte (Studie 5.2) als negatief/bedreigend of positief werden gepresenteerd. Deze 
experimentele condities werden zowel onderling als met een controleconditie 
vergeleken. Terwijl negatief en positief nieuws over een verre gebeurtenis het beeld 
over de verre groep in gelijke mate beïnvloeden (Studie 5.1 en 5.2), lijkt Studie 5.2 
erop te wijzen dat negatieve informatie over een verre gebeurtenis een sterkere 
negatieve invloed heeft op gevoelens tegenover dichtbije out-groepen, dan dat positief 
nieuws een positieve invloed heeft op gevoelens tegenover dichtbije out-groepen. Op 
basis van deze bevindingen kan geconcludeerd worden dat, zoals verwacht, slecht 
nieuws over verre gebeurtenissen zich snel verspreidt (zie ook Bouman et a., 2014, 
2015a, 2015b), maar dat goed nieuws over verre gebeurtenissen psychologisch vaak 
verder weg blijft. 
Algemene Discussie 
In dit proefschrift hebben wij onderzocht of, wanneer en hoe verre 
groepsdreigingen door middel van carry-over effecten intolerantie ten opzichte van 
dichtbije out-groepen kunnen veroorzaken. Binnen verschillende realistische 
contexten vinden wij bewijs dat verre groepsdreigingen inderdaad lokale intolerantie 
kunnen veroorzaken. Carry-over effecten lijken voornamelijk gericht op dichtbije out-
groepen (bijv. Marokkaanse Nederlanders) die worden geassocieerd met de verre out-
groep die verantwoordelijk wordt gehouden voor de dreiging (bijv. Egyptische 
opstandelingen). Hierbij blijken twee soorten associaties een belangrijke rol te spelen: 
de groepsassociatie (beide out-groepen worden met elkaar geassocieerd op basis van 
hun identiteit, cultuur, religie) en de dreigingsassociatie (beide out-groepen worden op 
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eenzelfde manier als bedreigend gezien). Deze associaties kunnen een waargenomen 
overkoepelende out-groep representeren, waarin zowel de verre als de dichtbije out-
groepen zijn opgenomen en waarbinnen de indrukken over deze out-groepen worden 
gegeneraliseerd. De bevindingen van dit proefschrift hebben een aantal belangrijke 
theoretische en praktische implicaties die wij hieronder kort zullen toelichten. 
Theoretische implicaties 
Onze bevinding dat verre gebeurtenissen een belangrijke invloed kunnen 
hebben op lokale groepsrelaties levert een belangrijke bijdrage aan de literatuur over 
groepsdreigingen en intolerantie. Onze uitkomsten illustreren dat verre 
groepsdreigingen lokaal relevant zijn en lokale intolerantie kunnen versterken. 
Hiermee voegen wij een nieuwe laag toe aan de bestaande literatuur over 
groepsdreigingen, welke voornamelijk gericht was op lokale groepsdreigingen en de 
impact van deze dreigingen op de percepties over de bedreigende out-groep zelf (bijv. 
Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2009). Deze laag is met name relevant voor 
samenlevingen waarin mensen zich vaak geconfronteerd zien met mediaberichten 
over ‘verre gebeurtenissen’. 
Daarnaast bevestigen onze studies de relevantie van het onderscheid tussen 
symbolische en realistische dreigingen (Stephan et al., 1999, 2009). Niet alleen konden 
beide groepsdreigingen (statistisch) van elkaar worden onderscheiden, ook lijken beide 
dreigingen op een andere manier lokale intolerantie te veroorzaken. Omdat 
symbolische groepsdreigingen over de identiteit van de groepen gaan (De Dreu, Vries, 
et al., 199; Harinck & Ellemers, 2014), roepen zij bij definitie een groeps- én 
dreigingsassociatie op. Realistische groepsdreigingen zijn meer concreet en gaan over 
groepsbezittingen (Esses et al., 1998, 2001; Stephan et al., 2009). Hierdoor wekken ze 
niet noodzakelijk beide associaties tegelijkertijd op, wat het carry-over potentieel van 
realistische groepsdreigingen kan verlagen. 
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Ook geven onze bevindingen de relevantie van overkoepelende out-groepen 
weer. Onze uitkomsten laten zien dat naast de vaak bestudeerde uitkomsten van 
overkoepelende in-groepen (Brewer & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio et al., 2009; Gaertner 
et al., 1993), mensen ook overkoepelende out-groepen waarnemen en dat zij negatieve 
ervaringen met een geïncludeerde out-groep binnen de overkoepelende out-groep 
generaliseren. Ondanks deze duidelijke theoretische implicaties, is het wel van belang 
te benadrukken dat verder onderzoek naar de bovengenoemde onderwerpen nodig is. 
Bijvoorbeeld: Kunnen de bovengenoemde uitkomsten gerepliceerd worden binnen 
andere populaties? Hoe werken verschillende dreigingen samen (zie ook Hoofdstuk 
2)? Wat zijn de uitkomsten van bedreigende berichtgevingen op de lange termijn (zie 
ook Gautier et al., 2009)? En vinden deze carry-over effecten bewust of onbewust 
plaats? 
Praktische en maatschappelijke implicaties 
De hierboven besproken onderzoeksuitkomsten dragen niet enkel bij aan 
theorievorming maar hebben ook meer praktische en maatschappelijke implicaties. In 
onze onderzoeken laten wij zien wanneer en hoe carry-over effecten optreden; 
daarmee geven onze uitkomsten ook weer hoe carry-over effecten gestimuleerd of 
gereduceerd kunnen worden. Omdat carry-over effecten voornamelijk tot lokale 
intolerantie leiden, beschouwen wij dit als een negatieve uitkomst voor de sociale 
harmonie en dus voor een samenleving. Daarom zullen wij ons hieronder richten op 
drie mogelijke handvatten om carry-over effecten te reduceren.  
Een eerste manier om carry-over effecten tegen te gaan is door een 
groepsassociatie te voorkomen. Deze associatie kan voorkomen worden door zich te 
richten op de verre out-groep (bijv. Tajikstan) en minder op de bredere culturele en 
geografische kenmerken van de verre out-groep (bijv. Midden-Oosten of Azië). In 
situaties waarin de verre out-groep relatief bekend is (bijv. Egyptische opstandelingen, 
Islamitische Staat), zou de overkoepelende out-groep (bijv. Moslims) minder 
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aangehaald kunnen worden en zouden namen die gemakkelijk een groepsassociatie 
opwekken vermeden kunnen worden (bijv. het gebruiken van IS in plaats van 
Islamitische Staat). Daarnaast zou de waargenomen prototypicaliteit van de verre out-
groep voor de overkoepelende out-groep verminderd kunnen worden door 
specifiekere en gedetailleerdere informatie te geven over de verre out-groep. 
Een tweede manier waarop carry-over effecten gereduceerd zouden kunnen 
worden is door een dreigingsassociatie te voorkomen. Uitkomsten van Studie 3.2 
lieten zien dat er voornamelijk sprake was van een dreigingsassociatie wanneer de 
dreiging werd toegeschreven aan persoonskenmerken van de verre out-groepsleden 
(bijv. lui, onwelwillend). Er leek geen sprake van een dreigingsassociatie wanneer de 
dreiging werd toegeschreven aan landskenmerken (bijv. politieke beslissingen, 
infrastructuur, klimaat). Carry-over effecten zouden daarom gereduceerd kunnen 
worden door de dreiging aan instituties (bijv. het falen van banken) en de context 
(bijv. binnen de mondiale economische crisis) toe te schrijven, in plaats van aan 
persoonskenmerken. 
Als laatste kunnen carry-over effecten mogelijk gereduceerd worden door de 
groepsdreiging psychologisch ver weg te houden. De psychologische impact van 
dreigingen lijkt groter wanneer mensen zelf geraakt (denken te) worden dan wanneer 
bijvoorbeeld “het land” geraakt wordt (zie bijvoorbeeld Studie 3.1 en 5.1, maar ook 
Brader et al., 2004). Het bespreken van de invloed van een dreiging (bijv. de Griekse 
economische crisis) op een land (bijv. Nederland) zorgt daarom waarschijnlijk voor 
minder lokale intolerantie dan het bespreken van de invloed op de typische inwoner 
(bijv. “Henk en Ingrid”; Groshek & Engelbert, 2012). 
Deze aanbevelingen zijn in het bijzonder relevant voor de politiek en media 
aangezien zij vaak verantwoordelijk zijn voor de communicatie over verre groepen en 
gebeurtenissen. Veel van onze studies maakten dan ook gebruik van (fictieve) 
nieuwsberichten of (overheids-) rapporten, waardoor veel van onze uitkomsten direct 
betrekking hebben op de invloed van deze partijen. De mate waarin, en de manier 
waarop onze aanbevelingen toegepast kunnen worden hangt logischerwijs af van de 
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mogelijkheden, doelen en idealen van de betrokken partijen. Desondanks hopen wij 
met onze bevindingen mensen bewust te maken van de (onbedoelde) invloed die 
berichtgeving over verre gebeurtenissen kan hebben op beelden over meer lokale out-
groepen.  
Conclusie 
Met dit proefschrift probeerden wij duidelijk te krijgen of, wanneer en hoe 
waargenomen verre groepsdreigingen een negatieve impact kunnen hebben op meer 
lokale groepsrelaties. In meerdere studies, waarin wij verschillende methodes 
toepasten binnen een verscheidenheid aan actuele contexten, hebben wij aangetoond 
dat verre groepsdreigingen inderdaad lokale intolerantie kunnen veroorzaken. Carry-
over effecten vinden voornamelijk plaats wanneer mensen de verre en dichtbije out-
groepen met elkaar associëren, en deze associaties kunnen een overkoepelende out-groep 
representeren. Door onze focus op verre groepsdreigingen en de invloed van deze 
dreigingen op lokale intolerantie, voegen wij een nieuwe laag toe aan de bestaande 
literatuur over groepsdreigingen en intolerantie. De uitkomsten van dit proefschrift 
zijn bij uitstek relevant in de huidige globaliserende wereld waarin mensen in 
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Ruim vijf jaar geleden wees Kai, volgens mij na Elanor haar promotie, nog 
maar eens op de mogelijkheid om een voorstel in te leveren voor het PhD fund 
(waarvoor dank!). Ikzelf was op dat moment nog niet helemaal overtuigd, want is een 
PhD niet — zoals door zoveel mensen gedacht wordt — een saai, sociaal isolement 
dat resulteert in een wetenschappelijk boekje dat niemand leest? Vrij last-minute 
besloot ik het toch een kans te geven, met succes, en de daarop volgende jaren hebben 
het stereotype volledig ontkracht. Een PhD is alles behalve een saai, sociaal isolement; 
en het feit dat je nu al tot pagina 207 bent gekomen1 betekent dat het boekje nog 
wordt gelezen ook! Ik heb ontzettend veel leuke, geïnteresseerde en betrokken 
mensen (beter) leren kennen, waar ik veel van heb geleerd en die zowel op werkgebied 
als daarbuiten veel voor mij hebben betekend en nog steeds betekenen. Met dit 
dankwoord wil ik deze mensen — collega’s, vrienden en familie — dan ook hartelijk 
bedanken voor deze leuke, bijzondere en leerzame tijd.  
Martijn en Sabine, wat ben ik blij dat ik ruim vijf jaar geleden bij jullie aan de 
deuren klopte met de vraag of ik jullie als mijn beoogde promotoren op mijn voorstel 
voor het PhD fund mocht zetten. Een keuze die, naast de overduidelijke kennis die 
jullie binnen dit vakgebied bezitten, ook gebaseerd was op jullie persoonlijkheden. 
Dankzij jullie betrokkenheid, openheid en eerlijkheid heb ik ontzettend kunnen 
genieten van de afgelopen jaren en hebben we, in mijn ogen, een mooi eindproduct 
afgeleverd. Jullie steun heeft mij meer vertrouwen gegeven in het nut van mijn 
onderzoek en mijn kwaliteiten als een wetenschapper. Onze besprekingen waren altijd 
gezellig en, wonder boven wonder, kregen we ook (vrijwel) altijd de dingen gedaan die 
we wilden doen. Martijn, het is voor mij nog steeds onbegrijpelijk hoe je zo snel, 
gedetailleerde en nuttige feedback kunt geven. Daarnaast heb ik ontzettend vaak 
gelachen om je, vaak sarcastische, grappen. Sabine, je vak Intergroup Relations wekte 
mijn interesse in mijn tweede studiejaar en vanaf mijn master ben je nauw betrokken 
                                                     
1 Ik weet ook wel dat de meeste mensen direct, zonder iets anders gelezen te hebben, naar deze 





geweest bij mijn opleiding. Je hebt de afgelopen jaren je zelf-aangemeten koosnaam 
“PhD Mutti” eer aangedaan. Bedankt! 
Naast Martijn en Sabine, wil ik ook Matty en Elze bedanken voor de 
geweldige onderzoekservaringen tijdens respectievelijk mijn Bachelor en Master. 
Ondanks dat ik onderzoek doen altijd leuk heb gevonden, heb ik door deze ervaringen 
ontdekt dat ik van onderzoek doen misschien ook wel mijn baan zou willen maken. 
Matty, de Bachelorthese die ik bij jou heb geschreven, hebben wij samen verder 
uitgewerkt, wat tijdens mijn PhD in mijn eerste echte publicatie heeft geresulteerd. 
Elze, tijdens de masterthese die jij begeleidde heb ik het werkveld leren kennen en 
alvast kunnen wennen aan mijn nieuwe werkplek die ik van je overnam toen jij voor je 
postdoc naar Yale verhuisde. 
Deze werkplek heb ik met veel genoegen mogen delen met Hedy, Lise, Bart 
en Wiebren. Lise, je aanstekelijke enthousiasme, gezelligheid en je, soms ietwat 
neurotische, trekjes (hopelijk val je nu niet van schrik van je stoel omdat ik soms ook 
wel een “valse” opmerking kan maken) lieten even wat leegte in onze werkkamer 
achter toen jij verhuisde naar een andere kamer. Bart, na enige twijfel van jouw kant, 
kwam je uiteindelijk toch bij ons op de kamer terecht. Ik heb je ervaren als een 
ontzettend gezellige, sociale kamergenoot, die — soms per ongeluk, soms expres — 
erg grappig uit de hoek kan komen. Met jouw putting kwaliteiten en mijn afslag 
kunnen wij vast Russell nog wel eens verslaan! Hedy, jij was mijn vaste kamergenoot 
(en overbuurvrouw). Je was net een paar maanden eerder begonnen dan ik, dus ik kon 
mooi bij je afkijken hoe het moest. Ik vond het ontzettend gezellig om een kamer met 
jou te delen. Je bent erg betrokken en behulpzaam en we hebben veel leuke dingen, 
zowel in ons werk als privé, tegelijkertijd meegemaakt. Wiebren, wij begonnen op 
hetzelfde moment aan ons proefschrift bij Sabine, maar bij de Summer School in 
Limerick heb ik je echt leren kennen. Met je eigen droge humor, betrokkenheid en 
koffiemomenten was er altijd wel wat te lachen. Net als Hedy, hebben wij veel dingen 
tegelijkertijd meegemaakt, het leek mij daarom ook niet meer dan logisch om jullie 
twee als mijn paranimfen te vragen.  
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Natuurlijk wil ik ook de collega’s waarmee ik geen kamer heb gedeeld 
bedanken voor de afgelopen jaren. In het specifiek de mede PhD’ers (ik ga hier geen 
lijst met namen neerzetten, want dan vergeet ik vast iemand), voor de 
behulpzaamheid, lol en gezelligheid. De S-groep voor de openheid, het meedenken, de 
inspirerende gesprekken en de leuke uitjes. Ik was dan misschien niet de meest 
“outgoing” persoon binnen de groep, maar ik heb erg genoten van het leuke contact 
met veel van jullie. Het secretariaat en de portiers, voor de hulp en de gezellige start en 
het slot van elke werkdag. De collega’s van het KLI en de Summer School, voor de 
leerzame en leuke cursussen en congressen. A special thanks to Hillie, David, Florian 
and the “PIGS” who made the Summer School an unforgettable and fun experience. 
Ook de collega’s bij Windesheim mogen niet ontbreken. Jullie warme welkom heeft 
me ontzettend snel thuis laten voelen in een toch best wel nieuwe omgeving. Ik hoop 
dat we, ondanks dat ik heb besloten om weer verder te gaan bij de RuG, contact 
blijven houden. En last (van de collega’s) but not least, de collega’s van de 
Environmental groep waar ik tijdens mijn PhD al regelmatig mee omging, maar waar 
ik nu ook echt deel van uitmaak. De leuke en sportieve ervaringen met jullie tijdens 
mijn PhD en de ontzettend leuke start van mijn postdoc beloven ontzettend veel voor 
de komende jaren! 
Danny, Ernst, Martijn en Wim, onze gedeelde (of geïndoctrineerde, het is 
maar hoe je het bekijkt) interesse voor basketbal en andere sporten (voetbal, tennis, 
schaatsen, etc.) heeft in heel wat leuke uitjes geresulteerd. Het regelmatig basketballen 
op het pleintje (samen met Gert, Koen, Xavi, Johnny, Marko, Ruud, Jan Willem en 
anderen), de NBA avonden, de bezoekjes aan FC Groningen, (die draken van) het 
Nederlands elftal en, als absoluut hoogtepunt, het WK-basketbal in Bilbao zorgden 
voor de nodige afleiding tijdens het promoveren. Bij deze sportactiviteiten mogen 
uiteraard ook het “Environmental” hardloopgroepje en de heren van Rebound ’73 
niet ontbreken, ik hoop dat nu het proefschrift af is ik weer wat vaker van de partij 
kan zijn. Met het oog op Rebound ’73 wil ik Jeroen Mulder in het speciaal bedanken. 





(of, iets realistischer, een hoofdklasse titel), maar heeft me zeker geïnspireerd om 
keihard te buffelen voor de dingen die je wilt bereiken. 
Als laatste wil ik uiteraard mijn (niet werk-gerelateerde) vrienden en familie 
bedanken, voor veel leuke momenten, gezelligheid en steun buiten “werktijd”. Pap en 
mam, ontzettend bedankt voor jullie liefde, gezelligheid, geïnteresseerdheid en steun. 
Ondanks dat jullie misschien wel wat meer over mijn proefschrift wilden weten dan 
dat ik spontaan losliet (jullie kunnen nu los, veel staat in dit boekje), stonden jullie 
altijd voor mij klaar als ik dat nodig had. Ik ben niet iemand die dit vaak uitspreekt, 
maar ik had mij geen betere en lievere ouders kunnen wensen. Marlies, naast dat je een 
topzus bent, kan je ook nog eens hele mooie voorkanten van boekjes ontwerpen, 
waarvoor ontzettend veel dank! Natuurlijk wil ook de “aanhang” bedanken, Rudo, 
Johann en Renskje, bedankt voor de gezelligheid en geïnteresseerdheid! En als laatste 
wil ik natuurlijk mijn drie lieve meiden thuis bedanken. Liza en Mirthe, waar je zou 
verwachten dat het krijgen van twee dochtertjes het afschrijven van een proefschrift 
alleen maar stressvoller maakt, bleek het geluk dat jullie mij brengen de perfecte 
afleiding. Zorgen en stress om een proefschrift verdwijnen als twee kleine monstertjes 
je in de deuropening staan op te wachten, krijsend van enthousiasme. Lieve Michelle, 
wat hebben wij de afgelopen jaren veel moois meegemaakt. Ik zou dit alles met 
niemand liever dan jou willen delen en bedankt dat je er altijd voor me bent! Jullie 
maken mijn leven mooier!  
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